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Articles
The Situational Character: A Critical Realist
Perspective on the Human Animal
JON HANSON * & DAVID YOSIFON **

This Article is dedicated to retiring the now-dominant "rational actor" model
of human agency, together with its numerous "dispositionist" cohorts, and
replacing them with a new conception of human agency that the authors call the
"situational character." This is a key installment of a larger project recently
introduced in an article titled The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational
Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture. 1 That introduc
tory article adumbrated, often in broad stroke, the central premises and some basic
conclusions of a new approach to legal theory and policy analysis. This Article
provides a more complete version of one of those central premises by elucidating a
more realistic conception of the human animal than is currently embraced in legal
theory. The Article begins with a short introduction to the larger project, and de
scribes the central place that a realist conception of the human actor plays in that
project. It then explores several bodies of literature within the fields of social,
cognitive, behavioral, and neural psychology in pursuit ofa vision of the human actor
that is grounded in social science. Having explicated that conception, the Article then
outlines some of the basic implications of it for law, legal theory, and social policy. It
then analyzes conventional legal scholars', particularly legal economists', arguments
for ignoring the lessons of social science in their treatment of human agency. As part
of that analysis, this Article describes why recent efforts to incorporate some psycho
logical findings-the sort of work that is often labeled "behavioralist"-have been
inadequate. Finally, the authors briefly look beyond the human actor itself to consider
some of the fairly obvious-but generally ignored-realities of our present social
situation, and some of their implicationsfor common policy presumptions.
As subsequent work will make clear, this new, situationist conception of the
human animal is as important to a realist account of law and legal theory as the
dispositionist conception has been to now-dominant accounts.
* Professor of Law, Harvard University.
** Visiting Professor of Law, Rutgers Law

School-Camden.
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"What is a human being? Legal theorists must, perforce, answer this
question: jurisprudence, after all, is about human beings. "
- Robin West2

"Ifyou want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad
man, who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge
enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct,
whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of con
science. "
- Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 3

"[Tlhe implicit modern liberal conception of the average person [is that he
is] good, but inept, and for both reasons not very responsive to incentives,
though perhaps rather plastic. The implicit conservative view of the average
person, in contrast, is that he is competent but bad; hence conservatives place
emphasis on incentives and constraints. "
4
- Richard Posner

2. Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 , I ( 1 988).
3. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 ( 1 897), reprinted in 78
B.U. L. REv. 699, 701 ( 1 998).
4. Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1 55 1 ,
J 5590. 1 5 ( 1 998).
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. BRINGING THE READER UP TO SPEED
In a companion article we introduced the concept of "critical realism," our
name for an analytic posture that strives to begin with as real an account of the
human animal-the ultimate subject of legal inquiry-as can be mustered. That
version of realism is critical in that it is suspicious of, and willing to scrutinize,
even our most basic lay and legal-theoretic assumptions about ourselves and
society. 5 In that first article-titled The Situation-we began to develop our
critical realist project by bringing together in a new way a few of the core
insights of social psychology and economics. With respect to the former, we
focused particularly on a central and recurring finding that humans tend to
overstate the role of individual disposition and under-appreciate the role of
situation in accounting for human behavior. 6 As a general matter, lay theories of
human behavior, as well as legal theories, recognize the role of situation only
when it is palpable or when theorists are particularly motivated to do so. And
even then, only the most salient or satisfying elements of the situation are
considered. Otherwise, disposition is presumed to govern.
Particularly in Western cultures, as we will explore, a person's behavior is
generally understood to manifest, not simply her disposition, but a particular
dispositionist causal schema that presumes that behavior reflects freely willed
(often consciously made) "choices," which in turn reflect a stable set of
"preferences." This Article thoroughly fleshes out that widely held conception
of human behavior which we call dispositionism. In so doing, we provide a
more realistic depiction of the human animal, and a more promising starting
place for theorizing about humans and their institutions, including laws and
legal theory. We call that depiction the situational character.
B. INTRODUCTION TO DISPOSITIONISM
In The Situation, we highlighted several foundational studies illustrating both
the strength of dispositionism and the extent to which our dispositionism is

5. Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to The Situational Character,
Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 1 52 U. PA. L. REV. 1 29 (2003) [hereinafter
Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation].
6. See LEE Ross & RICHARD E. NISBETI, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION 4 ( 1 983) ("People's inflated
belief in the importance of personality traits and dispositions, together with their failure to recognize
the importance of situational factors in affecting behavior, has been termed the 'fundamental attribution
error."'); see also Daniel T. Gilbert & Patrick S. Malone, The Correspondence Bias, 1 1 7 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 2 1 , 2 1 ( 1 995) ("Three decades of research in social psychology have shown that many of the
mistakes people make are of a kind: When people observe behavior, they often conclude that the person
who performed the behavior was predisposed to do so-that the person's behavior corresponds to the
person's unique dispositions-and they draw such conclusion even when a logical analysis suggests
they should not."). Some more recent writings in social psychology use the term "correspondence bias"
instead of "fundamental attribution error." See ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNmON: MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE
430 ( 1 999).
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wrong.7 Our exposition centered on the path-breaking work of Yale psycholo
gist Stanley Milgram, who cracked the dispositionist nut wide open in a
dramatic series of experiments in the 1960s.
Milgram arranged an experimental situation in which subjects--compensated
volunteers-were led to believe that they were participating in a study on
memory.8 In the basic design of the experiment, the subject first met another
"subject"-who was actually one of Milgram's confederates-and the two drew
straws to determine what part in the experiment they would take. The confeder
ate was inevitably assigned the role of the "student," and promptly strapped into
a chair with electrodes affixed to his body. The true subject was (seemingly
randomly) assigned the role of the "teacher," and was instructed to administer
an electric shock-by flipping a switch on a shock box--each time the "stu
dent" incorrectly answered a question posed by the experimenter. The "teacher"
was led to believe that the shocks would be painful, and that their intensity
would increase in fifteen-volt increments with each wrong answer-from 15
volts all the way up to 450 volts, which was labeled "Danger! XXX!" on the
shock box.9
Before the experiment was undertaken, Milgram described the protocol to lay
people and psychologists and then asked both groups to estimate how far most
"teachers" would go with the shocking before refusing to continue. Those
surveyed believed, as might the reader, that most would refuse early on. College
students predicted that just 1 in 100 subjects would shock all the way to 450
volts, and professional psychologists predicted that only 1 in 1000 -"the
sadists"-would go that far.

10

But we humans do not-and this is a central theme of critical realism
understand ourselves well. 11 In the basic design of the experiment, 100% of the
subjects continued with the shocking at least to 350 volts, and 65% went all the
,,
way to 450 volts ("Danger! XXX! ).12 The dispositionist assumption, that
people would never freely choose to knowingly inflict pain like that on an
innocent subject in the absence of a highly salient situational force-such as a
gun to their heads-is robust. But it is often wrong. In our dispositionism we

7. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 5, at 1 57-79.
8. See generally STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY ( 1 974) (describing and analyzing these
experiments); Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 5, at 1 50--53 (discussing Milgram's
studies).
9. See MILGRAM, supra note 8, at 1 3-26 (describing the experimental design). Two other variations
on the basic experimental design are worth noting. First, a clipboard-toting "experimenter" was to
implore the subject to continue shocking as the experiment continued. Second, the "learner" could be
heard yelping, then screaming and kicking, then complaining of heart irregularities, and, finally, at 300
volts, falling silent. See id. at 55-72 (desribing variations and controls on the basic experiment).
1 0. See id. at 28-29.
I I . Although this generalization is less true of some individuals and cultures than others, it is
nonetheless the case that few people (particularly in the West) come close to appreciating accurately the
role that disposition and situation, as we define those terms, play in moving us. See Hanson & Yosifon,
The Situation, supra note 5, at 250--59.
1 2. See MILGRAM, supra note 8, at 60 tbl.3.

8

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 93:1

fail to appreciate the powerful, but unseen, situational influences over the
subjects' behavior in Milgram's lab. Milgram performed his study in numerous
settings on hundreds of subjects who were, in all respects, typical people. They
were not sadists; they were simply, like all of us, situational characters who
were subject to unappreciated but profound influences in the situation. Indeed,
Milgram was able to alter his subjects' behavior by altering the situational
influences. By varying the proximity of the "teacher" to the "student," or the
"teacher" to the "experimenter," or by altering the prestige of the experimental
setting (by moving the location of the experiment from Yale to Bridgeport,
Connecticut), Milgram discovered he could increase or decrease the level of
shocking that subjects would be willing to administer.13
Experiments like Milgram's, and there are literally hundreds of others, 14 have
demonstrated that we place far too much emphasis on disposition-on an
individual's perceived motivations, preferences, choices, and will-in account
ing for her conduct. In so doing we fail to appreciate the very potent, though
often unnoticed, influences of situation.
c.

THE UBIQUITY OF DISPOSlTIONISM

Before we further describe the situational character, it is essential that we
make clear just how central and vital dispositionism is to virtually all of our
conventional legal theories, laws, social policies, and common sense self
conceptions. At almost every tum, dispositionism defines or biases what we see
and how we construe what we see: behavior is strongly presumed to reflect
freely willed, preference-satisfying individual choice. But as dispositionists, we
are both consistent and consistently wrong.
1. Dispositionism in (Law and) Economics

Dispositionism is very familiar to scholars and students who have studied the
"rational actor" model of law and economics, the now-dominant legal-theoretic
paradigm.15 Many complaints have already been leveled about the lack of
realism in that model, most of which focus on the apparent limits of "rational
ity" in human decisionmaking.16 We will review that literature below, but we
want to highlight at the start that even as they now vigorously debate the degree
or kind of "rationality" that human agents display, economists seem virtually
unanimous in assuming that people are preference-driven choosers (that is,
dispositionists).17
Richard Posner, a standard-bearer of the law and economics movement,
insists that law and economics does not depend on people thinking "rationally"
1 3. See id. at 32-43.
14. See Hanson & Ybsifon, The Situation, supra note 5, at 152 n.2.
15. See id. at 1 39-49 (describing dominance of law and economics in legal scholarship).
16. See id. at 140--4 1 (reviewing early critiques of the lack of realism in law and economics).
17. See id. at 1 59-65 (describing the dispositionism of the rational actor model of humanity that is
typically employed by legal economists).
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in the sense of being logical, calculating, and accurate; but it does depend upon
their being dispositional in the sense of choosing their own ends: "Rationality
means little more to an economist than a disposition to choose, consciously or
,,
unconsciously, an apt means to whatever ends the chooser happens to have. 18
For the legal economist, the ultimate line of defense for the rational actor is
dispositionism. Whether a person actually "rationally" thinks through his or her
decisions, or even whether people make decisions "consciously or uncon
sciously" is not, according to Posner, pivotal. To be sure, most legal economists
have presumed that their model agents are far more than mere choosers, but the
rational actor model itself need not be premised on more than the proposition
that choices are just that, the chooser's choices. 1 9 As Milton Friedman, the
Nobel Prize-winning economist and intellectual forerunner of the law and
economics movement put it: "[E]very individual serves his own private interest
. . . . The great Saints of history have served their 'private interest' just as the
most money-grubbing miser has served his private interest. The private interest
,,
is whatever it is that drives an individual. 20
Economically oriented analysts, in the words of Gary Becker (another Nobel
Prize winner), have applied the "combined assumptions of maximizing behav
ior, market equilibrium, and stable preferences, . . . relentlessly and unftinch
,,
ingly. 2 1 Despite their claim to social science, economists in general and legal
economists in particular have indeed applied dispositionist assumptions unflinch
ingly that is, without the self-suspicion and rigorous inspection that social
science would demand. This is no doubt because their dispositionist assump
tions seem so intuitively plausible, and so fundamental to our sense of our
selves, that they are beyond question?2 And perhaps this may also help explain
-

1 8 . RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 17 (5th ed. 1 998).
1 9. See id. ; see also ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 1 6- 1 7

(2d. ed. 1997)
("The construction of the economic model of consumer choice begins with an account of the
preferences of consumers. Consumers are assumed to know the things they like and dislike and to be
able to rank the available alternative combinations of goods and services according to their ability to
satisfy the consumer's preferences. This involves no more than ranking the alternatives as better than,
worse than, or equally as good as one another.").
20. Milton Friedman, The Line We Dare Not Cross: The Fragility of Freedom at "60%", ENCOUNTER,
Nov. 1 976, at 8, II. This strong disposition ism enjoys a long pedigree in economics. John Stuart Mill,
for example, had the same starting place: "The only freedom which deserves the name is that of
pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs or
impede their efforts to obtain it." JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 72 (Penguin Classics 1 975) (1 859).
2 1 . GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC ApPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 5 (1976). Becker and fellow
Nobel Prize-winning economist George Stigler famously defended these basic assumptions of the
economic approach in George J. Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67 AM.
ECON. REv. 76 (1 977). The Latin t itle summarizes well the basic dispositionist perspective of econo
mists. Its translation is: ''There's no accounting for taste."
22. See infra text accompanying notes 664-675 (summarizing Kreps's and Sens's arguments that the
dispositionism of economics is based on a leap of faith that itself is justified, not by the evidence, but by
intuitive plausibility).

10

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 93: 1

why Stanley Milgram never won the Nobel Prize?3
2. Dispositionism in Classic Liberal Political Theory

As we emphasized in our previous article, the sweep of dispositionism
extends far beyond the whipping post of law and economics and the rational
actor model. Indeed, the dispositionism of law and economics should be seen as
a kind of juiced-up version of the dispositionism that has been at the core of
every one of our society's most influential legal and social theories. Far from
being simply an artifact of a highly stylized and, to some, easily dismissed legal
theory, dispositionism of various forms has long been emblazoned on the
banner of classic liberal political theory itself.
John Locke's conception of the human animal, as expressed in his famous
Second Treatise on Government, for example, starts here:
[W]e must consider what state all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of
perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and
persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature; without
asking leave or depending upon the will of any other man. A state also of
equality, wherein all the power and j urisdiction is reciprocal, no one having
more than another . . . . Man in that state has an uncontrollable liberty to
dispose of his person or possessions . . . . 2 4

Such dispositionist assumptions-that by their very nature humans enjoy the
freedom to order their actions as they see fit-are the heart of Locke's contrac
tual theory of society, much as they are the heart of legal economists' familiar
calls for the expansion of, and deference to, contracts and markets and, more
generally, the cornerstone of classic liberal political theory.
A generation after Locke, the French philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau, in
his signature work The Social Contract, relied on dispositionism to make his
claim that freedom was the natural condition of humanity:
This common liberty results from the nature of man. His first law is to provide
for his own preservation, his first cares are those which he owes to himself;
and as soon as he reaches years of discretion, he is the sole judge of the
proper means of preserving himself, and consequently becomes his own
master. 25

23. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 5, at 34 1 -42 (discussing how Milgram's
findings may, in fact, have hurt his career); see also infra notes 38 1 -87 and accompanying text
(describing how Daniel Kahneman's work may have earned him a Nobel Prize in part because it is
dispositionist).
24. JOHN LocKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 1 01-02 (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. Press 2003)
( 1 690).
25. JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACf 2 (Charles Frankel ed., Hafner Library of
Classics 1 947) ( 1762).
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The human animal, in this classic liberal picture, i s its "own master," "the
sole judge of the proper means"-the "apt" means, to use Posner's tenn--of
pursuing its own interests. It is of particular importance that both Locke and
Rousseau, like the legal economists of today, begin their famous political tracts
with initial claims about the sources or nature of human behavior. Those
foundational axioms are presumed self-evident, and their truth is taken for
granted throughout. The assumptions are not, in other words, the demonstrated
conclusion of a philosophical or scientific inquiry.
Now is as good a time as any to pause and emphasize, as we did in our
previous article and will again, that dispositionists do not assume that human
beings are immutable or complete in their self-possession. Indeed, it was
Rousseau's view that, while humans were by nature all equal, some could
become severely twisted by extreme situational disadvantage. Inverting what he
took to be the classic view that slaves were by their very essence slave-like, for
example, Rousseau asserts that the dispositionist attribution is wrong for miss
ing the situation-that slavery wrought slave-like behavior and not the other
way around:
Aristotle [who held the essentialist view of slaves] was right; but he took the
effect for the cause. Nothing can be more certain than that every man born in
slavery is born for slavery. Slaves lose everything in their chains, even the
desire of escaping from them: they love their servitude . . . . If then there are
slaves by nature, it is because there have been slaves against nature. Force
made the first slaves, and their cowardice perpetuated the condition. 26

Rousseau sees situation, as dispositionists tend to, where it is highly salient
such as in the institution of slavery, or in the modern dispositionist cliche, when
there is "a gun to the head." That situation is recognized where it is highly
visible is the exception that proves the rule: situation, unless obvious, is
irrelevant, leaving only disposition?7
In the same generation as Rousseau, on the other side of the Atlantic, Thomas

26. [d. at 3.
27. Even in

the condition of slavery, however, where Rousseau seems to recognize the influence of
situation, his recognition still takes the form of a kind of dispositionism, for although he claims that the
qualities of slaves have been produced by the institution of slavery, he considers those qualities to have
grown stable and part of the slaves' own self-conception. As we outlined in The Situation, there were
several dispositionist justifications of slavery-for example, some assumed that Africans were a
different species and others assumed that they were at a different developmental stage. See Hanson &
Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 5, at 308-27. Also, Rousseau's recognition of the situational forces
of slavery was widespread in Europe, particularly in France, where there was strong opposition to the
international slave trade. It was partially in response to that opposition that Thomas Jefferson sought to
defend slavery by dispositionalizing slaves as naturally inferior to whites and therefore appropriate for
slavery. See id. at 3 1 2- 1 7 (reviewing Thomas Jefferson's writings on the topic). The tendency to
dispositionalize is often exacerbated by the motive to legitimate one's own social system in response to
perceived threats to the system. See infra text accompanying notes 479-503 (summarizing the influence
of "system threat" and the widely held motive of system affirmation).
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Jefferson embraced a similarly dispositionist view of humanity, and acted on it.
Jefferson, by any standard a leading proponent of classic liberal political theory,
opened the American Declaration of Independence with a statement of human
nature that echoed Rousseau's. It was "self-evident," Jefferson wrote, that "all
men are created equal . . . are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
,,
rights, [and] that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. 28
Individual liberty is not just a political goal, but also a self-evident self
conception. That such liberty would be exercised to pursue happiness was, for
Jefferson, also self-evidently grounded in a dispositionist presumption. When
Jefferson took the reins of the government he helped to fashion, dispositionism
remained integral to his vision of the state and the citizen. In his first inaugural
address, he stated that
[A] wise and frugal government, which shall restrain men from injuring one
another, shall leave them otherwise free to regulate their own pursuits of
industry and improvement, and shall not take from the mouth of labor the
bread it has earned. This is the sum of good government .
29
.

.

.

Though Jefferson was directing his comments to his Federalist political
opponents, his words nonetheless reflected a widely shared vision of humanity.
Those words have echoed off of that shared vision through successive genera
tions. Jefferson's ideas, according to the historian Richard Hofstadter, were
rooted not so much in a particular "system of economics or politics, but an
imperishable faith expressed in imperishable rhetoric. ,,30 That faith is a faith in
dispositional man, and it is a faith that has reverberated in our political
discourse throughout this country's history. While our political tradition has
been laced with conflict, there has also been, a shared "ideology of self-help,
free enterprise, competition, and beneficent cupidity . . . . However much at
odds on specific issues, the major political traditions have shared a belief in the
rights of property, [and] the philosophy of economic individualism . . . as
,
necessary qualities of man. ,3 1
And that ideology is at least as strongly shared i n our day. Ronald Reagan,
for example, made statements in his farewell address that echoed precisely the
sentiments Jefferson expressed in his inaugural address nearly two-hundred
years before: "And I hope we have once again reminded the people that man is

28.

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
29. Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1 80 1 ), reprinted in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF
THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 1 3, 1 5 -16 (Gov't Prtg. Office 1 989).
30. RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POUTICAL TRADmON AND THE MEN WHO MADE IT 42 (2d ed.
1 973).
3 1 . [d. Hofstadter's views about "consensus" in the American political tradition have been heavily
debated by generations of American historians. See, e.g., SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, AMERICAN POLmcs: THE
PROMISE OF DISHARMONY (1 981) (describing some of the limitations of the consensus theory). Our only

interest here is in highlighting the basic dispositionist view of humanity in the American political
tradition, a view that is not seriously at stake in that historiographical debate.
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not free unless government is limited. There's a clear cause and effect here that
is as neat and predictable as a law of physics: as government expands, liberty
,,
contracts. 32
Dispositionism does indeed promise "neat and predictable" causal attribu
tions. So long as we see our behavior as reflecting free, preference-satisfying
choices, social policymaldng becomes as clear as a law of physics-just as one
should get out of the way of a falling apple if one wants to avoid being hit on
the head, one need only remove all obvious situational constraints from con
sumer and citizen choice to ensure human liberty (and humanity's best hope for
happiness).33 Such a neat and predictable theory may be as attractive as it is
common, but as we hope to show in this Article, dispositionist presumptions are
no more laws of human reality than the presumption that the sun revolves
around the earth is a law of astronomy.34
3. Dispositionism in the Law

a. Contract Law
As surely as apples don't fall far from their trees, the fruit of dispositionism
defines, not only our common sense and our legal and political theories, but also
our laws. While this may not be surprising, it should be troubling. As if we are
trapped in a kind of self-conception fun house, this false image of ourselves
infects almost all of our institutions and systems, including our system of
justice.
Consider the law of contract, on which so much of our legal apparatus rests.
For the most part, the law of contract mirrors our basic dispositionist self
conceptions. It is concerned with the enforcement of promises.35 When prom
ises are perceived as freely made, they are generally enforceable.36 And when

32. Ronald Reagan, Farewell Address to the Nation (January 1 1 , 1 989), in 2 PuB. PAPERS 1 7 1 8, 1 721.
See generally Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law: The Legitimating Schemas of Modem
Policy and Corporate Law, 1 03 MICH. L. REv. 1 (2004) [hereinafter Chen & Hanson, The Illusion of
Law] (describing the emergence of today's similarly dispositionist, pro-market, and anti-regulatory

meta schemas to policymaking).
33. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 5, at 288-92 (describing the relationship
between dispositionism and policies advocating laissez-faire social policies).
34. See our discussion of geocentrism, dispositionism, Galileo, and deep capture in Hanson &
Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 5, at 202-30.
35. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § I (198 1 ) (defining contract as "a promise or a set of
promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some
way recognizes as a duty.") There are of course many theories of what contract law is. The discussion
here is a simple positive one that makes no pretense to nuance, except insofar as we think a more
nuanced exposition would further bear out our point. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note
5, at 285-97 (examining the dispositionism of contract law and contract theory, with special reference
to Professors Llewellyn, Fried, and Rakoff).
36. Enforcement may take many forms (e.g., the required payment of the promisee's expected
benefit of the promise, or the requirement of specific performance of the promised conduct). See E.
ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 1 2 (3d ed. 1 999) (discussing different kinds of contract remedies). Of
course, some promises, though freely made in the eyes of the law, are nevertheless unenforceable (such
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contract law sees behavior manifesting a promise-such as signatures or other
affirmative expressions of assent-it usually sees them as having been freely
made. This follows from dispositionism-human conduct is presumptively
understood as the free expression of individuals' preferences and will. Only
very narrow doctrines, such as "duress" or "undue influence," are available for
those rare instances when that presumption might be rebutted. The narrow
exceptions arise, predictably, only where the most palpable and powerful situ
ational forces are in play. The First Restatement of Contracts defined the kind of
duress that could make a contract voidable as a "wrongful threat of one person
by words or other conduct that induces another to enter into a transaction under
the influence of such fear as precludes him from exercising free will and
,,
judgment. 37
The starting place is the dispositionist will, which is presumed to be the usual
and proper cause of a person's behavior. The concept of duress does not depart
from the dispositionist view. It is only a particular kind of experience that will
excuse a promise under the doctrine: dispositionally experienced fear.
[D ] uress consists of threats that cause such fear as to induce the exercise of
volition, so that an undesired act is done . . . . The question is . . . did it put one
entering into the transaction in such fear as to preclude the exercise by him of
free will and judgment. Age, sex, capacity, relation of the parties, attendant
circumstances, must all be considered. Persons of a weak or cowardly nature
are the very ones that need protection. The courageous can usually protect
themselves; timid persons are generally the ones influenced by threats, and the
unscrupulous are not allowed to impose upon them because they are so
unfortunately constituted. 38

Even in the exceptional, backwater doctrine of duress, the focus of contract
law remains resolutely dispositionist-the will of the victim must be overcome
in order for the doctrine to be implicated. And because we see most behavior as
resulting from individual will, it is only the very palpable situational force of an
unscrupulous person making a fear-inducing threat that can trump the presump
tion that it is an individual's will in charge. Even then, it is primarily the
"unfortunately constituted" "[p]ersons of a weak . . . nature" who are vulnerable
to such obvious situational threats. There is little or no recognition in this
doctrine of the power of less conspicuous situation over virtually all of us,

as a promise to sell oneself into slavery, which is forbidden by the Thirteenth Amendment to the
Constitution); others are actually illegal to make (such as a promise to sell heroin, which is forbidden
by statute). See generally id. § 5 (discussing unenforceable contracts). There are many areas of social
life that are removed from the realm of contract altogether (for example, minimum wages for labor, the
adoption of children, the transfer of body parts from one person to another, etc.). The relative place of
disposition and situation in our self and social conception can be observed quite clearly in the contours
of contract in our social systems.
37. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 492(b) (1932).
38. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACfS § 492 cmt. a (1932).
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though this would seem to be the first place, if any, where situation should be
taken into account.39 Under this approach, the situational pressures created in
Stanley Milgram's laboratory would surely not be seen as duress.

b. Tort Law
A similar conception of human beings pervades the law governing noncontrac
tual harms-tort law. Long before the rational actor began making the rounds of
the law reviews, tort law's reasonable person was a dispositionist mainstay.4o
Just as contract holds people accountable for their promises, tort law holds them
responsible for their wrongful harms. Under the basic negligence standard, a
person is liable for the harms that a reasonable person would have prevented in
similar circumstances.41 The standard speaks to the disposition of the tortfeasor,
as well as to the disposition of the reasonable person against whom the
tortfeasor is to be judged:
The actor is required to recognize that his conduct involves a risk of causing
an invasion of another's interest if a reasonable man would do so while
exercising

39. The Second Restatement alters the definition of duress to the following: "If a pa rty's manifesta
tion of assent is induced by an improper threat by the other party that leaves the victim no reasonable
alternative, the contract is voidable by the victim." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(1)
(1981). The revised section attempts to eliminate any mention of will because of the confusion it
induces, but it nevertheless seems clearly to rely on the notion without naming it:
It is sometimes said that the threat must arouse such fear as precludes a party from exercising
free will and judgment or that it must be such as would induce assent on the part of a brave
man or a man of ordinary firmness.The rule stated in this Section omits any such requirement
because of its vagueness and impracticability. It is enough if the threat actually induces assent
on the part of one who has no reasonable alternative. . . .
In order to constitute duress, the improper threat must induce the making of the contract.. . .
No special rule for causation in cases of duress is stated here because of the infrequency with
which the problem arises. A party's manifestation of assent is induced by duress if the duress
substantially contributes to his decision to manifest his assent.. . . All attendant circumstances
must be considered, including such matters as the age, background and relationship of the
parties. Persons of a weak or cowardly nature are the very ones that need protection; the
courageous can usually protect themselves.
RESTATEMENT ( SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 cmts. b, c (1981) (internal cross-references omitted).In any
event, it appears that many jurisdictions continue to employ the explicit overbearing of the will
language reflected in the First Restatement.See, e.g., Ruane v. Jancsics, 2001 Mass. App.Div. 103, 105
(2001) ("To avoid a contract on the basis of duress, a party must show that conduct by the other party
caused him to enter into the contract 'under the influence of such fear as precludes him from exercising
free will and judgment.''') (quoting Convey v. President & Tr., CoIl.of the Holy Cross, 445 N.E.2d 136,
140 (Mass.1983)).
40. The classic statement of the reasonable person standard is contained in OUVER WENDELL HOLMES,
JR., THE COMMON LAW 108 (Little, Brown & Co. 1990) (1881) ("The law considers, in other words,
what would be blameworthy in the average man, the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence, and
determines liability by that.").
41. The tort of negligence involves four elements: duty, breach, causation, and damages. RESTATE
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1981). The reasonable person standard is generally seen as an aspect of
the second element, though it plays a part in the other elements as well.
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(a) such attention, perception of the circumstances, memory, knowledge of
other pertinent matters, intelligence, and judgment as a reasonable man would
have; and
(b) such superior attention, perception, memory, knowledge, intelligence,
and judgment as the actor himself has. 42

The person conceived in the reasonable person standard here is a disposi
tional actor. The law is concerned primarily with the tortfeasor's-or the
reasonable person's-dispositional qualities: her conscious thoughts (her "atten
tion"), her perceptions, her memories, her intelligence, and, finally, the culmina
tion of all of those features, her judgment. Situational influences are not entirely
ignored. In fact, more so than with contract and many other areas of law,
situational forces can be important to the outcomes in tort litigation. When
applying the reasonable person standard, for instance, juries are asked to
determine if a litigant's behavior was reasonable in the actor's situation. And, to
be sure, a fair amount of the litigation process can be devoted to framing and
debating causal attributions. It is not unusual, therefore, for at least one side to
emphasize certain salient situational considerations. Insofar as that occurs,
however, the anchor of dispositionism still significantly biases the factual and
legal assessments of wrongfulness and liability.4 3
Relatedly, tort law doctrine recognizes situational influences only where they
are so palpable as to make themselves clear to the reasonable dispositionist. As
in contract law, there are exceptional doctrines in tort law that can rebut the
basic dispositionist presumption, but they are only the most palpable situational
forces. A sudden tempest, for example, may excuse a wayward sailor's use and
damage of a stranger's dock, under the doctrine of necessity.44 Even there,
however, the law focuses less on the situation itself, and more on the reasonable
sness of the actor's choice given that palpable situation. And, as the Restate
ment indicates, such situations are rare.45 Circumstances that would warrant the

42. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 289 (l98\).
43. Dispositionism influences tort doctrines, the parties considered relevant in any given case, and
the attributions of the factfinders. That claim and evidence for it are more fully fleshed out in other
work. See, e.g., Jon Hanson, Ana Reyes & Daniel Schlanger, Attributional Positivism: The NaIve
Psychology Behind Our Laws (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) [hereinafter
Hanson, Reyes & Schlanger, Attributional Positivism] (examining how people make attributions of
causation, responsibility, and blame, and describing how attribution theory influences law and legal
theory); Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, The Costs of Dispositionism: The Premature Demise of
Situationist Law and Economics, 64 U. MD. L. REv. (forthcoming 2005) [hereinafter Benforado &
Hanson, Costs of Dispositionism] (examining history of efficiency-based tort theory and comparing the
relatively situationist approach of Guido Calabresi to the relatively dispositionist approach of Richard
Posner and the influence of the two approaches).
44. "One is privileged to commit an act which would otherwise be a trespass to a chattel or a
conversion if the act is or is reasonably believed to be necessary for the purpose of avoiding a public
disaster." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 262 (1981).
45. Most state courts' leading statements on excuse doctrines in tort law, such as duress or necessity,
are voiced in cases where the doctrines are found to be inapplicable. Cf Hanson & Yosifon, The
Situation, supra note 5, at 300-01 (discussing cases).
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application of the doctrine of necessity, for instance, include those in which a
defendant wanted "to protect against a public enemy, or to prevent or mitigate
,,
the effect of conflagration, flood, earthquake, or pestilence. 46 Consider another
exceptional tort doctrine: incapacitation. Tort law holds that if "an actor" causes
some harm because of a sudden incapacitation-such as an unexpected epileptic
fit or a heart attack while driving a car, the actor will be considered negligent
only if the incapacity was reasonably foreseeable to them.4 7 The first draft of
the Third Restatement notes that "the modern cases are impressively unanimous
in accepting" the principle that an unexpected incapacity is a defense to
negligence.48 And this is not surprising-an epileptic fit or a heart attack makes
a stunning case that the defendant had not dispositionally willed his allegedly
tortious behavior. But making this showing of "incapacitation" is the defen
dant's burden; the presumption is that the actor's conduct was an expression of
dispositional free Will.49 And the burden is a high one.
The situational clarity of an epileptic fit or a heart attack yields again to
situational invisibility just as soon as disposition can once more plausibly
account for behavior. Within its discussion of incapacity, the Third Restatement
compares the condition of incapacity to that of "mental illness," which gener
ally does not provide an excuse to negligence or otherwise alter the standard of
conduct.50 That is because, according to the Second Restatement, "limited or
moderate mental disorders . . . ordinarily are not especially important as an
,,
explanation for conduct. 5 1 Without sudden incapacity, the most important
explanation for conduct is expected to be, and in the eyes of tort law almost
irrebutably is, dispositional choice. On the outside, only a calamitous situation
such as a fire or a storm is seen to trump the presumption that people behave
dispositionally. On the inside only total incapacitation is. Tort law's reasonable
person is, no less than the rational actor or classical liberal theory 's natural man
is, a dispositional actor.
This basic dispositionist perspective in tort law was succinctly stated recently
in a federal judge's order dismissing a claim seeking to hold McDonald's liable
in some measure for the obesity (and concomitant health problems), of some of
its customers:

46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 262 cmt. b (198 1 ).
47. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 1 (b) (Tentative Draft No. I , 200 1 ) ("If an actor engages in
substandard conduct because of sudden incapacitation or loss of consciousness brought about by
physical illness, this conduct constitutes negligence only if the sudden incapacitation or loss of
consciousness was reasonably foreseeable to the actor"). "Sudden incapacitation can be caused by a
heart attack, a stroke, an epileptic seizure, diabetes, or other medical conditions." Id. cmt. d. The
epileptic fit is a favorite trope of the torts restatement, and excuse for conduct performed under such an
occurrence shows up in many settings.
48. Id. cmt. d.
49. See id. (noting that the cases are agreed that the incapacitation is an affirmative defense to
negligence which must be pled and proved by the defendant).
50. See id. § l l(b).
5 1 . RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 262 cmt. b.
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As long as a consumer exercises free choice with appropriate knowledge,
liability for negligence will not attach to a manufacturer. It is only when that
free choice becomes but a chimera-for instance, by the masking of informa
tion necessary to make the choice, such as the knowledge that eating Mc
Donalds with a certain frequency would irrefragably cause harm-that
manufacturers should be held accountable. 52

The presumption is that human behavior reflects dispositional choice and,
more specifically, that those eating frequently at a fast-food establishment
"irrefragably" (that is, indisputably) have "appropriate knowledge" of the harms
they will encounter by so doing. No liability will attach "as long as" this
presumption holds out. And it holds out a long time. Instances where behavior
will not be seen as evidencing free choice-such as where a manufacturer has
"mask[ed]" information necessary to the choice-are the rare exception. Such
instances, in fact, are "chimeras" of the expected experience of free will.53 The
world of humans, the real world that we think we perceive correctly, is the
world of free choice. Tort law is as certain of this as was Rousseau or
Jefferson.54 It leaves little room for the possibility that our dispositionism may
itself be the chimera.
c.

Criminal Law

In criminal law too, dispositionism dominates. Again, it is not that situational
considerations play no role. They do. Indeed, they may play as great a role here
as they do in any area of law. The law does not look just to outcomes and
behavior, it also attempts to assess a defendant's state of mind when engaging in
a particular act.55 In that quite dispositionist inquiry, situational considerations
are often brought to light by defense counsel in an effort to limit the defendant's
52. Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 5 1 2, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). The court continued
with the punchline: "Plaintiffs have failed to allege in the Complaint that their decisions to eat at
McDonalds several times a week were anything but a choice freely made and which now may not be
pinned on McDonalds." Id.
53. See infra text accompanying notes 620-634 (discussing the illusion of conscious will and the
human tendency to dispositionalize even inanimate objects).
54. For a more extended discussion of the role of dispositionism in the fast-food cases and in tort
law, see Adam Benforado, Jon Hanson, & David Yosifon, Broken Scales: Obesity and Justice in
America, 53 EMORY L.J. 1 645 (forthcoming Fall 2004) [hereinafter Benforado, Hanson & Yosifon,

Broken Scales].
55. Reflecting the law's dispositionism are the principles of voluntary action, and mens rea, the
guilty mind. Just as with tort law, there are areas of criminal law where liability is strict and mens rea is
not particularly relevant. In those areas, deterrence or other regulatory goals overshadow the signifi
cance of individual guilt, as for example with statutory rape laws (which in many states are per se,
meaning that the perpetrator's perception of the victim's age, no matter how reasonable, is irrelevant).
See generally Richard A. Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal Law, 1 2 STAN. L. REV. 731
( 1 960). Such cases are not the norm, however, nor do they necessarily represent a more situationist
approach to criminal law (though, depending upon the justification offered, they do). It is also true that
the state of mind that will satisfy the guilty mind requirement is not always intent. Often it is
recklessness, and sometimes, negligence. As we suggest just above with respect to tort law, however, all
of these liability standards are committed to a more or less dispositionist view of the human actor
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apparent culpability. Still, the process i s closely tethered t o the situational
insensitivity of the doctrine and the dispositionist presumptions of the factfind
ers.56 The Model Penal Code states: "A person is not guilty of an offense unless
his liability is based on conduct that includes a voluntary act or the omission to
,,
perform an act of which he is physically capable. 5 7 The depth of the Code's
dispositionism is illustrated by how broadly it construes volition.
The following are not voluntary acts within the meaning of [the standard set
forth above]:
(a) a reflex or convulsion;
(b) a bodily movement during unconsciousness or sleep;
(c) conduct during hypnosis or resulting from hypnotic suggestion;
(d) a bodily movement that otherwise is not a product of the effort or
determination of the actor, either conscious or habitual. 58

In other words, a person's behavior will only rarely be understood as the
result of some force other than voluntary choice.
The doctrines of duress, heat of passion, mental disorder, and diminished
capacity are as impoverished in criminal law as are their cousin doctrines in
contract and tort law. The Model Penal Code's basic approach to excuse
doctrines is summarized well in its formulation of duress:
It is an affirmative defense that the actor engaged in the conduct charged to
constitute an offense because he was coerced to do so by the use of, or a threat
to use, unlawful force against his person or the person of another, that a
person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to
resist. 59

Again, the only kind of situation that is recognized is a threat of force, a
highly palpable situational influence. An actor will be excused only for those
situational forces that a reasonable person, that is, a dispositional person, would
see as overtaking free will. As one court cited by the Code put it: "Duress
consists in [sic] forcing a person to act against his or her own will. It does not
exist when a person can choose whether he or she will perform the act said to
,,
have been done under duress. 6o
The excuse of mental illness is similarly narrow:

(recklessness, for example, involves a knowing disregard of a high probability that one will cause
harm).
56. For an excellent, and more complete, discussion of disposition ism in criminal law, see Lee Ross
& Donna Shestowsky, Contemporary Psychology 's Challenges To Legal Theory and Practice, 97 Nw.
U. L. REV. 1081 (2003).
57. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 (1962).
58. [d.
59. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1) ( 1 962).
60. State v. Fogarty, 607 A.2d 624 (N.J. 1992) (citations omitted).
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A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct
as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to
appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law.6 1

The strong presumption is that people, absent highly conspicuous situational
constraints, enjoy substantial capacity to conform their conduct to law. Determin
ing conduct, after all, is what the will is all about. As a practical matter,
defenses of mental incapacity are almost never successful-a verdict of not
guilty by reason of insanity, for example, succeeds in only one-tenth of one
percent of all felony cases.62 The dispositionist presumption that pervades our
common sense, and which is at the heart of the criminal law, is nearly irrebut
table.63
D. THE HIGH STAKES OF DISPOSITIONISM-AND OF OUR ARGUMENT

Our point should by now be clear: dispositionism is more than just a
fundamental axiom of law and economics; dispositionism lies at the heart of our
self-conceptions, our political and legal theories, and our laws. None of what we
have said thus far should be surprising. Dispositionism is, as we have empha
sized, the stuff of common sense. Our purpose in reviewing a parade of
dispositionism is to raise the stakes of what probably will come as a surprise:
the dominant attributional schema informing our self-conceptions, our lay and
social theories, and our laws, is, in important ways and to significant degrees,
6 1 . MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.0 1 ( 1 ) ( 1 962).
62. See Michael L. Perlin, "The Borderline Which Separated You From Me ": The Insanity Defense,
The Authoritarian Spirit, the Fear of Faking, and the Culture of Punishment, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1 375,
1 377 ( 1 997). Professor Perlin recounts that in response to public outrage after President Ronald
Reagan's would-be assassin John Hinckley was found not guilty by reason of insanity, Congress and
many states passed legislation imposing some version of the traditional M ' Naghten rule for insanity
defenses, which is even more unforgiving than the Model Penal Code's· approach. /d. at 1 380-83. The
M'Naghten rule exonerates a defendant on the basis of mental illness only if he did not know the nature
of his act, or whether the act was right or wrong. See id. at 1 376. The Model Penal Code's approach
accepts that one might know his act is wrong but still be unable to stop himself from doing it. The
distinction is not directly relevant to our argument here.
63. Professor Perlin quotes a Florida judge's revealingly dispositionist explanation of his resistance
to allowing social psychological testimony in a case before him (here concerning evidence of the
unreliability of witness identifications):
[I] am no blind partisan of the academic discipline concerned. Indeed, I should admit to a
certain quarrel with the social "sciences" in general and psychology in particular. They are, it
seems to me, founded on an almost indefensible premise: that one can fairly deduce some
truths about an individual by what classes of human beings do in the aggregate. That seems to

me so at odds with the human free will that any conclusions founded on the premise are
intrinsically unreliable.
Id. at 1424 (quoting McMullen v. State, 660 So. 2d 340, 342-43 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1 995) (Farmer, J.,

concurring) (emphasis added» . Notice that the judge is himself relying on the even more "indefensible
premise" that one can ignore what social science teaches about human beings' behavior "on the
aggregate" and that from the unsubstantiated presumption of "free will" "one can fairly deduce some
truths about an individual."
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wrong. We look in the mirrors all around u s and we see ourselves pursuing
preferred ends as rational actors or reasonable persons or, at the very least,
agents with determinative control over our cognitions and behaviors. We see
reflections and affirmations of our dispositionist selves, but those mirrors are
distorting.
The stakes of dispositionism are huge-and they are, in our view, stakes we
are losing and will continue to lose if we persist in ignoring the extent of our
self-deception. Our sense of ourselves is wrong not just in the details or on
average, or in some bounded way. 64 Rather, it is monumentally wrong, or so
suggests the best available social science.
Our critical realist purpose in what follows will be to explore a sample of
evidence indicating the flaws and illusions of dispositionism, and to offer the
best alternative conception of the human animal that social science (rather than
intuition, common sense, faith, or tradition) can provide. We ask our readers to
move back with us several steps to a decisive, though unseen, analytic moment
that takes place before most legal scholarship begins, to the basic assumptions
concerning the nature of the human agent. We ask our readers to focus on the
very question that most legal scholarship-indeed, most people-generally treat
as beyond question. Usually, when sound science is applied in legal-academic
writing, it is applied only after dispositionism is already firmly, implicitly, in
place. Our readers should therefore brace for the kind of elaborate analysis
typical of any law and economics text or other social scientific legal study, but
the analysis in this instance will begin where we believe it always should
begin-at the beginning.
Many of the studies and findings we report below are as fun as they are
fascinating. Often, though, they can also be quite threatening. The theories and
evidence that we highlight defy our dispositionist presumptions and thus chal
lenge our most basic expectations and beliefs about our systems and institu
tions, about the groups to which we do and don't belong, and about ourselves.
There is still more at stake. In The Situation, we sketched the basic outlines
,,
of a theory that we call "deep capture. 65 There and elsewhere we have argued
that a dispositionist conception of the human animal is generally extremely
valuable to large commercial enterprises, which share an interest in expanding
free markets, private property, and contract, in inhibiting profit-reducing regula
tion, and in justifying a normative conception of business enterprises as profit
maximizers. Where behavior is presumed to be a manifestation of free choice,
and where choices are presumed to reveal dispositional preferences, then mar-

64. See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 147 1 (1998) (explicating the conception of "bounded rationality, " which
endeavors to employ some insights of behavioral economics in a manner which can improve upon but
not fundamentally challenge the conventional law and economics paradigm). But see infra Part V.C.4
(describing limitations of Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler 's approach).
65. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 5, at 202-30 (explicating the deep capture
hypothesis).
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kets and free contracting appear to be a far more reliable means of increasing
personal and social welfare than are the best guesses of regulators, and profit
maximization (or shareholder primacy) seems to be similarly desirable because
of its tendency to maximize consumer choice, and thus social welfare. 66 If the
depth of our dispositionism can be influenced by situation-and social psychol
ogy demonstrates that it can be-then profit-maximizing firms will exercise
their power over situation to promote it. Just as conventional capture theory
predicts that profit-maximizing enterprises will work to capture the political and
regulatory system, "deep capture" theory predicts that they will endeavor to
influence the much broader situation that encourages a dispositionist outlook.
We will not review the arguments concerning "deep capture" in any depth here,
though we encourage readers to review our outline of it in The Situation67 and
to anticipate further elaboration of it in other work.68 The purpose of this Article
is to substantiate and elaborate a central premise of critical realism, that
although we think we are dispositional actors, we are better understood as
situational characters. Evidence that human animals are situational characters
implicates and threatens to deligitimate, not only our favored self-conception,
but also our laws, legal theories, and indeed, most of our social systems. So
brace yourself. 69
II.

MISSING THE SITUATION AND SEEING DISPOSITION

Much of the rest of this Article is dedicated to fleshing out the situational
character, who we believe should retire the "rational actor" and its dispositionist
brethren in our other conventional legal theories, social policies, and common

66. See Chen & Hanson, The Illusion of Law, supra note 32; see also Jon Hanson & Adam Wright,
In the Driver's Seat: Why Promoting Dispositionism Is Good Business (unpublished manuscript, on file
with authors) [hereinafter Hanson & Wright, In the Driver's Seat] (providing a more complete
description of the connection between dispositionism and pro-market and anti-regulation policy presump
tions).
67. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 5, at 225-68 (briefly describing incentives of
commercial interests to promote dispositionism and providing some examples).
68. See, e.g., Benforado, Hanson & Yosifon, Broken Scales, supra note 54 (revealing how disposition
ism has been employed by food, diet, and fitness industries); Chen & Hanson, The Illusion of Law,
supra note 32 (describing how macro script of corporate law and meta scripts of policymaking both
reflect and reinforce deep capture); Hanson & Wright, In the Driver' s Seat, supra note 66 (describing in
more detail the value of dispositionism to business interests generally).
69. Although we believe that the implications of what follows are dramatic, it is important that we
not be misunderstood as claiming more than we are. We will underscore this point several times,
because some previous readers have mistakenly placed our arguments into familiar-though inapposite
categories. We are not arguing that there is no such thing as free will. And we are not taking a firm
position on the age-old determinism debate or embracing a new form of behaviorism. Our claim is that
widely held, Western lay conceptions of the human animal or attributions regarding human behav
ior-as well as the related legal-theoretic conceptions, including that of law and economics-are, in
particular ways, largely incorrect. We are moved far more by forces that we do not appreciate than we
realize and far less by forces to which we attribute behavior than we realize.
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sense. 70
A. TWO SOURCES OF DISPOSITIONISM

1 . A Basic Source of Dispositionism
"[C]ompare the effect of education and the lack of it upon our human
nature to a situation like this: imagine men [and women] to be living in an
underground cave-like dwelling place . . . . The [women and] men have been
there from childhood, with their neck and legs in fetters, so their bonds
remain in the same place and they can only see ahead of them, as their bonds
prevent them from turning their heads. . . . . Do you think, in the first place,
that such men [and women] could see anything of themselves and each other
except the shadows which the fire casts upon the wall of the cave in front of
them?-How could they, if they have to keep their heads still throughout
life? "

In a sense, we are living in Plato's cave. We perceive in our world people
acting, and we presume that we are seeing the whole of what's happening. In
fact, we are looking at merely a shadow of the vast world of situational
influence occurring outside our narrow purview. A basic explanation of the
fundamental pattern that is at the root of dispositionism is that we are, so to
speak, only human-we have limited perceptual and cognitive capacity, and a
limited time in which to do our thinking. Because of those human limitations
we are "cognitive misers," getting by on the conceptual cheap-making use, in
most contexts, of that which is palpable, focused, and easy to understand. We
see disposition in part because it is salient and easy. Conversely, we miss
situation because it is neither.72 In short, seeing and not appreciating unseen
situation is dispositionist believing.

70. There may be some circumstances in which the rational actor model remains an illuminating
tool. For instance, when an actor's situation creates robust pressure for the actor to behave as if rational,
the model may prove useful as a means of predicting and influencing that actor's behavior. As will
become clear below, however, those circumstances are less common than dispositionists tend to
suppose. Moreover, even in such circumstances the model lacks normative significance.
71. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC * 5 1 4-15 (G.M.A. Grube trans., 1974) (c. 380 B.C.E.).
72. The "cognitive miser" explanatory starting place has been an influential one in social psychol
ogy. See, e.g., HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 1977); KUNDA, supra
note 6; SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION (2d ed. 1991); PHILIP ZIMBARDO &
MICHAEL LEIPPE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ATTITUDE CHANGE AND SOCIAL INFLUENCE (1991). The metaphor
itself embraces a kind of dispositionism, one is left almost with the impression, right from the start, of
the rational actor all over again, wily making efficient allocations of resources in the individual interest.
But this impression is mistaken-as we will describe, the miserliness of our cognitions is a situational
condition, an interior situational reality, the dynamics of which are not usually seen in our narrow
conscious conception of our own thought processes. Moreover, interior situation is subject to exterior
situational manipulation; what efficiency there is in our cognitive poverty may not always yield benefits
to ourselves. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 5, at 225-32.
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The cognitive limitations explanation of the fundamental attribution error is
evidenced also by the fact that it is true of people across cultures. And yet, the
depth of its grasp on our imagination of ourselves-the extent of the tendency
to emphasize disposition and overlook situation-varies across situations. In
some ways, it is more pronounced in the West than it is in the East. 73 Moreover,
dispositionism deepens intergenerationally among immigrants to a new, more
dispositionist culture.74 Our dispositionism is thus, to a significant degree,
culturally contingent.75 It is, in our terms, highly situationa1.76 Those variations
notwithstanding, the fundamental attribution error appears to wield significant
influence across all cultures.77 We are all, in some sense, in the same cave.

2. A Deeper Source of Dispositionism
Beyond our perceptions of the world, there is another, deeper source of
dispositionism that helps to explain its power within us.78 To see it, we would
like to distinguish between two types of fundamental attribution errors. The first
is the sort that we have focused on thus far and is what social psychologists
have meant by the term. We will call that the exterior fundamental attribution

73. See RIC HARD E. NISBETT, THE GEOGRAPHY OF THOUGHT: How ASIANS AND WESTERNERS THINK
DIFFERENTLY . . . AND WHY 40-45 (2003).
74. See id.
75. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 5, at 250-60.
76. Indeed, the fact that dispositionism can be influenced-promoted-by situation is an important
premise and piece of evidence for our deep capture thesis, which was one of the central conclusions of
our introductory article and an important piece of this proj ect. See id. at 1 57-78.
77. See id. There is considerable debate within social psychology about the variable patterns of
dispositionism across cultures; it has been a lively area of research and debate. See NISBETT, supra note
73, at 1 0-13. Nevertheless, we feel the claims we make here occupy the heartland of social psychologi
cal thinking, and that our case rests on mostly noncontroversial propositions about humanity within
social psychology. We want to make clear that the situational character, as we conceive of it through
critical realism, must be subject to constant revision, both because new evidence will continue to come
in from social psychology and related fi elds about who we are and because who we are will continue to
change as our situations change over time. There is a vast literature in not only social and cultural
history, but also in cultural anthropology, addressing how basic ideas of what it means to be human
differ across cultures and over time. See, e.g., Clifford Geertz, On the Nature of Anthropological
Understanding, 63 AM. SCI. 47 ( 1 975); Hazel Rose Markus & Shinobu Kitayama, Culture and the Self:
Implications of Cognition, Emotion, and Motivation, 98 PSYCHOL. REv. 224 (1991). These are valuable
and robust findings from sophisticated social sciences, and a complete conception of the situational
character-that is, of ourselves-should make use of them. While this situational contingency in the
quality of our dispositionism is, again, absolutely central to our broader thesis, through much of what
follows we will emphasize the deeply wired nature of our dispositionism, and the basics of its operation
in all humans.
78. In that, there are numerous explanations, all of which contribute to the overall effect. Several
interior situational sources of dispositionism are described below. See, e.g., infra text accompanying
notes 523-29 (naIve realism); 444-7 1 (self-affirming motive); 472-78 (group-affirming motive);
479-503 (system-affirming motive); see also Benforado, Hanson & Yosifon, Broken Scales, supra note
54 (describing numerous sources of dispositionism); Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, NaiVe Cynicism:
Some Mechanisms of Dispositionism and Other Persistent Attributional Errors in Policy Debates
(unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) [hereinafter Benforado & Hanson, NaIve Cynicism]
(summarizing those situational sources and describing some seemingly dispositional sources of disposi
tionism).
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error. When humans look at any external setting and make causal attributions,
certain key features of that setting-most importantly the observable actions of
individuals--exert disproportionate influence over their evaluations. We see
what "pops out" at us and tend to miss most everything else. The second
fundamental attribution error concerns what we see of ourselves or, more
precisely, what we see of our interiors. This interior fundamental attribution
error is subtler, but, as we have suggested, is often true and no less important
than the first.
B . THE INTERIOR FUNDAMENTAL ATTRIBUTION ERROR

"The inner world cannot be observed with the aid of our sensory organs.
Our thoughts, wishes, feelings, and fantasies cannot be seen, smelled, heard,
or touched. They have no existence in physical space, and yet they are real,
and we can observe them as they occur in time: through introspection in
ourselves, and through empathy (i.e., vicarious introspection) in others. "
�

Heinz Kohut79

"There s an old story about two men on a train. One of them, seeing some
naked-looking sheep in a field, said, Those sheep have just been sheared. '
The other looked a moment longer, and then said, They seem to be-on this
side. It is in such a cautious spirit that we should say whatever we have to
say about the workings of the mind . . . . ..
'

�

John HoltSO

The primacy of dispositionism reflects what we call the "interior"s l fundamen
tal attribution error. That error, which is analogous to its exterior counterpart, is
the tendency to "see," and to attribute a powerful causal role to certain salient
features of our interior lives that actually wield little or no causal influence over
our behavior, while simultaneously failing to see those features of our interiors
that are in fact highly influential. Those elements of our interior experience that
are clearly felt help to make possible, if not likely, a theory of ourselves in
which dispositions play the dominant role in our behavior. We are primed by
our felt interior experience and the resultant pre-theoretic axioms to see disposi-

79. Heinz Kohut, Introspection, Empathy, and Psychoanalysis: An Examination of the Relatinoship
Between Mode of Observation and Theory, 7 J. AM. PSYCHOANALYTIC ASS'N 459 ( 1 959), reprinted in

THE SEARCH FOR THE SELF: SELECTED WRITINGS OF HEINZ KOHUT, 1950-1978, at 205, 205-06 (Paul H.
Ornstein ed., 1 978).
80. JOHN HOLT, How CHILDREN LEARN, at x ( 1 967).
8 1 . Our definition for this term will become clearer below when we look more closely at some of the
interior situational forces. For now, it is sufficient to understand "interior" as "inside of us." Cf JOHN
SABINI, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 2 1 0 (2d ed. 1 995) ("Behaviors that psychologists are interested in are
caused by the interplay of things outside the skin (stimuli) and things inside the skin (the central
nervous system). So all behavior . . . has sources both inside the skin and outside it.").
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tions and to overlook potentially more significant influences. In other words, the
interior fundamental attribution error contributes significantly to the exterior
fundamental attribution error. Below, we will summarize some of the unappreci
ated, but highly influential, interior forces that social psychologists have identi
fied. But the remainder of this section will describe those familiar aspects of our
interiors that, while ultimately a woefully incomplete picture, are the most
readily "observed" aspects of our interiors.
When we seek--consciously or not-to understand what we are or why we behave
as we do, we tend to attribute a vast majority of the causal weight to certain key
mechanisms. AI> with the exterior, we see-or, as Heinz Kohut describes it, introspect
only a small part of what moves US.82 Only a fraction of our interior setting seems
vivid and abiding, while the greater portion is pallid and evanescent. Indeed, there are
facets of our perceived interior experience that are so prominent that our sense of
ourselves is completely dominated by them, and our existence apart from them is
difficult to conceive. These basic features can be roughly described in four categories
of felt inner experience: thinking (that is, self-conscious, articulable evaluation);
preferring (which includes a variety of perceived interior sources of choice proclivi
ties, such as our dispositions, wishes, goals, values, feelings, attitudes, and tastes);
willing (the experience of consciously choosing or intending); and, the most visible of
all, acting (our sense of the culmination of our thoughts, preferences and will, in our
behavior). 83
That basic schema, which, if we are right, should be more or less familiar to
readers from their own experience of their own inner lives, is loosely depicted
in Figure 1 :

Think
Will
.J..

Act

Prefer

Figure 1.

Social psychologists who have studied self-conceptions across cultures sum
marize this Western person schema as follows:
82. See supra text accompanying note 79.
83. One might add one or more of a number of other features, such as talents or abilities, without
altering the thrust of our point.
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The person is believed to consist of a set of "internal," "personal" attributes
such as . . . personality traits, preferences, subjective feeling states, beliefs,
and attitudes. These attributes are thought to be internal and personal in the
sense that they come from within and characterize the person regardless of the
situation (that is, a person's attributes are not generated by or relative to
current social context). Taken together, these attributes define each person as
an autonomous, freely choosing, special individual. Within this social system,
a human being is a person by virtue of being distinguishable from others on
the basis of these attributes, which collectively constitute the person's social
identity.
The independent cultural model that prevails in North America and in much
of Europe emphasizes certain features of the person as natural, necessary,
"healthy," and good. The person
• is a bounded, coherent, stable, autonomous, "free" entity.
• "possesses" a set of characteristic identifying attributes-preferences, mo
tives, goals, attitudes, beliefs, and abilities-that are the primary forces that
84
enable, guide, or constrain actions.

And, as Daniel Wegner writes, "[ w]e each have a profound sense that we
consciously will much of what we do, and we experience ourselves willing our
,,
actions many times a day. 85
The four basic, salient elements of our interior-thinking, preferring, willing,
and choosing (or acting) -significantly shape the parameters, the building
blocks, and the pre-theoretic axioms of our self-conceptions and our theories
and, in tum, shape how we construe and evaluate our environs. 86 Those features

84. Alan Page Fiske, Shinobu Kitayama, Hazel Rose Markus

Richard E. Nisbett, The Cultural
(Daniel T. Gilbert,
Susan T. Fiske & Gardner Lindzey eds., 4th ed. 1 998) (emphasis added). As that quotation indicates,
our description of our perceived interiors is informed by, and largely consistent with, social psychologi
cal evidence on the "conceptual self." See also Chie Kanagaw, Susan E. Cross, & Hazel Rose Markus,
" Who am I ? " The Cultural Psychology of the Conceptual Self, 27 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL.
90, 9 1 (200 I ) (summarizing the Western view of the self "as a more-or-Iess integrated whole composed
of abilities, values, personality attributes, preferences, feeling states, and attitudes"); NISBETI, supra
note 73, at 47-78 (contrasting schemas of the human animal in "Western" and "Eastern" cultures);
DANIEL M. WEGNER, THE ILLUSION OF CONSCIOUS WILL 2 ( 1 992) (describing our perception of "will").
But our assertions are also based in part on our own observations of what others seem to find obvious
and incontestable as well as on our own naIve introspection. As will be detailed throughout this Article,
others have similarly found many of the features we mention to be obvious and incontestable.
It is important to emphasize that we are--our thesis is-not wed to the details of this already rather
stylized description of the interior fundamental attribution error, but we do stand by our claim that a
process analogous to the exterior fundamental attribution error is occurring in our interiors (and
probably for similar reasons). Our goal here is simply to sketch a simple account of our oversimplified
perceived interiors. As will become clear in Part Y, even if the description provided in this section
oversimplifies the widely held, oversimplified self-conceptions, there is no disputing that our interiors
remain uncharted mysteries to most of us even as we maintain the belief that our interiors are well
understood.
85. WEGNER, supra note 84, at 2.
86. Cf Claude M. Steele, The Psychology of Self-Affirmation: Sustaining the Integrity of the Self, in
2 1 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 26 1 , 295 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1 988) (explaining
&

Matrix of Social Psychology, in THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 9 1 5, 920
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are especially "visible" and influential, because they themselves can be, and
typically are, understood as causally connected.87 We "know" that we have
preferences, which we "know" are revealed and informed through our thinking
and acting; we "know" that we think about our options and decide according to
our preferences and will our acts accordingly.88 Those known features and their
connections are, we suspect, too common, too self-evident, too salient, and too
widely shared to be discounted in favor of the many interior features, explored
below, that are less easily seen or experienced.

1 . Thinking and Being
Take thinking. Most of us understand thinking-that is, the thinking that we
are conscious of-as one of the primary occupations of life. As a species, we
have designated ourselves "homo sapiens" (Latin for "thinking beings") for a
reason. The story of Adam and Eve's eating of the apple from the forbidden
Tree of Knowledge can be understood as a story about how we humans gained
our characteristic ability (or curse) of reflective thinking. When Descartes
announced the seemingly incontestable "I think therefore I am" as the founda
tion of human understanding, he was beginning the modem philosophical
project with our most basic experience of ourselves. He was articulating, among
other things, a widely shared sense of what it means to be alive (as a human, at
least):
From this I knew that I was a substance whose whole essence or nature is
solely to think, and which does not require any place, or depend on any

that the idea "that the 'self is a concept about oneself' . . . has taken firm hold in social psychology,
along with the tendency to explain self-phenomena as stemming from the operations of this knowledge
structure. These structures heighten subjects' sensitivity to self-relevant stimuli . . . , facilitate the
processing and memory of these stimuli . . . , foster resistance to information that is incongruent with
the structure . . . , and foster assimilation of congruent information . . . .") .
87. People tend to embrace plausible "causal" theories even when wrong precisely because they are
plausible causal theories. See generally Timothy De Camp Wilson & Richard E. Nisbett, The Accuracy
of Verbal Repons About the Effects of Stimuli on Evaluations and Behavior, 41 Soc. PSYCHOL. 1 1 8
( 1 978). For a more recent and thorough treatment of this tendency and its causes, see Timothy Wilson's
fascinating book, Strangers to Ourselves: Discovering the Adaptive Unconscious (2002).
88. Cj. Philip N. Johnson-Laird & Eldar Shafir, The Interaction between Reasoning and Decision
Making: An Introduction, 49 COGNITION I , 1-2 ( 1 993) (describing the "folk" psychology of reasoning
and decision making-"the view that most individuals in our culture accept about mental life"-as
follows: "Human beings have desires and needs, and they use their knowledge to decide what to do and
to infer how best to achieve their goals. They reason in order to make decisions and to justify them both
to themselves and others; they reason in order to determine the consequences of their beliefs and of
their hypothetical actions; they reason to work out plans of action. They make decisions about what
values to treat as paramount; they make decisions about what actions to take; and they make decisions
about what information to base their reasoning on."); Arthur Lupia, Mathew D. McCubbins & Samuel
L. Popkin, Beyond Rationality: Reason and the Study of Politics, in ELEMENTS OF REASON: COGNITION,
CHOICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF RATIONALITY I , I (Arthur Lupia et al. eds., 2000) ("[Clhoice is the product
of reason, where reason is the human process of seeking, processing, and draing inferences from
information.").
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material thing, in order to exist. Accordingly, this "I"-that is, the soul, by
which I am what I am-is entirely distinct from the body
. 89
.

.

.

The Cartesian insight is so powerful because, at some level, it seems obvi
ously right. Thinking seems pretty good evidence of being. Thinking about
thinking seems better still. And there is little meaning in (human) being without
thinking. Everyone reading this article knows what it means to be and to think,
and probably understands each as a key, perhaps necessary, feature of the other.

2. Preferences and Identity
Similarly, most of us know what it means to prefer oranges to apples (or,
perhaps, apples and self-awareness to a heavenly garden of ignorance) and to
choose one or the other, even if we have trouble comparing them. Much of our
thinking experience pertains to being struck by, and reacting to, the things,
people, and experiences that we like and those that we do not. While our
Cartesian experience of thought assures us of our existence, our perceived
preferences help inform us about our particular identity in the broader backdrop
of being. That which we like and do not like, or value and dis value, and our
relative rankings of the particulars among them, go far, it seems, in creating our
identities. Our perceived similarities to, and dissimilarities from, those people
around us are based significantly, though by no means solely, on our perceptions
of our shared and distinct tastes, values, preferences,9o and dispositions. And
those identities are commonly, perhaps increasingly, "expressed" through our
choices-work choices, if such are available, and particularly these days our
consumption choices. 9 1

89. RENE DESCARTES, DISCOURSE ON THE METHOD Pt . I V (1 637), reprinted in DESCARTES: SELECTED
PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS 20, 36 (John Cottingham et al. trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988).
90. As indicated earlier, our identities depend importantly on all the features of our perceived

interiors, and not just our preferences. And, of course, they depend as well on aspects of ourselves that
have little to do with our perceived interiors. As William James wrote in 1890:
In its widest possible sense . . . a man's Self is the sum total of all that he can call his, not
only his body and his psychic powers, but his clothes and his house, his wife [or husband, or
partner] and children, his ancestors and friends, his reputation and works . . . . If they wax and
prosper, he feels triumphant, if they dwindle and die away he feels cast down.
(Encyclopaedia Britannica 1952) (1890). The
naive account of our interiors, it should be clear now if it wasn't before, strongly reflects the cultural
(and, thus, sometimes patriarchal) lens through which we view our interiors. In addition, our identities
tum importantly on features of ourselves that are often perceived as fixed or given by nature or some
larger external influence: abilities, talents, genetics, race, gender, age, appearance, health, ethnicity,
language, social class, and so on.
9 1 . See generally MARYE C. THARP, MARKETING AND CONSUMER IDENTITY IN MULTICULTURAL AMERICA
(2001) (describing the disintegration of the "mass market" and the construction of individual identities
through distinctive consumption choices). This vision, like the others, is likely more or less culturally
contingent. See, e.g., id. at I ("In multicultural America, your age, address, language and accent, skin
color, or shape of eyes, as well as the music you listen to, whom you have sex with, and where you
work, are the tools with which American consumers construct, communicate, and change social
identity. Rather than lifetime, fixed definitions of ourselves, these self-made, chosen identities are built
WILLIAM JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 291-92
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3. Willing, Acting, and Freedom

We "see" ourselves thinking, we "see" our preferences, and perhaps most
decisively to our dispositionist sense of ourselves, we experience ourselves
intentionally willing the tangible result of the whole process, our resultant
actions. As Harvard psychologist Daniel Wegner puts it, the "conscious will
,,
explanation" of our own conduct has a "deep[] grip on our imagination. 92
We can't possibly know (let alone keep track of) the tremendous number of
mechanical influences on our behavior because we inhabit an extraordinarily
complicated machine. So we develop a shorthand, a belief in the causal
efficacy of our conscious thoughts. We believe in the magic of our own causal
agency. 93

Thus, "[ w]e have a profound sense that we consciously will much of what we
,,
do, and we experience ourselves willing our actions many times a day. 94
Saying much more about this sense of our own will is especially hard, and the
challenge of its fuller elaboration has occupied artists and writers for genera
tions. 95 In the interest of making explicit our common-sense experience of the
human interior, it suffices to say that we feel within ourselves, associated with
our own behaviors, "a kind of internal 'oomph' that somehow certifies authenti
,,
cally that one has done the action. 9 6 And so it is that "most people believe that
,,
their conscious feelings and judgments control their actions. 97 We see our
selves making choices among options, and the choices reflect our particular
identity as against the rest of the world and the options not taken. Thus our
actions, to the extent that they are perceived as freely taken, are seen as
manifestations of our thinking, preferring, and willing. We often experience
such actions as exercised freedom, our ability actually to manifest in the world
the being and identity that we otherwise know makes us who we are in our

upon a constantly changing foundation of personal characteristics and behaviors. It is a lifetime project,
always in flux, never finalized, but frequently expressed by how we spend our money and time."
(emphasis added»; see also Douglas A. Kysar, Kids & Cul-de-Sacs: Census 2000 and the Reproduction
of Consumer Culture, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 853, 890-94 (discussing the role that consumption plays in
our self-definition in a culture that provides few alternatives); id. at 891 ("Individuals no longer receive
their place in the world from authoritarian dictate or historical happenstance; instead, they must fashion
it themselves from some combination of available cultural and material resources. The claim of
consumer culture theorists is that individuals in the modem world (and particularly in the United States)
have sought to satisfy this obligation of self-definition through the medium of consumption."); J.
McManus, Tapped In, Tapped Out, AM. DEMOCiRAPHICS, Dec. 1 988, at 6 ("The brand is merely a beacon
for a set of values in the broad spectrum of choices.").
92. WEGNER, supra note 84, at 2.
93. /d.
94. ld.
95. For a great overview of generations of grappling with the question of will, see DANIEL DENNEIT,
CONSCIOUSNESS EXPLAINED ( 1 991).
96. WEGNER, supra note 84, at 4.
97. Johnson-Laird & Shafir, supra note 88, at 2; cf id (adding that the "claim is a legacy of the

Cartesian identification of the mind with consciousness").
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minds.

4. Summary of the Interior Fundamental Attribution Error
"A man need not, it is true, do this or that act,-the term act implies a
choice,-but he must act somehow. "
- Oliver Wendell Holmes, 1r. 98

Just as the availability of human aCtiVIty tends to overwhelm our causal
understandings of our exteriors, the availability of thinking, preferring, willing,
and acting (and perhaps some other similarly salient, conscious features) over
whelms our causal understandings of our interiors. We perceive ourselves
thinking, we perceive our own dispositions or preferences, and we perceive
ourselves acting freely in accordance with our cognitions, tastes, and free will.
So it is that certain assumptions about our psychological processes are said to be
"axiomatic, though generally implicit, in many modern Western cultures": 99
•
•
•
•
•
•

•

Actions are freely chosen.
Choices imply a preference.
Preferences are stable over time.
Preferences implicate the identity of the self.
Outcomes are mostly controllable.
People are responsible for (and hence the self is implicated in) the
choices they make and the resultant outcomes.
Smart (good) people make good choices, whose outcomes they are
1 00
happy with.

We assume, then, that actions reflect something within us-our choices. Those
choices reflect a stable set of preferences, which themselves determine and
reflect our "personality" or identity. Because our behavior reflects such choices,
most of what happens is controllable-simply a matter of choice. And because
outcomes are subject to a person's control, each person is responsible for the
outcomes that define her circumstances. Furthermore, outcomes reflect some
thing about the person making the choices: Good people enjoy good outcomes,
and bad outcomes tend to happen to bad people.
With that schema of the human animal in place, we are easily convinced that
we are who we claim ourselves to be-free, autonomous, thinking, preferring
actors-and there is very little cognitive space for considering the role of

98. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 80 (Little,
99. Fiske, Kitayama, Markus & Nisbett, supra note 84, at 939.

Brown & Co.

1 990) ( 1 88 1 ).

1 00. [d. ; see also Claude M. Steele, Thin Ice: "Stereotype Threat" and Black College Students,
at 44, 47 ("Ours is an individualistic culture; forward movement is seen
to come from within.").
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Aug. 1 999,
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influences within us and around US. 101 In other words, what we "see" gives rise
to fundamental attribution errors both externally and internally.102
These are the cliches of our self-understanding: seeing is believing, and out
of sight, out of mind.

5. The Situation of Our Interiors
"The more we examine the mechanism of thought, the more we shall see
that the automatic, unconscious action of the mind enters largely into all its
processes. Our definite ideas are stepping-stones; how we get from one to the
other, we do not know: something carries us; we do not take the step. "

1

- Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr. 0 3

Our concern here is less with what so many of us, laypeople and theorists
alike, find self-evident and more with what we do not. As was true exteriorly, it
is the unavailable or less salient features of our interiors that often wield the
most influence over us. It is, in the words of the elder Holmes, something "we
do not know" that "carries us." Even Descartes' terse proposition about the
unity of thinking and being is flawed in an illustrative way. The Cartesian
insight imagines thinking as that cognitive process that we are aware of and that
is independent from all else, including even the body in which that thinking
occurs. That is the flaw that neuroscientist Antonio Damasio has dubbed
"Descartes' Error" in his book of the same title. 104 Human cognitive processing
is not simply the stuff of conscious thinking. Our thinking is situational, and is
influenced outside of our awareness and control by everything from our bodies
to our social environments: "Consciousness, the feature at the center of what
makes humans unique, is the culprit [of our dispositionism] , for it permits a
view of who we are (and what we are capable of that is independent of the . ,
,,
knowledge and feelings that may drive beliefs, attitudes, and behavior. 105 But,

1 0 1 . As we described in The Situation, the self-conceptions of many people in Eastern cultures
render them less subject to some aspects of the fundamental attribution error. See Hanson & Yosifon,
The Situation, supra note 5, at 250--60.
102. It is worth noting that what we perceive about ourselves may depend on the perspective that we
have of ourselves. Robert Wicklund, building on the work of George Mead, argues that we have two
selves: the "I," which is the acting, behaving feature of ourselves that engages our environs according
to our desires, values, and beliefs; and the "me," which is the self-reflective, self-aware feature of
ourselves. The "me" emerges, for instance, when we see ourselves as others might. And "I" behavior
can change to a "me" experience by placing ourselves in front of a mirror or a video camera. See Robert
A. Wicklund, Objective Self-Awareness, in 8 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 223 (L.
Berkowitz ed., 1 975).
1 03. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr., Mechanism in Thought and Morals: An Address Delivered Before
the Phi Beta Kappa Society of Harvard University (June 29, 1 870).
1 04. ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES ' ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE HUMAN BRAIN 249 ( 1 994).
105. Mahzarin R. Banaji, Ordinary Prejudice, PSYCHOL. SCI. AGENDA, Jan.-Feb. 200 1 , at 8, 8

[hereinafter Banaji, Ordinary Prejudice] ; see also Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Attitudes Can Be
Measured [hereinafter Banaji, Implicit Attitudes], in THE NATURE OF REMEMBERING: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
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as Damasio states:
[T]he comprehensive understanding of the human mind requires an organis
mic perspective; that not only must the mind move from a nonphysical
cogitum to the realm of biological tissue, but it must also be related to a whole
organism possessed of integrated body proper and brain and fully interactive
with a physical and social environment. 1 06

Thinking may imply being, but our thinking is not what we experience it to
be. The problem is, again, one of perceiving disposition and overlooking
situation. That partial vision is, as we've argued, a key feature of being human
and may be part of what Augustine was suggesting when he wrote: "Fallor ergo
sum" (I am deceived, therefore I am) 1 07 or, in any event, it is what we mean
when we write "I think dispositionally, therefore I am deceived."
Our point in this discussion has been that there is more to the "situation" than
what occurs outside of the human actor. Just as there is an unseen exterior
situation that gives rise to the exterior fundamental attribution error, there is an
interior situation-undetected but incredibly powerful-that gives rise to the
interior fundamental attribution error. Our experiences are wrapped in two
layers of situational influences. To better understand what moves us requires
understanding them both; and to better understand the power of either requires
understanding its relationship with the other.
6. Situation Defined

The bulk of this Article is dedicated to providing a more thorough examina
tion of interior situation. Before proceeding with that, however, it may be
helpful to offer a slightly more encompassing definition of situation. Situation,
as we mean it, includes anything that influences our attitudes, memories,
cognitions, emotions, behaviors, and the like in ways that we tend not fully to
appreciate or control. The situation, then, is part of the human predicament it is
in and around us, it is influencing us, and it is doing so in ways that we do not
appreciate, do not understand, do not have a place for in our theories, and do not

ROBERT G. CROWDER

1 1 7, 129 (H.L. Roediger, III et al. eds., 200 1) (describing the problem earlier noted
by William James in creating psychological constructs "that the knower and known are one and the
same. For many constructs like memory, attitude, or consciousness, the knower and known have a close
relationship, a condition ripe for delusions that derive from intuitive notion of what memory, attitude, or
consciousness ought to be. Among the most invidious of traps when investigating mental constructs
with which one's own thinking apparatus has intimate familiarity is the demand that the constructs
ought to feel 'real,' even to the scientist.").
1 06. DAMASIO, supra note 1 04, at 252.
107. [d. at 249. Darnasio quotes St. Augustine but does not make the same point we are making.
Interestingly, Damasio himself, and other neuroscientists, have recently been criticized for, in effect,
replicating the Cartesian error. See M.R. BENNETT & P.M.S. HACKER, PHn.OSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
NEUROSCIENCE (2003); Dennis Patterson, Book Review, NOTRE DAME PHIL. REVIEWS (Sept. 1 0, 2003)
(reviewing BENNETT & HACKER, supra), at http://ndpr.icaap.org/contentJarchives/2003/9/patterson_ben
netChacker.htmL
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individually or dispositionally control. Although that may strike many as an
unorthodox understanding of situation, 1 08 it is designed to upend the unexam
ined orthodoxy by emphasizing not just that we humans are blind, but that we
are blind to our blindness. 1 09
III.

GETTING TO

KNow THE SITUATIONAL CHARACTER

A. INSIDE THE SITUATIONAL CHARACTER

"Consciousness of the mind is precisely the same as consciousness of
kidney function. Both the brain and the kidney are organs that result in bodily
processes. . . . For both, we can observe the states that result from activity in
the system, but we have no special access to how either works. We have only
the evident products of each to consider and from which to fabricate models
of process. Naive theoretical models result from observations of the products
of the system and scientific models (right or wrong) result from scientific
methods. "
I
- Robert Crowder 1 0

1 . Flies, Rats, and Science
Where do flies come from? What about rats? Fish? Microorganisms? "From
the time of the ancient Greeks until well into the 1 9th century, it was common
III
'knowledge' that life could arise from nonliving matter."
This was the idea of
"spontaneous generation." Flies were born of rotting meat, rats from stinking
rubbish, fish from water-covered mud, and microorganisms from almost any
thing. The theory was intuitive and seemed consistent with the evidence. Get rid
of the rotting meat, the flies disappear. Clean up the trash, no more rats.
There was really no reason to reject what seemed so obvious. Then, in the
late Renaissance, Italian scientist Francesco Redi noted a connection between
1 08. Webster's defines situation as "the way in which something is placed in relation to its
surroundings." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICITONARY 1098 ( lOth ed. 1 998). That is only part of
what we mean by the term.
1 09. To be clear, our definitions of related concepts are similarly unorthodox. S ocial psychologists
traditionally use the term "disposition" to indicate something internal, like personality, preferences,
desires, moods, and so on, as opposed to "situation," by which social psychologists often mean
something external, like environmental cues, time constraints, social pressures, and the like. The
"fundamental attribution error," as social psychologists typically use the term, refers to the tendency to
over-attribute to disposition, thus defined, and under-attribute to situation, thus defined. When we write
of "dispositionism" in this Article, we are mostly referring to the particular causal schema generally
employed by Westerners to explain behavior: that is, stable (person-specific) preferences combined with
some thinking and will. The "fundamental attribution error," as we use the term, is therefore more
profound (indicating a failure to appreciate the role of both the exterior situation and the interior
situation in explaining behavior) than that imagined when the phrase is conventionally used. We will
refine that terminology in future work, but those definitions should be adequate for present purposes.
1 1 0. Robert Crowder, The Brain, the Kidney, and Consciousness (unpublished manuscript, c. 1 990),
in Banaji, Implicit A ttitudes, supra note 1 05, at 1 30.
I I I . NElL A. CAMPBELL & JANE B. REECE, BIOLOGY 5 1 6 (6th ed. 2002).
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squirming white maggots and flies and decided to try to test the theory of
spontaneous generation. He cleverly placed meat in two jars in the open air with
a mesh cover over one to allow air in, but not flies. We can skip the particulars
of the "discovery," because, today, spontaneous generation is so obviously
wrong, so inconsistent with our intuitions and the evidence, that there is no need
to review them. Redi's findings put a fly in the ointment of spontaneous
generation, but still the idea persisted-indeed, thrived-among scientists and
lay people well into the 1 800s. At last, in the midst of intense scientific
controversy, Louis Pasteur settled the matter in an award winning set of
I 12
experiments, which, again, we needn't review for our audience.
But little of what Redi and Pasteur showed reduces the predictive power of
spontaneous generation. It remained, one might say, a powerful positive theory
of fly genesis: flies act as if they spontaneously generate from old meat. If you
don't believe us, leave some out. And the hold of spontaneous generation as an
explanatory theory comes from the fact that it is true that we find flies where we
find rotting animals, it is true that we find fish where we find mud, and it is true
that we find rats where we find garbage. The associations are accurate. It is just
that those associations do not explain the phenomena. There is more to the
situation.
The point is a general one. In attempting to understand our worlds, we
commonly create theories from the features of our environment that we observe
or to which we have comparatively easy access. Good science allows (some
times forces) us to look again and more closely at that environment. It permits
us to see illusion where we once saw truth and inspires a search for a new truth
(and, if possible, a broader truth that also explains the associations underlying
the illusion).
The purpose of this section-and the bulk of this Article-is to demonstrate
how social psychology, social cognition theory, cognitive psychology, and
cognitive neuroscience have shattered the illusions that most of us experience as
truths about ourselves and what moves us. This science has been necessary to
pierce our self-illusions precisely because while it is true that we experience
ourselves thinking, true that we experience ourselves preferring, true that we

1 1 2 . See EVELYN Fox KELLER, MAKING SENSE OF LIFE: EXPLAINING BIOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT WITH
MODELS, METAPHORS, AND MACHINES 22-49 (2002); Russell Levine & Chris Evers, The Slow Death of

Spontaneous Generation (1668-1859), at http://www.accessexcellence.orgIRClABIBClSpontaneous_Gen
eration.html (last visited Dec. 27, 2004) ("The theory of spontaneous generation was finally laid to rest
in 1 859 by the young French chemist, Louis Pasteur. The French Academy of Sciences sponsored a
contest for the best experiment either proving or disproving spontaneous generation. Pasteur's winning
experiment . . . . boiled meat broth in a flask, heated the neck of the flask in a flame until it became
pliable, and bent it into the shape of an S. Air could enter the flask, but airborne microorganisms could
not-they would settle by gravity in the neck. As Pasteur had expected, no microorganisms grew. When
Pasteur tilted the flask so that the broth reached the lowest point in the neck, where any airborne
particles would have settled, the broth rapidly became cloudy with life. Pasteur had both refuted the
theory of spontaneous generation and convincingly demonstrated that microorganisms are everywhere
even in the air.").
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experience ourselves willing, and true that we experience ourselves choosing,
there is, in fact, more to the situation.

2 . A Closer Look at the Interior Situation
What many people describe as "thinking," social psychologists would call
"cognitions." Cognitions, succinctly defined, are the mental activities associated
with acquiring and processing information and are associated with some forms
of perceiving, conceiving, reasoning, judging, remembering, and imagining.
What we experience as "preferences," social psychologists would label "atti
,,
tudes 1 1 3_"a categorization of a stimulus along an evaluative dimension" I 14 or
"[a] learned predisposition to react to a given situation, person, or other set of
,,
cues in a consistent way. 1 1 5 Social psychologists would label what we com
monly see as choices as "behavior." Behavior refers to actions that individuals
take, such as voting, buying, shocking, and doing legal theory. It also refers, less
obviously, to actions that individuals do not take. 1 1 6
Social psychology thus recognizes the self-evident features of our interiors,
I
though it uses slightly different terms to represent them. 1 7 B ut social psychol
ogy and its sister disciplines have not been satisfied with our intuitive self
understandings. Social psychology has attempted to understand the nature of
our interior situations-the aspects of our experience that elude our conscious
awareness. 1 1 8 And it has discovered a great deal about our interior situations
that is both surprising and troubling. I 19 Among other things, it has found that
"[ 0]ur minds contain knowledge of which we are unaware. Our feelings can be
impervious to the assertion of conscious will. Our behaviors subsume acts that
are unintended, even opposed to those that are intended or consciously de
sired." 1 20

1 1 3. Preferences might also be labeled "affective responses," a concept we discuss below. See infra
Part lILC.3.
1 14. FiSKE & TAYLOR, supra note 72, at 463.
1 15. RAy CORSINI, THE DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGY 76 (2002).
1 16. ZIMBARDO & LEIPPE, supra note 72, at 32.
1 17. Social psychology has had somewhat less to say about the felt experience of "the will," but
what work there has been is, we think, incredibly revealing, and we will tum to it towards the end of
this Article. See infra Part III.E.2 (discussing the illusion of conscious will).
1 1 8. The distinction between situational and dispositional is sometimes a difference in degree rather
than a difference in kind. Some interior situational factors, like those on the exterior, can often be
seen-with some effort. They are situational because we humans tend not to see them. They are
typically nonreflective and automatic.
1 1 9. It is revealing, we believe, that the assumptions now made by economists resemble those once
made by early social psychologists. See infra Part III.B.2.b (summarizing early attributionists); infra
Part III.C. l .a (discussing traditional view that attitudes were stable); see also FiSKE & TAYLOR, supra
note 72, at 465. It was only through testing those assumptions that social psychologists came to
discover the flaws in their intuitively appealing theories. The point here is not to criticize economists
for failing to test their pre-theoretic axioms (we will make that criticism below, see infra Part VA-B),
but to provide more evidentiary support for our claim about the naiVe view of our interiors that most of
us, including those who set out to study our interiors, tend to hold, at least initially.
1 20. Banaji, Ordinary Prejudice, supra note 105, at 8.
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Figure 2.

Although we may find intuitive the bold boxes and bold causal connections
depicted in Figure 2, it is the effect of less salient features of our interiors (the
ovals in Figure 2) on our interiors and the effect of our largely unseen exterior
on those interior attributes that are more responsible for our behavior.
The balance of this Part will employ the lessons of social psychology to tum
dispositionism on its head. To do so, it will highlight some of the many ways in
which we are moved by what we do not see and in which what we do see is
illusion. Section B summarizes what social science has revealed about the
unseen features of our "thinking" or cognitions. Section C reviews key unseen
aspects of our "preferences" or attitudes. Section D examines some surprising
evidence of how our "choices" do not always follow from our thinking,
preferring, and willing. And Section E reviews evidence that our "will" can
itself be illusion. Not only does each section demonstrate the fallacies of our
self-schemas, 1 2 1 it also helps to make clear how each element of our interior
situation renders us vulnerable to exterior situational manipulation.
B.

UNSEEN COGNITIONS (VS. "THINKING")

Take thinking. There is an immense gulf between the way we think and the
way we think we think. 1 22 Our cognitions are often not conscious, and, of

1 2 1 . See supra text accompanying notes 84-88 (reviewing the conventional Western schemas for
human behavior).
1 22 . See Johnson-Laird & Shafir, supra note 88, at 2 ("Individuals are often not aware of how they
reason, having at best only glimpses of the process. They are aware of the results, not the mechanism.
What they say about their reasoning does not tally with its real nature . . . . "); id. at 3 ("[I]ntrospection
is not a direct route to understanding mental processes, and, as far as we know, there is no direct
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course, we tend to have very little sense of what we are thinking when it is not
conscious. Just as we are at any given moment in tune with none or, with the
help of some electronic device, just a tiny fraction of the broadcast signals and
electromagnetic frequencies enveloping our exteriors, so it is with the cognitive
signals enveloping our interiors. And often even our attempts to tune in one
single wavelength are likely to meet with some crossed signals and iffy recep
tion.
Do you doubt this? If so, can you avoid thinking of a chocolate chip cookie
right now? 1 23 And if you are not thinking of a chocolate chip cookie, what
devices are you using to avoid it? 124 How strong are those devices? How do you
explain your occasional inability to rid your mind of a song or advertising
jingle? And, when that happens, do you ever remember the moment in which
that hard-to-shake ditty quits playing in your head or does it just fade away
without your knowing? Has your mind snagged on something you have read in
this article so far? Did it blanch, for instance, when it came to the phrase
"squirming white maggots?" If so, were you aware of it as it happened, or did it
take our question now to "remind" you that, yes, it had happened. Have you
ever arrived at work not remembering anything about your trip to get there
even when you were driving? More seriously, consider the thoughts about the
desires, images, or worries moving in your mind that you try to silence but
sometimes cannot, the thoughts that distract you, occupy you, or leave you
restless. Conversely, consider the times when you want to focus on a topic or
idea, perhaps our argument here, or something about your life, but find it
difficult or impossible to do so.
In short, a little casual empiricism, in the form of introspection, makes fairly
obvious something of which most of us tend usually to be unaware. Even the
most central features of our interior seem at times recalcitrant and at other times
uncontrollable. Regardless of whether we are cognizant of or whether we can
control our cognitions, social psychologists have identified a plethora of interior
situational features that bias or influence those cognitions and, in tum, our
attitudes. We will focus on two general types of cognitive biases: choice biases
and process biases.

route."); Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy DeCamp Wilson, Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal
Reports on Mental Processes, 84 PSYCHOL. REv. 23 1 ( 1 977); J. St. B . T. Evans, D.E. Over & K.I
Mantelow, Reasoning, Decision Making and Rationality, 49 COGNITION 1 65 ( 1 993).
1 23. In other words, can you prevent the image or idea of a chocolate chip cookie still warm from
the baking pan, perhaps next to a glass of cold milk, from coming to mind? There is evidence that our
attempts to suppress a thought often backfire, making the thought more prominent in our consciousness.
Daniel Wegner has labeled this effect the "ironic reversal." WEGNER, supra note 84, at 4; see also
KUNDA, supra note 6, at 299. Kunda refers to that effect as the "hyperaccessibility of suppressed
thoughts." [d. at 300-{)l .
1 24. According to Fiske and Taylor, "[t]he only way out, as successful dieters and practiced
meditators know, is to find a substitute thought," a solution that is harder than it sounds. See FISKE &
TAYLOR, supra note 72, at 279-80; see also KUNDA, supra note 6, at 300.
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1 . Choice Biases
We begin with "choice biases" because, of the innumerable interior situ
ational features that social psychologists have discovered, these have received
the most attention from economists and legal theorists. As we will explain
below, the reason for this situational foot in the door of economics stems from
the fact that these biases most clearly influence (and challenge economists'
typical assumptions regarding) people's choices; and to economists and legal
economists, choices are the most significant of dispositional interior features. 1 25
Thus, by "choice biases," we are referring to the growing body of evidence of
"heuristics" and "biases" that, according to economic behavioralists, lead to
systematic anomalies to the basic "rational actor model." Partially because they
are now quite fashionable in academic policy literatures, we can spare the
reader a substantial review of choice biases. 1 26 We briefly describe a sample of
two types of choice biases: intra-temporal biases (of which we will highlight
three) and inter-temporal biases.

a. Intratemporal Effects
Most of the best-known choice biases occur within a precise time period and
largely without relation to temporal considerations. In this subsection, we briefly
consider three of them: heuristics, endowment effects, and framing effects.

i. Heuristics
People, for good reason, are cognitively frugal. Some say, as we noted earlier, that
humans are cognitive misers. 1 27 Because cognitive capacity is scarce, comer cutting is
not just useful, it is necessary. People engaging in inferential tasks "virtually always"
rely on judgmental strategies-termed heuristics-that help them reduce complex
problems into manageable ones. 1 28 Such strategies "probably produce vastly more
correct or partially correct inferences than erroneous ones, and they do so with great
speed and little effort." 1 29 Still, there are significant problems with such mental rules
of thumb. First, "[a]lthough these heuristics often lead to effective reasoning, they also

1 25 . See infra text accompanying notes 658-87.
1 26. For a more comprehensive review, see Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioral·
ism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N .Y.U. L. REv. 632, 646-67 ( 1 999) [hereinaf
ter Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously /]; Jolls, Sunstein, & Thaler, supra note 64, at
I 47Cr-79; Matthew Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J. EcON. Lrr. 1 1 ( 1 998). For examples of
scholars using choice biases to enhance policy analysis, see BEHAVIORAL LAW AND EcONOMICS (Cass R.
Sunstein ed., 2000). For useful overviews of choice biases by social psychologists, see JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds.,
1 982) [hereinafter JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY] and SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND
DECISION MAKING ( 1 993).
1 27 . See supra text accompanying notes 72-77 (noting cognitive limitations as one cause of the
fundamental attribution error).
1 28. FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 72, at 39 1 .
1 29. RICHARD NISBETT & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL
JUDGMENT 1 8 ( 1 980).
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lead to systematic biases and errors." 1 30 Second, we nonnally do not realize we have
these biases, leaving us undefended against their harmful effects. 1 3 1 And, third, for the
same reasons, our cognitive shortcuts leave us susceptible to exterior situational
manipulation. 1 32

Availability, for example, "is a heuristic that is used to evaluate the frequency
or likelihood of an event on the basis of how quickly instances or associations
come to mind." 1 33 This shortcut may not mislead us, but it often does. "There
are many factors uncorrelated with frequency . . . [that] can influence an event's
immediate perceptual salience, the vividness or completeness with which it is
recalled, or the ease with which it is imagined." 1 34 So it is that in experimental
surveys people have evaluated the risk of homicide as greater than the risk of
death by stomach cancer, when, in fact, the reverse is true. Indeed, the latter is
" 17 times more common." 1 35 This heuristic can thus have tragic social conse
quences. And so, "[b]ecause members of minority groups who perform unusual
behaviors are especially distinctive, people may form illusory correlations
,,
between group membership and the unusual behavior 1 36-that is, incorrect
stereotypes .
Mentioning or asking about an event can itself increase its availability-just
as mentioning "chocolate chip cookie" can increase the extent to which people
visualize such a delight. 1 3 7 And like the jingle that has overstayed its welcome,
when something is on our mind, it can be hard to get it off. For instance,
"random and irrelevant starting points can have a dramatic impact on judg
,,
ment. 1 3 8 Tversky and Kahneman, seminal authorities on heuristics, identified
what they tenn the anchoring bias based on a series of experiments demonstrat
ing that "[i]nitial starting points, even totally irrelevant ones, seem to serve as

1 30.
131.
1 32.
Jon D.

KUNDA, supra note 6, at 56.
See NISBElT & Ross, supra note 1 29, at 1 8.
See Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously I, supra note 1 26, at 672-87; see also
Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market
Manipulation, 1 1 2 HARV. L. REV. 1 420, 1 425-27 ( 1 999) [hereinafter Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavior
alism Seriously II].
1 33 . FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 72, at 384.
1 34. NISBElT & Ross, supra note 1 29, at 19.
1 35. KUNDA, supra note 6, at 91 (citing P. Slovic et aI., Facts Versus Fears: Understanding
Perceived Risk, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 1 26, at 436).
1 36. KUNDA, supra note 6, at 1 59 (emphasis added); see also id. at 1 30-33 (explaining that we "see"
illusory correlations when "rare and distinctive individuals," who therefore "capture our attention"
engage in certain behaviors); infra Part III . B.2.a.i (discussing this and other sources of stereotypes). See
generally Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The Influence ofKnowledge Structures on
Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 1 06 (2004) [hereinafter Chen & Hanson, Categorically
Biased] (describing in detail the process by which stereotypes are created and activated).
1 37 . For a review of the evidence, see Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously II, supra
note 1 32, at 1532-34; see also KUNDA, supra note 6, at 1 23 ("Merely asking participants to analyze the
reasons for their behavioral predictions made them view the behaviors as more likely.").
1 38 . KUNDA, supra note 6, at 1 02.
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anchors."1 39 "[O]nce we have made an intuitive estimate, even i f we are told
that we are wrong, we still keep the initial rough estimate as an implicit
baseline. We are anchored to it. We are unwilling to neglect it completely and
,,
start afresh. 1 40
Similarly, we cannot seem to shake what we know did happen when estimat
ing what we would have predicted would happen. As B aruch Fischhoff discov
ered, "[rJeporting an outcome's occurrence increases its perceived probability of
occurrence; and . . . people who have received outcome knowledge are largely
unaware of its having changed their peceptions . . . . ,, 141 And on top of this,
people even overestimate the accuracy of predictions that they actually made. 1 42
This hindsight bias, which has been demonstrated for a wide range of events, is
one of the interior situational influences that we observe in others (but not in
ourselves) often enough to give rise to the common phrase "hindsight is 20/20."

ii. Endowment Effects
Another interior situational influence that profoundly affects our thinking
outside our awareness is a phenomenon social psychologists have dubbed the
endowment effect. 143 This term stands for the well-documented tendency of
humans to value things they have (or believe they have) already, over that
which they do not have (or do not believe they have). An early study demonstrat
ing this pattern has become somewhat familiar in legal-theoretic references to
the lessons of "behavioralism"-the Cornell coffee mug study. 1 44 In that study,
subjects, who were given a coffee mug, valued the mug more than did students
who were not given the mug. The subjects' willingness to pay and willingness
to accept money for the same item was influenced significantly by the initial
endowments.
Beyond demonstrating the basic contours of the endowment effect, the coffee
mug studies also nicely show how this bias operates in a seemingly automatic
fashion; subjects valued what they had more than what they did not have even
when the item was relatively meaningless and had only been "theirs" for a very

1 39. Id. (citing Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty; Heuristics and
Biases, 1 85 SCIENCE 1 1 24 ( 1 974)). See generally Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously I,
supra note 126, at 667-69 (reviewing some of the experiments).
1 40. MASSIMO PIATELLl-PALMARlNI, INEVITABLE ILLUSIONS: How MISTAKES OF REASON RULE OUR MINDS
7 1 -72 ( 1 994).
1 4 1 . Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight oF Foresight; The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment
Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 288, 288 ( 1 975).
142. See KUNDA, supra note 6, at 1 84; Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously I, supra
note 1 26, at 660.
143. See Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, The Endowment Effect, Loss
Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 1 93 , 1 97-20 1 ( 1 99 1 ) ; see also Hanson & Kysar,
Taking Behavioralism Seriously I, supra note 1 26, at 673-76 (summarizing social psychological
findings concerning the endowment effect).
144. See Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of the
Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1 325, 1 330 ( 1 990) (describing the Cornell
coffee mug study, and several variations of it, in detail).
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short time. Other variations of the coffee mug experiment highlight the uncon
scious nature of the effect by showing that subjects in an ex ante perspective
underestimate the effect that a hypothetical endowment would have on their
valuation of an item. 1 45 Still other studies have demonstrated the presence of the
endowment effect in more important areas of social life, such as in the patterns
of workers' valuation of health care benefits. Research indicates that workers
will value particular health benefits more when they are mandated, and thus
presented as an endowment, than they do when the same benefits are not
presumptively endowed. 1 46
The robust findings concerning the influence of the endowment effect thus
should undermine our confidence in the reality of the thinking-preferring
choosing model of human thinking. What is perhaps even more troubling about
this cognitive pattern, however, is not just that it happens, but that like other
interior situational influences, the operation of the endowment effect is subject
to exterior situational influences that can frame our sense of what we presently
have and do not have. Cues in the environment can, without anyone noticing,
orient the burdens of proof, persuasion, and negotiation.

iii. Framing Effects
And more generally, the way in which an issue is presented to us significantly
influences how we perceive it. Psychologists have dubbed this the framing
effect. Even minor alterations in the presentation of options that are substan
tively identical seem to influence our perceptions and attitudes regarding the
options. 147 Kahneman and Tversky, the cognitive psychologists who identified
and named the phenomenon, describe it as "both pervasive and robust." It is "as
common among sophisticated respondents as among naIve ones . . . . In their
stubborn appeal, framing effects resemble perceptual illusions more than compu-

1 45. See George Loewenstein & Daniel Adler, A Bias in the Prediction of Tastes, 1 05 EcON. J. 929,
93 1 ( I 995}.
1 46. See Jonathan Gruber, The Incidence of Mandated Maternity Benefits, 84 AM. ECON. REv. 622
( l 994). Gruber's study found that the imposition of mandatory maternity benefits caused the wages of
workers to fall by at least the cost of providing the insurance, but that the hours worked and the
probability of the workers' being employed did not change or was only slightly lower with the
endowment in place. According to Gruber, "[tlhe findings consistently suggest shifting of the costs of
the mandates on the order of 1 00 percent, with little effect on net labor input." Id. at 623; see also Jolls,
Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 64, at 1 506--07 (discussing Gruber's findings as inconsistent with
conventional economic analysis but consistent with social psychological studies concerning the endow
ment effect). For other "real world" findings concerning the endowment effect that sweep beyond
coffee mugs, see Ward Farnsworth, Do Panies to Nuisance Lawsuits Bargain After Judgment? A
Glimpse Inside the Cathedral, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND EcONOMICS, supra note 1 26, at 302; Kahneman,
Knetsch & Thaler, supra note 1 43.
1 47. See Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously I, supra note 1 26, at 644, 684-87
(reviewing several key studies). Consider, for example, the very different response supermarkets are
likely to elicit from their customers when they label their beef as being "eighty-five percent fat free,"
rather than "fifteen percent fat," or that filling stations are likely to inspire when they frame their
cash-based prices as "discounts" rather than advertising that they charge a premium for purchases on
credit.
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,
tational errors., 1 48 As another decision theorist has explained, the power of the
phenomenon results from our "tendency to accept problem formulations as they
are given . . . [to] remain, so to speak, mental prisoners of the frame provided to
,,
us by the experimentalist, or by the 'expert, ' or by a certain situation. 1 49 More
succinctly, "framing" is one identified piece of the manipulable situation.

iv. Summary
There is something familiar about the source of these well-documented
heuristics. They are different ways of talking about the same basic phenomenon.
They are all just manifestations in different contexts of what we have been
describing throughout this Article and its companion : we see the vivid and we
miss the pallid. Small pieces of the picture tend to dominate our assessment of
the whole image. We readily see what is available, anchored, and presently
normal, all according to how it had been framed, and we find it difficult to see
much else. As Ziva Kunda puts it, these choice biases "may be viewed as a kind
of mental contamination . . . . Even though we do not want our judgments to be
contaminated in this manner, it is very difficult to eliminate the contamina
,,
tion. 1 5o
That difficulty, we believe, is largely the consequence of our interior situa
tions. We do not see these biases at work. We do not see, in other words, that we
do not see. This inability to see our interior situation is the source of the interior
fundamental attribution error. And our interior myopia helps give rise to the
exterior fundamental attribution error. People's behavior, like news of a homi
cide, is available. Their situation, like statistics on stomach cancer, generally is
not. We are dispositionists because of what comes to mind most easily-and,
once in our minds, anchors our attributions. 1 5 1 Interiorly and exteriorly, we
humans miss the situational forest for the dispositional trees.
In part because our exterior dispositionism is causally related to our interior
disposition ism, our interior situation can be easily exploited through the manipu
lation of our exterior situation. Each study demonstrating a choice bias is itself
indirect proof of that fact. Scientists were able to manipulate cognitions by
manipulating the exterior situation. And the interior situation leaves open and
unguarded the gates through which the Trojan horse of exterior situation freely
enters, not as a trophy of our dispositional triumph, but as a hidden means of
influencing our behavior. 1 52

1 48 . Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOL. 34 1 , 343
( 1 984).
149. PIATELLl-PALMARINI, supra note 140, at 30.
1 50 . KUNDA, supra note 6, at 1 06.
1 5 1 . See KUNDA, supra note 6, at 1 04 (discussing George Quattrone's work suggesting that "anchor
ing may play a role in producing the [exterior] fundamental attribution error") (citing George Quat
trone, Overattribution and Unit Formation: When Behavior Engulfs the Person, 42 J. PERSONALITY &
Soc. PSYCHOL. 593 ( 1 982» .
152. For a related discussion of "the problem of manipulation," see Hanson & Kysar, Taking
Behavioralism Seriously I, supra note 1 26.
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b. Intertemporal Effects
Psychologists and economic behavioralists have discerned a general category
of choice bias that results from the effect of time. Consider the following
thought experiment. Would you rather receive a prize of $ 1 00 today or a prize
of $200 two years from now? If you are like most people, you opted for the
smaller amount of money today. And even those who choose to wait for the
bigger prize find the choice a tough one. I S3
Now, which would you choose if the options were $ 1 00 in six years or $200
in eight years? That's an easy one, even for people who have j ust answered the
first question. Almost everyone we ask unhesitatingly opts for the larger,
delayed prize. Some are struck (even embarrassed) to realize that the choices
are exactly the same, except for the time frame. The second pair of options is
just the first pair, six years later. 1 54 So, are you willing to wait two years for an
extra $ 1 00 or not? Somehow the choices in the two proposals seem different.
There is considerable evidence that people find it difficult to delay gratification
and very easy to delay displeasure. 1 55 More generally, people attach greater
significance to outcomes-good or bad-that are close by than those that are far
away. 1 56
If you want $100 today instead of $200 in two years, but would prefer $200
in eight years to $ 1 00 in six, you are probably responding to the exterior
situational salience of money today, in your pocket, ready to spend on all the
items that likewise are comparatively available. Any of the other sums at future
times are far less immediate, as are the items you might purchase. Thus, when
faced with the second pair of options, the options are fungible in availability
terms, making the larger sum more attractive. In other words, money is not
fungible where the situational frame is not. 1 57 That people do not anticipate
those differences and that theorists have difficulty explaining that tendency

1 53. We have ourselves conducted this experiment in a number of different settings, and each time
we have seen that the formal renditions of the experiment predicted the results. For the formal versions
of the hyperbolic discounting experiments, see George Ainslie & Nick Haslam, Hyperbolic Discount
ing, in CHOICE OVER TIME 57, 69 (George Loewenstein & Jon Elster eds., 1992); see also Shane
Frederick, George Loewenstein & Ted O' Donoghue, Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical
Review, J. EcoN. LIT. 35 1 , 360--6 1 (2002) (summarizing similar studies including some done on
pigeons).
1 54. If you didn't experience the apparent reversal in attitudes, try reducing the sums to, say, $ 1 0
and $20.
I SS. See, e.g. , Frederick, Loewenstein & O' Donoghue, supra note 1 5 3 , at 36 1 ; see also Ted
O' Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Doing It Now or Later, 89 AM. EcoN. REv. 103, 103 ( 1 999) ("People
are impatient--they like to experience rewards soon and to delay costs until later."). But see Dan Ariely
& George Loewenstein, When Does Duration Matter in Judgment and Decision Making?, 1 29 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 508 (2000) (describing some exceptions); Drazen Prelec & George loewen
stein, The Red and the Black: Mental Accounting of Savings and Debt, 17 MARKETING SCI. 4 ( 1 998)
(same).
1 56. This evidence contradicts the conventional discounted utility model of neoclassical economics
that has long been the dominant normative and positive model of intertemporal decision-making. See
infra text accompanying notes 339-80.
1 57 . See generally VIVIANA ZELIZER, THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MONEY ( 1 997).
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illustrates the power of our interior situation. 1 5s And that we humans are
unaware of this power renders us especially vulnerable to manipulation through
external situation.
Although social psychologists have not recently focused closely on this
particular choice bias, their general findings about our cognitive processes
predict and explain it. Time variations are really just variations on the theme
that we have been developing and that social psychologists discovered decades
ago-situation matters. And temporal proximity is part of the situation. 1 59
One does not need to be terribly well-versed in social psychology to find
examples of broader phenomena that would include the time effects that
economic behavioralists have highlighted. In addition to the many studies
discussed elsewhere in this Article, consider, for example, a Wilson and Nisbett
experiment in which subjects were asked in a bargain store to judge which one
of four nylon stocking pantyhose was the best quality. 1 60 The subjects were not
told that the stockings were in fact identical. Wilson and Nisbett presented the
stockings to the subjects hanging on racks spaced equal distances apart. As
situation would have it, the position of the stockings had a significant effect on
the subjects' quality j udgments. In particular, moving from left to right, 1 2% of
the subjects judged the first stockings as being the best quality, 1 7% of the
subjects chose the second pair of stockings, 3 1 % of the subjects chose the third
pair of stockings, and 40% of the subjects chose the fourth-the most recently
viewed pair of stockings. 1 6 1 When asked about their respective jUdgments, most
of the subjects attributed their decision to the knit, weave, sheerness, elasticity,
or workmanship of the stockings that they chose to be of the best quality. 1 62
Dispositional qualities of the stocking, if you will. Subjects provided a total of
eighty different reasons for their choices. 1 63 Not one, however, mentioned the
position of the stockings, or the relative recency with which the pairs were
viewed. l 64 None, that is, saw the situation. In fact, when asked whether the
position of the stockings could have influenced their judgments, only one
subject admitted that position could have been influential. 1 65 Thus, Wilson and
Nisbett conclude that "[w]hat matters . . . is not why the [position] effect occurs
but that it occurs and that subjects do not report it or recognize it when it is

158. Even the more creative explanations that economic behavioralists provide, such as "mental
accounts," are actually just somewhat ad hoc and narrow versions of highly developed and expansive
theories that social psychologists have long been refining, but the lessons of which go far beyond what
economists recognize in their provisional categories. See, e.g., infra Part III.B.2.a. (discussing role of
knowledge structures).
159. Cf TODD RAKOFF, TIME (2002) (analyzing the role of law in structuring people's conception and
experience of time).
1 60. See Wilson & Nisbett, supra note 87, at 1 23.
1 6 1 . ld.
162. [d. at 124.
163. ld.
164. ld.
165. /d.
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,,
pointed out to them. 1 66
Consider, again, Stanley Milgram's classic studies. Social psychologist Roger
Brown reanalyzed the twenty-one variations of Milgram's studies in terms of
the concept of immediacy, which he defines as "proximity in space or time and
,,
presence or absence of barriers. 1 67 Brown appreciated that there were two
people exerting a situational force on the subject (the "teacher"): the "experi
menter" and the "learner." Brown then ranked the experiments according to the
"net immediacy" of those two forces and identified seven variations along a
spectrum of immediacy. 1 68
At one extreme, the experimenter was present as described in our summary
above, 1 69 but the "learner" was in another room and could neither be seen nor
heard. Thus the experimenter was, relative to the "learner," very immediate to
the subject. Under that design, one hundred percent of the subjects shocked to
the limit of 450 volts. At the other extreme, the "learner" pounded the wall and
screamed as we described earlier but the experimenter gave no orders at all,
leaving the teacher free to choose shocking levels. In that variation, then, the
suffering "learner" was, relative to the experimenter, very immediate. There,
only one of forty teachers shocked to the limit and the mean maximum shock
was only forty-five volts.
In between those extremes, Brown analyzed the immediacy effects of bring-

166. /d. For more examples of the powerful role of the situational influence of proximity, see Nisbett
& Wilson, supra note 1 22. Wilson and Nisbett's analysis was, particularly initially, met with consider
able criticism. See, e.g., Eliot R. Smith & Frederick D. Miller, Limits on Perception of Cognitive
Processes: A Reply to Nisbett and Wilson, 85 PSYCHOL. BULL. 355 ( 1 978) (asserting that Nisbett and
Wilson's claim that people have no direct access to their mental processes is overstated); Peter White,
Limitations on Verbal Reports of Internal Events: A Refutation of Nisbett and Wilson and of Bem, 87
PSYCHOL. REV. 105- 1 2 ( 1 980) (criticizing Nisbett and Wilson's interpretations and methodologies);
Peter Wright & Peter D. Rip, Retrospective Reports on the Causes of Decisions, 40 J. PERSONALITY &
Soc. PSYCHOL. 601 ( 1 98 1 ) (claiming that Wilson and Nisbett's conclusion that people have no
awareness or retrieval abilities of their mental processes is overstated); Robert E. Kraut & Steven H .
Lewis, Person Perception and Self-Awareness: Knowledge of Influences o n One 's Own Judgments, 42
J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 448 ( 1 982) (finding that judges' self-reports about what influences their
judgments are moderately accurate at estimating the actual influences on their judgments); George A.
Quattrone, On the Congruity Between Internal States and Action, 98 PSYCHOL. BULL. 3 ( 1 985) (arguing
that self-report effects are significant and congruent with behavior more frequently than indicated by
Wilson and Nisbett). More recently, however, Nisbett and Wilson's arguments and conclusions are
enjoying greater support. See, e.g., Mirjam Sprangers et aI., A Constructive Replication of White's

Alleged Refutation of Nisbett and Wilson and of Bem: Limitations on Verbal Reports of Internal Events,
23 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 302 ( 1 987) (finding that observers' causal reports are no more
accurate than actors' causal reports on judgment processes); Charles K. Turner, Don 't Blame Memory
for People 's Faulty Reports on What Influences Their Judgments, 1 4 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 622 ( 1 988) (finding that memory decay is not attributable to people's inability to accurately
report on judgment processes); Banaji, Implicit Attitudes, supra note 105.
167. ROGER BROWN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 20 (2d. ed. 1986). The following summary of Brown's work
comes from id. at 20-24.
1 68. Milgram himself adjusted the experimental setting to examine the effect of the "closeness of
the victim" and "closeness of authority." See BROWN, supra note 1 67, at 2 1 . Brown was therefore just
building on Milgram's intended design.
1 69. See supra text accompanying notes 8- 1 3 .
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ing the "learner" into the same room with the teacher and even of requiring the
teacher to force the victim's hand down onto a shock plate. He found that the
net immediacy of the various manipulations perfectly explained the variance in
the percentage of teachers who shocked to the limit. The "willingness to shock a
victim, though always the same in its supposed ultimate effect, declines . . . as
the person administering the shock becomes more immediately and intimately
,,
acquainted with the suffering he believes he is producing. 1 7o
Thus, the Milgram experiments reveal the same tendency-more broadly
understood as immediacy-that economic behavioralists have struggled to ex
plain under the heading of intertemporal dynamics. But even that description
understates the narrowness of economic behavioralists' theorizing. Immediacy
is thus another manifestation of the far more general phenomenon that we have
been describing: the human tendency to see the accessible, vivid, and immedi
ate, and to miss all else, the situation. 1 7 I Often, the obvious eclipses the
influential.
Consider another dramatic demonstration of the power of "recency" in the
situational character's perception of its experience. Many individuals have
experienced the discomfort of routine colonoscopy examinations. Social psy
chologists Donald Redelmeier and Daniel Kahneman conspired with doctors to
perform a variation of that routine to help better understand human memory and
perceptions of pain. During and just after a basic colonoscopy, patients were
,,
surveyed about the quality of the "unpleasantness. 1 72 In the control group, the
exam was performed in the usual way, under routine conditions in which the
doctor left the examining instrument, the source of the discomfort, inside of the
body for only as much time as was needed to safely perform the colonoscopy.
With a second group of subjects, the same routine examination was performed,
except that after the examination was otherwise complete, the doctors left the
spectroscope in the anal sphincter for a short time, without moving it around,
before finally pulling it out. 1 73

1 70. BROWN, supra note 1 67 , at 22.
1 7 1 . Cf id. ("[I]t seems reasonable to extend immediacy so as to give it psychological sense such as
salience in consciousness . . . . "); NISBETT & Ross, supra note 1 29, at 62 ("People give inferential
weight to information in proportion to its vividness. Vividness is defined as the emotional interest of the
information, the concreteness and imaginability of information, and the sensory, spatial, and temporal
proximity of information.").
172. Donald A. Redelmeier & Daniel Kahneman, Patients ' Memories of Painful Medical Treat
ments: Real-Time and Retrospective Evaluations of Two Minimally Invasive Procedures, 66 PAIN 3
( 1 996). Redelemeier and Kahneman's study fits into an extensive body (no pun intended) of social
psychological study of memory. See, e.g., D. Thomas & E. Diener, Memory Accuracy in the Recall of
Emotions, 59 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. \091 ( 1 998) (finding that people's memories of
emotional experiences are often inaccurate).
173. A t some level this study was more invasive than even Stanley Milgrim's, in that the experiment
ers actually inflicted pain for experimental purposes on the second group of patients. Without elabora
tion, Redelmeir and Kahneman noted that "[n]o colonoscopy . . . was performed solely for research
purposes and all patients gave informed consent." Redelmeier & Kahneman, supra note 1 72, at 4.
There is no word on the situation within which the consent was given. We have already seen from
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Both groups of patients rated the different periods of the examination the
same in terms of the degree of "unpleasantness" they were experiencing when
asked-both rated the height of the examination, when the spectroscope was
moving, as the most painful. Both groups also rated moments in which the
scope was inside the body but not moving as painful, but far less painful than
the moments when the instrument was moving. Common sense would hold that
the second group experienced more total pain or displeasure than did the control
group. 1 74
But common sense tends to miss the situation: just after the examination was
completed, when the subjects were asked to evaluate the overall experience on a
scale of unpleasantness, the second group rated the experience as less unpleas
ant overall than did the first group. 1 7S The additional, but more recent lower
amounts of pain that the experimental group endured apparently overshadowed
their memory of the intense pain (that, again, they experienced in equal measure
with the control group) and altered their perception of the whole experience. 1 76
Studies like this one 1 77 demonstrate the situational power of recency in our
evaluative process. What is most recent to us is, other things being equal,
closest to us and most prominent in our minds. While the study seems to
contradict common sense, it resonates easily with the tenets of social psychol
ogy. As the authors point out, "[t]he discrepancy between people's real-time and
retrospective evaluations is not surprising given the limitations of human memory
and judgment." 178
Like many such studies, the colonoscopy findings can have both particular
and parabolic implications. With respect to medical-care concerns, Redelmeier
and Kahneman explain that their findings do not counsel a clear policy:
If the objective is to reduce patients' memory of pain[,] . . . [g]radual relief
may be preferable to abrupt relief if patients retain a less aversive memory
[through the delayed relief approach] . . . . In contrast, if the objective is to
reduce the amount of pain actually experienced, conducting the procedure

Milgram's work that the question of "informed consent" is perhaps just that, a question, and not one
that can be answered in the form of a simple waiver like the one indicated here. In a later publication in
which he discussed this experiment, Kahneman drops a footnote and writes: "The ethical justification
for the experiment was the observation of poor compliance among patients who have had a painful
colonoscopy and are instructed to schedule another." See Daniel Kahneman, Experienced Utility and
Objective Happiness: A Moment-Based Approach, in CHOICES, VALUES AND FRAMES 673, 676 n.2 (Daniel
Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000).
1 74. Redelmeier & Kahneman, supra note 172, at 4-5.
1 75. [d. at 6.
1 76. [d. at 6-7 .
1 77. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman, Evaluation By Moments, in CHOICES, VALUES AND FRAMES, supra
note 1 73, at 693, 694-99 & fig.38. 1 (B) (reporting similar patterns in overall evaluations by control
subjects who hear a sharp unpleasant sound as compared to the evaluations of a group of subjects who
heard the same sharp unpleasant sound followed by several other somewhat less sharp but still
unpleasant sounds; the latter group rated the overall experience as less unpleasant than did the first).
1 7 8 . Redelmeier & Kahneman, supra note 1 72, at 7.
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swiftly may be appropriate even if doing so increases the peak pain intensity
9
and leaves patients with a particularly aversive memory. 1 7

Their findings nevertheless counsel a clear theoretic prescription to consider
the profound role that situation plays in how humans perceive their own
experience, both immediately and retrospectively. Such findings present "com
,,
plex ethical issue[s], 1 80 not only for medicine, but for any enterprise that
purports to be devoted to human welfare. 1 8 1 The "natural limitations of human
,,
memory 1 82 are likely always in play in our assessments. Thus, as another team
of social psychologists noted, Redelmeier and Kahneman's "results have both
humane and Orwellian implications and suggest enormous possibilities for
I
decision engineering." 8 3
Encouraging lawmakers and legal theorists to confront those possibilities is,
of course, a primary goal of this Article. Before evaluating the "Orwellian
implications" of our predicament, however, legal theorists must first be willing
to distrust their own perceptions and common sense.
2. Process Biases
While the previous section focused on several choice biases, this section
focuses 'on a pair of process biases that similarly operate out of sight within our
interiors. The distinction between the two general types of biases is not in their
situational source but in the scope of their influence over our thinking and
behavior. Choice biases are treated as having only task-specific implications
related to instances of judgment or decisionmaking. Process biases, in contrast,
are more systemic tendencies of human cognition that influence individuals
across a vast range of cognitive experience.
So what are "process biases"? Social psychologists have taken to construing
and portraying �ople as intuitive scientists. 1 84 And for with good reason: All
people, not just those who occupy academic and scientific institutions, have a
deep urge to understand and make sense of themselves and their worlds. 1 8 s
Indeed, those institutions reflect a more general human urge and set of pro-

1 79 . /d.
1 80. Id.
1 8 1 . Kahneman has recently delved more deeply into providing a utility analysis model that
comports with his and others' findings about pain and memory. See Kahneman, supra note 1 73.
1 82. Redelmeier & Kahneman, supra note 172, at 7.
1 83. See B.A. Mellers, A. Schwartz & A.DJ. Cooke, Judgment and Decision Making, 49 ANN. REV.
PSYCHOL. 447, 455 ( 1 998).
1 84. See, e.g., BROWN, supra note 1 67, at 1 33-68; FRITZ HEIDER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERPERSONAL
RELATIONS ( 1 958); KUNDA, supra note 6, at 1 1 1-60 (examining how "we test particular hypotheses
about the world"); Ross & NISBETI, supra note 6, at 2; Harold H. Kelley, A ttribution Theory in Social
Psychology, in 15 NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION 1 92 (David Levine ed., 1967).
1 85 . See infra Part m.e.2.a (describing the motive to understand).
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cesses. 1 86 And for now-familiar reasons, those general processes are often
biasing for lay and professional scientists alike. This section summarizes three
systems of information processing and their biasing effects: knowledge struc
tures, causal attributions, and counterfactual thinking. Because those systems
are being described in detail in contiguous work, 1 87 we can again spare our
readers an extended review.

a. Knowledge Structures
"Out of time we cut 'days ' and 'nights, ' 'summers ' and 'winters. ' We say
what each part of the sensible continuum is, and all these abstract whats are

concepts.
The intellectual life of man consists almost wholly in his substitution of a
conceptual order for the perceptual order in which his experience originally
comes. "
I

�

William James 88

"By such mental operations we simplify the world of phenomena, but we
cannot avoidfalsifying it in doing so . . . .
"

�

Sigmund Freud l 89

Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross define knowledge structures as the "intuitive
implements" that "allow the individual to define and interpret the data of
,,
physical and social life. 1 90 Ziva Kunda has more recently explained, similarly,
that our knowledge structures or concepts l91 "help[] us make sense of our social
,,
worlds and guide our social judgments. 1 92 They are "the building blocks of
,,
,,
cognition, 1 93 or the "tools of construal 1 94 whose many crucial functions
"include classification, inferring additional attributes, guiding attention and
1 86. Cf Harold H. Kelley, The Process of Causal Attribution, 28 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1 07 ( 1 973);
Leslie Ann McArthur, The How and What of Why: Some Determinants and Consequences of Causal
Attribution, 22 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1 7 1 ( 1 972).
1 87. See Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 1 36; Hanson, Reyes & Schlanger,
Attributional Positivism, supra note 43 (examining how people make attributions of causation, responsi
bility, and blame, and describing the relevance of attribution theory for law and legal theory).
1 88. WILLIAM JAMES, SOME PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY: A BEGINNING OF AN INTRODUCITON TO PHILOSOPHY
( 1 9 1 1 ), reprinted in WILLIAM JAMES, WRlTlNGS 1 902- 1 9 1 0, at 1 008-09 (Bruce Kucklick ed., 1 987).
1 89. SIGMUND FREUD, ANALYSIS TERMINABLE AND INTERMINABLE ( 1 937), reprinted in 23 THE COMPLETE
PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 209, 228 (James Strachey ed., 1 986).
1 90. NISBETT & Ross, supra note 1 29, at 6-7.
1 9 1 . Terminology here is a little up for grabs and somewhat context dependent. What Kunda refers
to as concepts are sometimes referred to as "mental representations," "schemas," "theories," or
"categories," among other names. See Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 1 36, at 1 1 3 1
& n. 1 1 1 .
1 92. KUNDA, supra note 6, at 1 5 .
1 93. 1d. at I 6.
1 94. Ross & NISBETT, supra note 6, at 1 2 .
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interpretation, communication, and reasoning." 195
When we encounter objects or experiences or ideas or people or behavior, we
classify them, as best we can, within our existing concepts, which then allow us
to obtain understandings that go well beyond those we would obtain were we
forced to rely solely on a present instance alone. And when we enter any
exterior situation, the concepts in our interior situation-and the "wealth of
causal information" they contain l 96-give us a filtering system for narrowing
our focus to the information we will use to make sense of what we encounter.
By way of analogy, imagine searching for a particular definition in a dictio
nary with the sole strategy of reading random sections or of reading from
beginning to end until you encounter the target word. Knowing to pick up a
dictionary is an important start, but more is needed to make processing the
information contained in the dictionary feasible. The alphabetical arrangement
of words in dictionaries is a schema, and one that is a huge time-saving device.
Similarly, imagine searching web pages for particular information without the
aid of search engines or links . . . or even a shared language.
Those exterior schemas, which we tend to take for granted and rarely, if ever,
clearly examine, are analogous to (and sometimes reflect and influence) our
interior schemas, of which we are even less aware and which we are therefore
less likely to scrutinize. We process stimuli "through preexisting systems of
schematized and abstracted knowledge-beliefs, theories, propositions, and
schemas. These knowledge structures label and categorize objects and events
quickly and, for the most part, accurately. They also define a set of expectations
,,
about objects and events and suggest appropriate responses to them. 1 97
Thus, the benefit of such knowledge structures is that they provide us, often
automatically, with a way of understanding our world so that we can operate
reasonably well within it, at the same time that they free up cognitive capacity
to cope with other pressing issues. 1 98 Similarly, the concepts, insofar as they are
shared, allow us to communicate efficiently with those around US. 1 99 In short,
without the knowledge structures "[w]e would be unable to extract meaning
from the huge amount of information that surrounds us, unable to generalize
from one experience to another, and unable to communicate effectively with
,,
each other. 200
But those benefits are not without costs: "A price is paid for this mental
,,
economy. 20 1 The alphabetical arrangement of a dictionary is little help when

1 95 . KUNDA, supra note 6, at 1 7 .
1 96. Id. a t 52; see also id. at 36-4 1 .
1 97 . NISBElT & Ross, supra note 1 29, at 7 .
1 98. See Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 1 36, at 1 1 39-77.
1 99. KUNDA, supra note 6, at 20. The field of cognitive linguistics demonstrates a similar role for
metaphor. See generally GEORGE LAKOFF, MORAL POLmcs: How LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES THINK (2d
ed. 2002); GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE By ( 1 980).
200. KUNDA, supra note 6, at 1 7 .
20 1 . NISBElT & Ross, supra note 1 29, at 7 .
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you want to know, precisely, how to spell the word that sounds like "siekol
lojee." "The knowledge structures themselves are not infallible guides to the
nature of physical or social reality."zoz
Some beliefs, theories , and schemas are relatively poor and inaccurate repre
sentations of the external world. Furthermore, objects and events are not always
labeled accurately and sometimes are processed through entirely inappropriate
knowledge structures,z03 "Without these structures stored in memory, life would
be a buzzing confusion, but the clarity they offer is helpful only in proportion to
their validity and to the accuracy with which they are applied to the data at
hand."zo4 And when that is not the case, they can be misleading and harmful.
Indeed, that is the main point that this Article is making about the dominant
self-schema: dispositionism. We are not who our knowledge structures tell us
we are.

i. The Stereotypical Knowledge Structure
At a time when the world as a whole suffers from panic induced by the rival
ideologies of the east and west, each comer of the earth has its own special
burdens of animosity. Moslems distrust non-Moslems. Jews who escaped
extermination in Central Europe find themselves in the new state of Israel
surrounded by anti-Semitism. Refugees roam in inhospitable lands. Many of
the colored people of the world suffer indignities at the hand of whites who
invent a fanciful racist doctrine to justify their condescension. The checker
board of prejudice in the United States is perhaps the most intricate of all.
While some of this endless antagonism seems based upon a realistic conflict of
interests, most of it, we suspect, is a product of the fears of the imagination.
-Gordon W. AIlportZ05

Gordon Allport's now-classic description of group stereotypes was an impor
tant step toward explaining the cognitive mechanisms behind the senseless
hatred and prejudice that have reverberated throughout human history. Although
the consequences of such ethnic- and race-based knowledge structures seem as
evident today as they were fifty years ago when Allport wrote, parts of his
message seem to have taken root.
Indeed, the best known-indeed, for many, the only known-example of the
operation of interior schemas is the group-based stereotype.Z06 "[S]tereotypes

202. /d.
203. See Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 1 36, at 1 1 55- 1 2 1 8 (detailing the often
distorting effects of our categories and schemas).
204. See N rsBETI & Ross, supra note 1 29, at 7.
205. GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE, at xiii ( 1 954).
206. It is to avoid the pejorative associations of "stereotyping" with racism that some social
psychologists have adopted different names for the broader tendency to categorize people in the same
way as we categorize all things. See, e.g., Nisbett & Ross, supra note 1 29, at 35 (explaining why they
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are typically viewed as cognitive structures that contain our knowledge, beliefs,
,,
and expectations about a social group . . . . 207 They are described as "culturally
,,
shared, indeed hackneyed, notions 208 about those groups. Here is where the
human tendency to rely on knowledge structures has come to be understood as
an inherently pernicious process, instead of as a necessary and often helpful
one?09 Stereotypes, in other words, are the stereotype of what we are calling
"knowledge structures."
To see more clearly the role of stereotypes and, more generally, schemas,
consider this classic experiment. White subjects were shown a videotape of a
purportedly unscripted conversation between two men. At several points during
the video a beep sounded, prompting the subjects to characterize the conduct of
the men they were watching into one of several possible categories (for ex
ample, "dramatizes," "gives information," "asks for opinion," "playing around,"
"aggressive behavior," and "violent behavior").2 1 0 The videotaped conversation
becomes increasingly heated and the men begin to say things like "you must be
crazy," and "you're just too damned conservative." Finally, one man pushes the
other, at which point subjects were beeped again and asked to characterize the
push?l I
Different versions of the video were shown to different subjects, using
different combinations of black and white men in the conversation. Where a
black man pushes a white man, seventy-five percent of the subjects character
,,
ized the push as "violent behavior. 2 1 2 Where a white man pushes a black man,
only seventeen percent of the subjects categorized the push as "violent behav
ior."2 1 3 Another forty-two percent of the subjects characterized the white man's
,,
behavior simply as "dramatiz[ing)" or "playing around. 2 1 4

prefer the "concept of persona" to the concept of stereotype even though the two are "not essentially
different"). In other words, social psychologists are understandably concerned about the influence of
schemas on our understanding of schemas.
207. KUNDA, supra note 6, at 3 1 5.
208. NISBETI & Ross, supra note 1 29, at 35.
209. Through our knowledge structures, we automatically process new information into familiar
groupings, categories or schemas. Stereotypes are just one of the many consequences of that interior
situational process. See Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 1 36, Part II. People form
stereotypes of social groups at a very young age and have difficulty suppressing their automatic
schemas when they encounter a member of the stereotyped group, even when they do not desire to see
that person in a prejudicial way. See Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination and
Mental Correction: Unwanted Influences on Judgments and Evaluations, 1 1 6 PSYCHOL. BULL. 1 1 7,
1 26-27 ( 1 994). Indeed, actively trying to suppress stereotypic responses can increase the frequency of
such responses. See id. at 1 27. Those automatic prejudices and stereotypes, therefore, constitute a form
of "mental contamination" that affects how people come to understand and view certain social groups.

Id.
2 1 0. Birt L. Duncan, Differential Social Perception and Attribution of Intergroup Violence: Testing
the Lower Limits of Stereotyping of Blacks, 34 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 590, 593-94 ( 1 976).
2 1 1 . Id. at 593.
2 1 2. Id. at 595.
2 1 3 . Id.
2 1 4. /d.
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The same subjects were also asked to indicate the extent to which the action
of the pusher should be attributable to situational forces, to the pusher person
ally, to the issue discussed in the conversation between the two men, or to some
combination of those factors. Subjects tended to attribute the black pusher's
behavior to his disposition, and the white pusher's conduct to his situation,
revealing how motivation can sometimes overcome our dispositionist presump
tion.215
The dynamics of our stereotypical thinking are driven by the interaction of
our interior and exterior situation. Stereotypes that are prominent in our culture
meet with a cognitive situation within us that is poised to confirm them. We
tend to test a hypothesis by asking questions about whether there is evidence to
confirm it and forgetting to ask whether there is evidence that would disconfirm
it. That unbalanced positive-test strategy and the resultant confirmatory bias2 1 6
occurs, not only for hypotheses that we generate ourselves, but also for any
hypotheses or schemas that occupy our interiors. Thus our minds automatically
search for, and disproportionately emphasize, evidence in the world that will
tend to confirm our racial or sexual stereotypes (be they negative or positive,
conscious or implicit). 2 1 7
The tendency i s heightened by the fact that as a consequence of this bias in
our mental processing, social psychologists have suggested that encouraging
reflection about stereotypes, without more, may perversely result in the search
and location of further confirmatory evidence for the stereotype under re
view? 1 8 More attention, in other words, may not counteract the confirmation
bias; it may simply give it more to work with.2 1 9 That pattern, troublingly,
suggests other opportunities for the situational manipulation of our mental
process. For instance, those who can influence what theories are readily avail
able in our cultural situation can influence what theories we tend to test and
seek to confirm.220

ii. Cognitive Groupism
These findings about the operation of stereotyping have been replicated for
other group schemas, including those for gender, age, professions, and social

2 1 5. See id. at 596; see also infra Part III.C.2 (summarizing interior situational motivations and their
influence). See generally Hanson, Reyes & Schlanger, Attributional Positivism, supra note 43 (summa
rizing numerous situational sources of situationism); Benforado & Hanson, NaIve Cynicism, supra note
78 (same).
2 1 6. See KUNDA, supra note 6, at 1 1 1 - 1 5 , 1 2 3-30.
2 1 7. See id.
2 1 8. See id.
2 1 9. See id.

This is an example of why it is not enough to reduce our calculus of mental processes
simply to the amount of energy or time that is allocated to an inferential task. There is not a singular
correspondence between the amount of energy given to a question and the accuracy or reliability of our
answer.
220. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 5, at 202-3 1 (describing the problem of deep
capture).
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class.z2 1 In one experiment, a group of subjects viewed one of two videotapes of
a fourth-grade girl and then were asked to evaluate her academic ability. One
videotape showed the girl in an urban, low-income setting, and the other
showed her in a middle-class, suburban area. Next, a portion of the subjects
seeing one of those videos was shown another-this time of the girl responding
to achievement-test problems. The girl's performance on those problems was
intentionally ambiguous.
Subjects who saw that last video, but neither of the first two, tended to rate
the child's academic ability roughly on a par with her known school grade
levee22 However, those subjects who had viewed the child in either the low or
high socioeconomic setting rated her abilities as appearing to be either below or
well above her grade level, respectively.z23 Thus, as Ziva Kunda summarizes,
"[i]t appears that when behaviors are somewhat ambiguous, the identical behav
ior will be understood quite differently when performed by individuals who
,,
belong to differently stereotyped groupS. 224 So it is that our knowledge struc
,
tures "color our reality. .z25 As we will review below, they also can change our
reality by coloring the experience and altering the performance of those being
stereotyped, and by reassuring us that inequalities and outcomes that might
otherwise appear illegitimate are, in fact, just. 226
The operation of group schemas need not be related to cultural stereotypes.
Indeed, "any given 'us' category is liked better than any given 'them' category,
,,
under most circumstances. 227 Muzafer Sherif, in a classic set of experiments in
the 1 950s and 1 960s, discovered some of the ways that group schemas are
generally created, as well as some of their basic effects.228 Sherif and his
collaborators ran a summer camp229 in which boys, at the beginning of the
summer, were divided into two groups: the Rattlers and the Eagles. Throughout
the summer, the boys were subtly asked to rank friendships and to make other
"sociometric" designations about each other. 230
In the first stage of the experiment, the groups were kept apart and behaved as

22 1 . See FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 72, at 1 24; KUNDA, supra note 6, at 347.
222. John M. Darley & Paget H. Gross, A Hypothesis-Confirming Bias in Labeling Effects, 44 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 20, 25 ( 1 983).
223. Id. at 24-25.
224. KUNDA, supra note 6, at 347.
225. Id. at 19.
226. See infra text accompanying notes 253-65 (summarizing evidence of stereotype threat and
disidentification).
227. FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 72, at 1 33.
228. See Ross & NISBEIT, supra note 6, at 39.
229. Yes, they actually ran a summer camp, and did so for several years, to conduct their
experiments-these were the Milgram days of social psychology, before human subjects committees
regulated social psychological studies. See MUZAFER SHERIF ET AL., INTERGROUP CONFLICT AND COOPERA
TION: THE ROBBERS CAVE EXPERIMENT 27-68 ( 1 96 1 ). Today the federal government has promulgated
extensive regulations governing the use of human subjects in psychology experiments. See generally
Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.P.R. pt. 46 (2003).
230. See BROWN, supra note 167, at 6 1 1 (revisiting Sherif's study).
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typical campers might behave, with only weak out-group aversion or in-group
solidarity?3 1 In the second stage, the groups were pitted against each other in
various competitions for prizes.232 In that situation, each group posed a realistic
threat to the other's advantage,233 and members of each group wanted nothing
to do with members of the other group. More specifically, both out-group
animosity and in-group solidarity increased dramatically as the competitions
continued, and the resultant stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination that
followed were robust:234
[M]ere informational campaigns, even those couched in appeals in moral
values, were universally unsuccessful in reducing enmity. Sunday religious
services that interrupted the period of competition with especially pointed
appeals for brotherly love, forgiveness of enemies, and cooperation had no
impact. The campers solemnly departed from the services and then, within
minutes, returned to their preoccupation with defeating or harassing the
detested out_group. 235

Put differently, appeals to dispositional change came up empty. Similarly,
placing the groups in various noncompetitive settings together-taking meals,
filling out surveys, shooting off fireworks, and so on236--did little to ameliorate
the two groups' out-group animosity, as subsequent food fights demonstrated?37
Only after the experimenters placed the campers in numerous situations of
mutual dependence and cooperation did the groups begin to alter their "us
versus them" schema. For example, a bus transporting both groups to dinner
«broke down," forcing the hungry campers to cooperate. With a rope that had
once been used in the tug-of-war competition, the groups worked to jointly push
and pull the bus to restart it.238 Operating under such cooperative ("common
enemy") conditions over time, the campers �hanged their group-based views of
one another and intergroup friendships em�rged "between erstwhile rivals and
,,
even former enemies. 239
By the end of the summer, "the twenty boys themselves proposed that they
return to Oklahoma City in a single bus, and the self-chosen seating did not
reflect the Eagles['] and the Rattlers[']" group identities.z40 By that time the old
stereotypes between the two groups had dissipated significantly, as measured by
23 1 . See SHERIF ET AL., supra note 229, at 74-83.
232. See id. at 96-1 13.
233. Sherif's famous experiments became a favorite example in an early, significant theory of
stereotyping known as realistic group conflict theory. See SUSAN T. FISKE, SOCIAL BEINGS: A CORE
MOTIVES ApPROACH TO SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 436 (2004).
234. See id. at 1 1 7-49.
235. Ross & N ISB ETT, supra note 6, at 40.
236. SHERIF ET AL., supra note 229, at 1 5 1-58.
237. [d. at 1 58.
238. [d. at 1 70-7 1 .
239. Ross & NISBETT, supra note 6 , at 39.
240. BROWN, supra note 1 67, at 6 1 1 ; see also SHERIF ET AL., supra note 229, at 1 82.
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Sherif's surveys:
Rattlers now thought that almost all Eagles had become like the Rattlers
themselves: brave, tough, and friendly. The Eagles said as much for the
Rattlers. There were no more sneaky, smart-aleck stinkers . . . [T]he boys as
observers of one another saw personality change as the cause of the new
order, but Sherif, of course, knew better. He knew that the boys had changed
their thoughts and feelings because of a succession of situations designed to
require cooperative effort. 24 1
.

What caused the Rattlers to be "sneaky, smart-aleck stinkers" was not
disposition, as prevalent schemas and attributions would have it, but forces
hidden in the situation. Sherif, by manipulating the situation, was the real
"sneaky . . . stinker."
Much has been learned since Sherif's important work to confirm, refine, and
expand upon what the campers taught about the operation of group schemas.242
For example, more recent studies have shown that the actual threat that one
group poses to another is unimportant. It is the perception of threat that
generates the intergroup hostility?43 Even merely random group designations,
without any intergroup competition or other distinguishing features, can elicit
in-group and out-group sentiments. "In other words, even the most arbitrary and
seemingly inconsequential group classifications can provide a basis for discrimi
,,
natory behavior. 244
We will not review any more of the studies here?45 They prove a point that
all of us, upon reflection, should already see as central and deep-seated in the
human experience. The influences-good, bad, and otherwise--of the "us and
them" schema, or what we will call groupism, are all around us. One needn't
look beyond the loyalty of sports fans to their favorite teams and their derision
of rival teams to find these influences in many people's daily lives. A favorite
player-a Roger Clemens-becomes a hated turncoat (itself a telling expres
sion) by changing his uniform and moving 250 miles southward. A ridiculed
rival, for those on the other side of the move, becomes a local hero by so
changing his uniform and address. Similarly, a World Series sweep (Red Sox
over Cardinals) is less meaningful and rewarding than the preceding conference

24 1 . BROWN, supra note 1 67, at 6 1 3 .
242. For reviews of the more recent work, see id. at 543--6 1 ; FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 72, at
133-34.
243. Thus, Susan Fiske has proposed renaming realistic group conflict theory as perceived group
conflict theory. FISKE, supra note 233, at 437.
244. See, e.g., Ross & NISBETT, supra note 6, at 40; see also BROWN, supra note 1 67, at 543-5 1
(reviewing some of the studies); FISKE, supra note 233, at 437 (same). For an interesting recent study of
how Jewish and Arab subjects reacted to the acts of Jewish and Arab groups, see Raanan Lipshitz, Ziv
Gilad & Ramzi Suleiman, The One-oj-Us Effect in Decision Evaluation, 1 08 ACTA PSYCHOLlGlCA 53
(200 1 ).
245. See infra Part III.C.2.b.ii-iii (discussing further various group-serving motivations and biases).
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series comeback victory over a long-term and ml,lch-despised rival (Red Sox
over Yankees).
The "us and them" process, and, just as revealingly, its situational malleabil
ity, characterizes all levels of competitive activity. The phenomenon is not
limited in the least to campers and athletes. Cross-town high-school rivals
graduate and end up cheering for the same college mascot. College rivals move
on to become close business associates, and business competitors merge to
become a bigger "us" to out-compete a newly defined "them." And the dynam
ics and their effects can be far more serious. As we write this, Boston is
experiencing a re-ignition of neighborhood gang battles. Although the dynamics
of the situation are complex, the group affiliations are strikingly schematic: "us"
and "them" is defined largely by the happenstance of residence?46 The schema
is evident, too, in the way some groups refer to America as "Satan" and the way
that many Americans refer to those groups as "evil." Those labels dispositional
ize the enemies, contributing to and justifying the anger and desire for retribu
tion that both seem to feel. More generally still, the in-group and out-group
situation is felt in ethnic and national wars throughout the world and throughout
history.247 Every reliance on this cursory us-them cognitive structure operates to
excuse ourselves from the burden of exploring the much more complex, though
more significant, situational influences behind the circumstances we despise.
Put differently, groupism provides a motive for dispositionism, and disposition
ism encourages groupism.
Finally, the group dynamic can be seen in the legal-theoretic debate we are
joining here. For example, groupism very clearly seems to be behind Milton
Friedman's claim, reviewed below, that people who question markets are all in
the same out-group of anti-freedom stinkers as "a Galbraith . . . , a Nader . . . , a
,,
Marx or an Engels or a Lenin, 248 and behind Richard Posner's claim that the
"sociology of law is . . entirely dominated by scholars of left-liberal bent"
whose politics are "[s]o uniform . . . that they may unconsciously regard
liberalism (in its modem, 'welfare state' sense) as part of the definition of their
,,
field. 249 And it similarly lies behind the stereotype of legal economists as
,,
right-wing conservatives.25o And then, of course, there is the "mushy middle. 25 1
.

246. See generally Fox Butterfield, Killing of Girl, 1 0, and Increase in Homicides Challenge
Boston s Crime-Fighting Model, N.Y. TIMES, July 1 4, 2002, at A 14.
247. See generally SAM KEEN, FACES OF THE ENEMY: REFLECfIONS OF THE HOSTILE IMAGINATION ( 1 986)
(collecting hundreds of political cartoons, posters, and artwork showing how enemies have been
depicted in twentieth century war propaganda).
248. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, BRIGHT PROMISES, DISMAL PERFORMANCE: AN ECONOMIST'S PROTEST 89
(William R. Allen ed., 1 972).
249. Richard A. Posner, The Sociology of the Sociology of Law: A Viewfrom Economics, 2 EuR. J.L.
& ECON. 265, 274 ( 1 995) (emphasis added).
250. See, e.g., Alex M. Johnson, Jr., An Appeal for the "Liberal " Use of Law and Economics: The
Liberals Fight Back, 67 TEX. L. REV. 659, 661 ( 1 989) (reviewing ALAN S . BLINDER, HARD HEADS, SOFT
HEARTS: TOUGH-MINDED ECONOMICS FOR A JUST SOCIETY ( 1 987»; Posner, supra note 2499, at 274.
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(iii) Stereotype Threat and Some Exterior Situational Consequences of
Knowledge Structures
Our attention, thus far, has been on how knowledge structures make up part
of our interior situations without our knowing it. Yet its influence on our lives is
powerful. Consider the issue of standardized testing-a subject that provides a
vantage from which to view several of the topics that we have already touched
on in this section: stereotypes, groupism, and interpretation of academic perfor
mance.
For several decades, scholars, educators, policymakers, and commentators
have debated the significance, meaning, and possible biases of the standardized
tests that our society routinely and increasingly relies upon to help determine
educational and career opportunities. As a sorting device, the implications of
these exams are undeniably immense-and their use only seems to be increas
ing as politicians push for inexpensive ways to compare educational curricula
and pedagogical techniques.
One attraction of such tests is that, as their name underscores, they are
standardized-and thus appear to be objective and fair. Everyone has to take the
same test, which is graded anonymously by computer. That seems pretty fair.
Such a view appears to underlie a general public acceptance of the exams as the
primary, sometimes the sole, means of measuring intelligence or aptitude?52
The exams and their widespread use provides some evidence of our disposition
ism-for the exams are implicitly premised on the notion that we each are born
with or acquire through our academic choices and efforts a stable dispositional
quality called "intelligence" which, like the wattage of a light bulb or the
horsepower of an engine, is measurable through simple tests yielding hard
numbers.
Some controversy has emerged over the tests, however, in response to the
fact that the results have tended to vary significantly across different social
groups. Numerous explanations have been offered. The easiest conclusion-and
the one that many conservative groups tend to reach-is that the variation is
attributable to dispositional or essentialist influences, including both genetics
and acculturated dispositions.253 But critics of the exams (or of the weight given
to the exams) have attributed the variations to harder-to-see exterior situational
factors, including social, economic, and environmental conditions and opportuni-

25 1 . For a more complete discussion of the influence of groupism in academia and across groups
that identify with certain ideas or worldviews, see generally Benforado & Hanson, Naive Cynicism,
supra note 78.
252. For the best history of intelligence testing and its cultural, scientific, and political context, see
STEPHEN lAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN ( 1 98 1 ).
253. See, e.g., RICHARD 1. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND
CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE ( 1 994).
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ties?54 Yet even those variables cannot fully explain the disparate perfonnance
of different groups. As Claude Steele recently summarized, "virtually all aspects
of underperfonnance-Iower standardized-test scores, lower college grades,
lower graduation rates-persist among students from the African-American
middle class. This situation forces on us an uncomfortable recognition: that
beyond class, something racial is depressing the academic perfonnance of these
,,
students. 255
Professor Steele and numerous other social psychologists have thus begun
looking where we dispositionists have been least apt to look (indeed, have not,
because of our knowledge structures, thought to look): to the interactive and
reinforcing roles of interior and exterior situations. According to Steele's basic
thesis, when a person belonging to a stereotyped group suspects that her
perfonnance at some task could confinn a negative stereotype about that social
group, that person experiences stereotype threat?56 Such a threat is posed to
anyone whose identity is connected to one or another social category or group
(whether that group be defined by age, race, ethnicity, profession, ideological or
political affiliations, religion, sexual preference, looks, gender, income bracket
or whatever).
Put differently, no one-not even groups or individuals that we tend to think
of as powerful-is immune to the risk of being negatively stereotyped or to the
behavioral consequences that such a threat poses. For example, Catholic priests,
under the threat of a newly salient stereotype, have gone to some lengths to
avoid providing any indication that they are pedophiles. Republicans, in the
wake of Senator Trent Lott's remarks valorizing the segregationist efforts of the
late Senator Strom Thunnond, went out of their way to avoid being seen as
racist or as supportive of racism?57 And legal scholars, under the threat of being

254. Another criticism, of course, is that the exams measure intelligence and aptitude along, at best,
an extremely narrow dimension-as a free-throw competition would measure aptitude for basketball.
See Steele, supra note 1 00, at 54.
255. Steele, supra note 1 00, at 46.
256. See id. at 47.
257. See Adam Clymer, Bush Rebukes Lott Over Remarks on Thurmond: G.O.P. s 40 Years of
Juggling on Race, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2002, at A I ; Adam Nagourney & Carl Hulse, Bush Rebukes
Lott Over Remarks on Thurmond: Sharp Shift in Strategy by the White House, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1 3,
2002, at A I .
The strong negative reaction to Trent Lott's barely ambiguous and deeply troubling endorsement of
Senator Strom Thurmond's (pro-segregationist) presidential platform is pretty unusual and, we suspect,
the consequence of numerous factors, including the fact that this was by no means the first time that
Lott made such comments. See A Closer Look: A Primer of Senator Lott s Quotations, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
1 3, 2002, at A22. More typically, in our view, calling someone a "racist" or alleging that they support
"racist" policies is viewed as more damaging and inappropriate than doing or saying something that is
ambiguously racist. Though we will not defend this claim here, we believe that a major force behind the
"politically incorrect" movement and the recent widespread use of what we call the "race card-card" is
an attempt by individuals and groups attempting to weaken the felt threat of being stereotyped as racist.
Cf James Boyle, The PC Harangue, 45 STAN. L. R EV 1 457 ( 1 993) (reviewing DEBATING P.c.: THE
CONTROVERSY OVER POLITICAL CORRECfNESS ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES (Paul Berman ed., 1 992)). They have
done so by, for instance, reinforcing definitions of racism that ensure that only the most egregious,
.
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viewed a s "advocates" or polemicists, rather than a s "neutral, objective social
scientists," often avoid evocative issues or conclusions and seem often to steer
for a compromise or a moderate position, even as their logic would seem to
push them toward a more extreme position.
Now suppose that the stereotype involves not pedophilia, racism, or polemi
cism, but intelligence. Few of us want to be perceived as unintelligent. And
many of us know the frustration of being in a situation in which we want
desperately not to "look dumb" and of feeling the resultant anxiety that itself
seems to tum us into babbling fools. Interviewing for that "perfect job," or
making conversation with a celebrity are two scenarios where desire to do well
can be counterproductive. Similarly, calling someone to whom we feel attracted
to ask out on a first date is, stereotypically, an immense hurdle-we feel
intensely the threat that by our behavior we may confirm what we fear the
recipient suspected all along: that we belong to that class of those with whom
no one in their right mind would want a date.
Social psychologists have shown that when people care about appearing
intelligent and are at risk of being stereotyped as unintelligent, they tend to react
in very much that way.258 A significant and still growing body of evidence
reveals that stereotype threat heightens a person's performance anxiety and,
when the task or test is sufficiently challenging, the presence of stereotype
threat causes the person to perform less well-thereby confirming the stereo
type.
In one of the seminal experiments revealing that tendency, black and white
Stanford students took a challenging, thirty-minute verbal exam that should
have been equally difficult for each group, based on their common experiences
and knowledge bases.259 However, the groups' performance turned significantly
upon how the test was framed. When the test was presented to the subjects as a
test of ability, white students performed far better than black students. Yet when
the test was presented as a means of understanding how people solve certain
sorts of problems, and subjects were told that the test was not a measure of a
person's intellectual ability, the two groups performed almost identically?60
This study and many like it reveal how stereotypes-a feature of our interior
intentional, and hate-inspired acts count and by making the mere mention of "race" as a causal factor in
social outcomes a violation of appropriate norms of discourse (except, perhaps, when "reverse racism"
is said to be involved).
258. That is, as unintelligent. The more we care about it the greater the threat. See Claude M. Steele
& Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Test Perfonnance of Academically Successful African
Americans, in B LACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP 401 (Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips eds., 1 998);
cf KUNDA, supra note 6, at 470-7 1 (explaining how individuals with greater numbers of identifying
characteristics-that is, great "self-complexity"-are less threatened by failures in one area of the self,
because the fai lure tends to be confined to that one area, while the other areas of the self, like eggs in
other baskets, remain intact).
259. Steele & Aronson, supra note 258, at 402.
260. More specifically, the black students performance improved significantly (reflecting stereotype
threat) and the white students' performance actually worsened (reflecting the absence of their previ
ously enjoyed stereotype lift), such that both groups performed at the same level. See id. at 4 1 0 fig. I 1 -2.
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situations--exist "in the atmosphere" and thus influence us as part of the unseen

exterior situation. Unlike the nervous and tongue-tied date-seeker, struggling to
find the right words and to adopt the proper demeanor, neither the anxiety
created by stereotype threat nor its source is likely to register consciously on the
part of the test taker. But stereotype threat does indeed create the performance
harming anxiety.26 1
Black students taking the test under stereotype threat seemed to be trying too
hard rather than not hard enough. They reread the questions, reread the
multiple choices, rechecked their answers, more than when they were not
under stereotype threat. The threat made them inefficient on a test that, like
most standardized tests is set up so that thinking long often means thinking
wrong, especially on difficult items . . . . 262

Researchers have also discovered that black students engaging in a challenging
task have significantly higher blood pressure when under stereotype threat than
when not under stereotype threat (and have higher blood pressure under both
conditions than do white students).263
It is important to recognize that this phenomenon is not occurring because of
a person's overall level of self-esteem or some other stable dispositional quality.
When mathematically inclined white male students, a group thought to enjoy
high levels of self-esteem, were given a challenging math test, they performed
significantly less well on it when they were told that Asians generally scored
better than whites on the exam, than they did when not met with such a
stereotype threat.264 The phenomenon occurs, not because of the dispositional
qualities of the test-takers, but rather because of exterior situational influences
that is, the threat of being stereotyped.
So it is that we can perceive (and to some extent measure) dispositional
features that may themselves both reflect and obscure the already hard-to-see
situational features that permeate and largely define our existence. And so it is

261 . See, e.g., id. at 415 & fig. 1 l -3 (reporting that black subjects about to take the test in the "ability
frame" condition were more likely to fill out blanks in word fragments to create race-related words and
to eschew preferences for sports and music associated with African-Americans than were black subjects
in the "unrelated to ability" frame condition).
262. Steele, supra note 1 00, at 5 1 .
263. See J. Blascovich et aI., Racism and Racial Categorization, 72 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL.
1 364 (2003); see also Jim Blascovich & Wendy Berry Mendes, Challenge and Threat Appraisals: The
Role of Affective Cues, in FEELING AND THINKING: THE ROLE OF AFFECf IN SOCIAL COGNITION 59, 67
(Joseph P. Forgas ed., 2000) (summarizing studies on physiological responses to threats); Joe Tomaka et
aI., Cognitive and Physiological A ntecedents of Threat and Challenge Appraisal, 73 PERSONALITY &
Soc. PSYCHOL. 63 ( 1 997).
264. See David M. Marx et aI., Allport 's Legacy and the Situational Press of Stereotypes, 55 J. Soc.
ISSUES 49 1 , 496 ( 1 999) (citing Joshua Aronson et aI., When White Men Can 't Do Math: Necessary and
Sufficient Factors in Stereotype Threat, 35 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCH. 29 ( \ 999)).
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that stereotypes are, in that way among others, often self-fulfilling.265

b. Attributional Processes
i. Causation, Responsibility, and Blame
There is a second "fundamental process underlying much of social perception
and action" that has long been understood by social psychologists, but not by
the rest of us: namely, the process of making causal attributions?66 People are
eager to understand the causes of salient outcomes and actions in their environs
and have fairly deeply ingrained schemas (using the term broadly267) for
identifying those causes. Fritz Heider introduced the concept of attributions in
the middle of the last century, and since then probably no feature of cognitive
process has received more attention from social and cognitive psychologists?68
In the late 1 960s, Harold Kelley hypothesized that lay scientists rely on the
same inferential mechanisms as professional scientists do for understanding
causation?69 Kelley's theory was both normative, regarding how people should
make causal attributions, and descriptive, regarding how people actually do
make causal attributions?70 Particularly early on, the evidence seemed to
confirm the theory as a descriptive matter?7 1 From those ambitious and promis
ing origins, several important literatures have since developed?72
First, social psychologists went on to discover a number of systematic biases
in people's attributional processes-including the actor-observer bias,273 the
false consensus effect,274 the self-centered bias,275 attributional schemas,276
265. See generally FISKE, supra note 233, at 42 1 -22 (briefly reviewing studies on "self-fulfilling
prophecies," "expectancy confirmation," and "behavioral confirmation").
266. See N ISB ETT & Ross, supra note 1 29, at 5. For a much more extensive discussion of the
relevance of attributional process to law and legal theory, see Hanson, Reyes, & Schlanger, Attribu
tional Positivism, supra note 43.
267. Social psychologists sometimes indicate that knowledge structures and schematic processes are
inconsistent with attributional processes. But that point is typically directed at the statistically based
normative version of attribution theory proposed by its early proponents. See, e.g. , Edward E. Jones &
Keith E. Davis, From Acts to Dispositions: The Attribution Process in Person Perception, in 2
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 2 1 9 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1 965); Kelley, supra note
1 86. It does not apply to much of the more recent attributional work; indeed, it only stretches the
concept of "knowledge structures" a little to claim, as we do, that common attributional processes
reflect a widely held knowledge structure. The discussion below will help make that clear.
268. See FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 72, at 57; Eliot R. Smith, Social Cognition Contributions to
Attribution Theory and Research, in SOCIAL COGNITION: IMPACT ON SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 77, 77-80
(Patricia G. Devine et al. eds., 1 994).
269. See generally FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 72, at 23-95 (summarizing the origins and evolutions of attribution theory); Hanson, Reyes & Schlanger, Attributional Positivism, supra note 43 (same).
270. See PLOUS, supra note 1 24, at 1 74.
27 1 . See FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 72, at 23-95.
272. See sources cited in supra note 269.
273. See supra note 1 88.
274. See infra notes 536-39.
275. See Hanson, Reyes & Schlanger, Attributional Positivism, supra note 43.
276. See id. ; see also FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 72, at 60 (noting the role of knowledge structures
in people's causal inferences).
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and, most important, the fundamental attribution error?77 There is little need, in
light of our discussion above (and below), to further describe those sorts of
biases or their sources. They are all manifestations of the more general phenom
ena that we are highlighting in this Article: our perceptions and construals are
skewed by what we tend to see, which tends to be only a small piece of the
whole picture. For example, instead of relying on covariation principles of the
sort that Kelley imagined, people too readily rely more on temporal and spatial
contiguity and salience in making causal attributions.27 8
For those sorts of reasons, Kelley's preliminary hypothesis is now understood
to have significant shortcomings, at least as a descriptive model. This leads to
the second significant development in attribution theory. Numerous scholars
have worked to develop more successful descriptive models of people's attribu
tional processes?79 For example, Bernard Weiner, with some of his colleagues,
has shown that people tend to focus on three (or four) causal dimensions: locus,
stability, control, (and, in some models, intent)?80 In his early work, which
focused on how people made attributions in terms of these categories with
respect to achievement efforts, he focused on three dimensions: whether the
cause was stable or temporary, whether the locus of the cause was internal or
external to the individual, and whether the person had control over the cause? 8 1
A little introspection-or a careful read through the newspaper headlines
should confirm that we humans are indeed focused on those dimensions when
examining causation for all sorts of surprising outcomes that we encounter.
Furthermore, as this line of research shows, our reactions (affective and behav
ioral) vary significantly depending on how we perceive a cause along those
dimensions. Thus, the destruction caused by a forest fire seems different to us
when it was caused by a person, rather than a bolt of lightening (locus).
Likewise, it matters if the person had control over the outcome (controllability),
whether the person has created several such fires in the past (stability), and
whether the person was a careless camper or a profiteering arsonist (intent).
Weiner's basic attributional model has enjoyed considerable empirical support
and has been expanded to apply in numerous settings.28 2
And that leads to the third major development in attribution theory since
Kelley's initial effort. Social psychologists, including Weiner, have constructed
more refined theories to capture not just how people make causal attributions,
but also how they assign responsibility and blame based on those causal
277. See supra text accompanying notes 8 1-1 06. For useful summaries of those and other attribu
tional biases, see BROWN, supra note 167, at 1 69-94; Hanson, Reyes & Schlanger, Attributional
Positivism, supra note 43.
278. See FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 72, at 58-59.
279. See id. at 57-66 (reviewing some examples).
280. See, e.g., Bernard Weiner, Attribution, Emotion, and Action, in HANDBOOK OF MOTIVATION AND
COGNITION 28 1 (Richard M. Sorrentino & E. Tory Higgis eds., 1 986).
28 1 . See Hanson, Reyes & Schlanger, Attributional Positivism, supra note 43; see also FISKE &
TAYLOR, supra note 72, at 52-53 (summarizing Weiner's work).
282. See FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 72, at 53-54.
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attributions. Kelly Shaver has argued that people tend to assign responsibility
for harmful outcomes when, roughly, the harm was foreseeable and when the
person acted volitionally and without justification.283 And people assign blame,
a more punitive designation, when the harmful outcome was intended?84 In
Shaver's words, "An assignment of blame is . . . a particular sort of social
explanation. It is the outcome of a process that begins with an event having
negative consequences, involves judgments about causality, personal responsibil
,,
ity, and possible mitigation. 285 Again, there is considerable evidence to support
those attributional theories?86

ii. Lay Judges
That leads to the most recent development in attribution theory. There is
significant evidence that many of our legal institutions reflect people's attribu
tional impulses (and not, for example, a means of promoting efficiency or
wealth maximization). Put most simply, just as people want to identify causa
tion, they likewise want to, when attributionally appropriate, assign responsibil
ity and blame. Moving from causal attributions to attributions of responsibility
or blame, the lay scientist turns in her lab coat for a judicial robe. As Bernard
Weiner explains:
In [such] situations, an appropriate metaphor to capture the reactions of the
involved observer is that he or she is a judge presiding in a courtroom. The
judge determines whether others are innocent or guilty and then passes
sentences based on these beliefs and experienced emotions. Indeed, life may
be considered a courtroom where dramas related to transgression are played
out. The observer is a scientist in determining causal judgments, but then acts
in a Godlike manner by reaching moral conclusions regarding right and
wrong, good and evil. 287
We would go further. Just as the habits of the professional scientist reflect
the same urges and biases as the habits of the lay scientist, 288 so do the
judgments and sentences of the courtroom judge reflect those of the lay judge.
And our legal system appears to reflect and, to a significant degree, satisfy our
impulses to establish causation, assign responsibility, and lay blame. 289

283. See KELLY SHAVER, THE ATfRlBUTION OF BLAME: CAUSALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND BLAMEWORTIllNESS passim ( 1 985).
284. [d.
285. [d. at 4.
286. See id.
287. Weiner, supra note 280, at 336-38; see also SABINI, supra note 8 1 , at 1 74 (discussing "man the
lawyer").
288. See supra text accompanying notes 265-74.
289. See Hanson, Reyes & Schlanger, Attributional Positivism, supra note 43. For a superbly
executed analysis of the attributional tendencies of jurors in tort cases, see Neal Feigenson's important
book, LEGAL BLAME: How JURORS THINK AND TALK ABOUT ACCIDENTS (2000).
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iii. The Situation ofAttributions
Although attributional processes are situational, when pointed out they are
easier for people to see (or accept) than many of the other interior situational
processes. For example, we are not surprised to learn that "control" and
"foreseeability" tend to influence our attributions of causation, responsibility,
and blame. In some ways, such insights are commonsensical.290
B ut, if they are not pointed out to us, our attributional processes begin and
remain largely automatic and unconscious29 1 ; they are experienced, if at all, as
obvious and natural. In that way, our attributions manifest themselves more as
conclusions than as a process or analysis that yields a conclusion. Like thinking,
preferring and choosing, our attributional ascriptions appear to us as self
evident and, in a sense, dispositional. We miss much of the situation out of
which they emerge?92 Social psychologist Roger Brown attempted to capture
something of the situational flavor of causal attributions this way:
It appears to be the case that the rules of the causal [attributional] calculus are
known and regularly used by all adults and also by very young children, by
you and me . . . . That is to say that you already know the causal calculus, but
you know it tacitly or implicitly rather than explicitly. You know how to use it
but not yet how to conceptualize it, think about it, and talk about it. 293

A major contribution of attribution theorists has been to make explicit what
Brown describes as tacit and what we call situational?94 That we can see our
attributional conclusions does not mean that understanding their sources is easy,
any more than seeing the effects of gravity implies that understanding precisely
how it works or interacts with other forces is easy?95 As Brown writes:
"Creating explicit knowledge where there was only tacit knowledge is far from

290. See G. WEARY ET AL., ATTRIBUTION 6 ( 1 989).
29 1 . See generally Peter A. White, Causal Processing: Origins and Development, 104 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 36 ( 1 988) (reviewing research on the origins of causal processing and describing the function as
"probably automatic").
292. There may be another reason why "seeing" our attributional process seems fairly easy. We tend
to accept theories about ourselves that resonate with our institutions and values-as attribution theory
tends to (not merely as a matter of coincidence). Many aspects of our interior and exterior situations do
not share that advantage, and we are, in some sense, motivated to remain blind to them. See, e.g., supra
text accompanying notes 227-35 (implicit attitudes) & 258-60 (system justification).
293. BROWN, supra note 167, at 1 36; see also id. ("Explicit knowledge exists when someone can
formulate a rule as well as act in accordance with it. Explicit knowledge brings new powers-the power
to think and talk about rules. In the domain of language it is the difference between an untutored fluent
native speaker (tacit knowledge only) and a linguist, a student of the structure of language; in
attribution it is the difference between any layman and social psychologist who studies every day
attribution.").
294. Cf BERNARD WEINER, AN ATTRIBUTIONAL THEORY OF MOTIVATION AND EMOTION, at xi ( 1 986) ("I
now identify myself simply as someone who arranges, classifies, and systematizes common sense. In
doing so, I attempt to develop as broad and as parsimonious a conceptual system as possible to explain
everyday social conduct.").
295. See infra Part VI.B.
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an effortless process. There is something pleasurable in it but also something
difficult."296 But social psychologists help us see, not just the process, but also
the biasing influence of that process-including, for instance, the fact that our
attributions are often altered by the severity of the harm.297
Like all interior situational influences, our attributions can be, and commonly
are, influenced by exterior situation. Whether we perceive a person to be in
"control" or to have acted "intentionally" are matters that can be framed and
promoted.298 Is sexual preference within the control of gays and lesbians? Do
guns kill people or do people kill people? What did the hierarchical authorities
within the Catholic Church know about the pedophilic conduct of the priests
serving its archdiocese, when did they know it, and what did they do about it
when they knew? Are welfare recipients dispositionally lazy or situationally
disadvantaged? Attributional stereotypes are part of our cultural landscape, and
at the core of many cultural debates. There is obviously a great deal at stake in
attributions. And there are many interests competing to shape our attributional
presumptions and stereotypes.

c. Counterfactual Thinking
A small plane crashes in a remote northern province. Two of the passengers
survive the crash and attempt to walk to safety. One of the two succumbs to the
extreme cold seventy-five miles from the nearest town. The second trudges on
but dies when she is just a quarter of a mile from the town. Tragic. Is the second
more tragic than the first? Many people think SO?99 Even though both people
died from the cold after a plane crash, we respond more strongly when someone
comes so close to safety. This is an example of counterfactual thinking , another
type of process bias that plays off of our pre-existing schemas.30o
Our schemas define what we think is "normal." When a bad outcome appears
to stem from abnormal circumstances the emotional impact is greater than when

296. BROWN, supra note 1 67, at 136; see also WEARY ET AL., supra note 290, at 6.
297. See FISKE, supra note 233, at 1 1 7 (summarizing evidence regarding "defensive attribution,"
which is the tendency to increasingly "perceive the individual actor to be responsible" as the serious

ness of a harm or offense increases).
298. For a brief discussion of how the tobacco industry manipulated attributions, see Hanson &
Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously //, supra note 1 32, at 1524-27, and Jon D. Hanson and Douglas
A. Kysar, The Joint Failure of Economic Theory and Legal Regulation [hereinafter Hanson & Kysar,
The Joint Failure], in SMOKING: RISK, PERCEPTION, AND POLICY 229 (Paul Siovic ed., 200 1 ). For a
discussion of how our "policy scripts" tend to be influenced by outside sources, see generally Chen &
Hanson, The Illusion of Law, supra note 32, and Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 5, at
230-84.
299. See Dale T. Miller & Cathy McFarland, Counterfactual Thinking and Victim Compensation: A
Test of Norm Theory, 12 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 5 1 3, 5 1 6-17 ( 1 986) (finding that subjects

recommended greater compensation for the family of the victim who died one quarter of a mile from
town than for the survivors of the victim who died seventy-five miles away).
300. See generally NEAL J. ROESE & JAMES N. OLSON, WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN: THE SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF COUNTERFACTUAL THINKING ( 1 995) (bringing together recent research and theory on
counterfactual thinking).

68

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 93 : 1

the same outcome results from a familiar situation. A number of factors can lead
us to think an outcome is abnormal . For example, the closer the distance
between the actual outcome and a potential "normal" outcome, the less abnor
mal an outcome seems.30l Thus, a soldier's accidental death a few days after a
war ends, but before news of it reaches the front lines, seems more regrettable
than a combat death two days before the war ended. Outcomes that follow
unusual actions also stand out as abnormal in our minds.302 So the plight of a
plane crash victim who switched flights minutes before takeoff seems particu
l arly poignant. When a bad outcome results from events or behavior that is
contrary to our schemas, scripts, or routines, it is easy for us to imagine a
different outcome. The more available our expectations are, the more salient
will be any deviation from them, and the more painful will be any harm that
results from that deviation.303 Indeed, social psychologists have found that
people tend to award greater compensation to victims of accidents in contexts
where the victims' behavior prior to the injury had deviated from their normal
behavior. Again, the availability of the easily imagined counterfactual appears
to increase the sense of tragedy in the occurrence.304
Our counterfactual patterns of thought are related to the same basic internal
situation that drives the fundamental attribution error.305 For instance, both
reflect the more general tendency to focus on what is easy to see and on what
we expect to see?06 Moreover, counterfactual imaginings reflect and further

301 . Miller & McFarland, supra note 299, at 5 14.
302. Id.
303. See id.
304. See KUNDA, supra note 6, at 149. For a sample of both laboratory and real-world evidence of
that tendency, see Robert K. Bothwell & Kermit W. Duhon, Counterfactual Thinking and Plaintiff
Compensation, 1 34 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 705, 705 ( 1 994) (citing Miller & McFarland, supra note 299, but
finding that the sense of tragedy decreased when blame was attributed to the victim); Patrizia Catellani
& Patrizia Milesi, Counterfactuals and Roles: Mock Victims ' and Perpetrators ' Accounts of Judicial
Cases, 3 1 EuR. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 247 (200 1); Barbara A. Spellman & Alexandra Kincannon, The

Relation Between Counterfactual ( "But For") And Causal Reasoning: Experimental Findings and
Implications for Jurors ' Decisions, 64 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 241 (2001); Richard L. Wiener et. aI.,
Counterfactual Thinking in Mock Juror Assessments of Negligence: A Preliminary Investigation, 1 2
BEHAv. SCI. & L . 8 9 ( 1 994).
305. Individual behavior is usually easier to see. It is more readily available to our minds than are
the myriad of situational influences that give rise to the behavior, and so we focus on individuals in
explaining behavior. See supra text accompanying notes 72-102 (discussing the fundamental attribu
tion error).
306. When we encounter an event or an experience we do so through a particular conceptual
framework (schema or script), comprised of event and norm expectations. When we encounter an event
or an experience, that framework helps provide the meaning. When the new circumstance is seen, it is
set against the norm expectation framework. Striving to make sense of a new circumstance, we "see"
through the norms that we bring to the circumstance, and are relatively blind to those that we are not
expecting. We give a meaning to the new circumstance based on our norms. The closer an experience
approximates our schema-based expectations, the more normal it seems to us and, hence, the more
difficult it is to imagine that the experience could have come out any other way. Counterfactual thinking
is driven by the availability of imagined alternatives. The more abnormal an event is, the easier it is for
us to cognitively undo what happened. See KUNDA, supra note 6, at 145. Exceptional situations are
more mutable in our imagination than our normal ones, because of the greater availability of the normal
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entrench the situational character's dispositionism. When we think of what
might have been, we tend to focus on the individual actors and their actions,
rather than on the situation in which they were acting. Because of our disposition
ism, we are better able to imagine people acting differently than they did than to
imagine that the situation could have been different than it was. Thus, because
of the fundamental attribution error our counterfactuals tend to be dispositionist.
And when we think about something bad that has happened to a person, even
when we the thought is motivated by sympathy, our counterfactual thoughts
tend to be oriented toward undoing or altering actions or choices on the part of
the person.307
Counterfactuals guide more than our reactions to recent happenings . This
pattern of the mind continues to influence our mental lives long after an event
has transpired. Counterfactuals play a lasting role in our own self-conceptions.
To understand how, it is helpful to understand another effect of counterfactual
thinking-the omission bias. "[T]he availability of a close counterfactual"-an
alternative and familiar path-"can increase the regret and disappointment that
,,
one feels after experiencing a bad outcome. 308 And we alter our behavior in
order to avoid such disappointment. For example, when choosing among poten
tially bad outcomes, people tend to favor the inactive option over the option that
requires action. That is true because "action is more regrettable than inaction
because it is easier to undo action by mentally erasing it than it is to undo
,,
inaction by mentally adding the action not taken. 309
Do not be misled into seeing this as evidence of a stable-preferenced indi
vidual, one that consistently prefers inaction over action. Our counterfactuals do
not reflect a consistent dispositionist outlook; rather, they change as our situa
tion changes. The basic pattern is this: we begin by thinking that we will regret

situation. See id. at 1 50. Counterfactuals, however, not only guide our approach to our new happening,
they linger and take new forms in our mental lives after the event as well. See infra text accompanying
notes 308- 19.
307. See KUNDA, supra note 6, at 1 5 1 ("A disturbing implication of these findings is that the more
one identifies and emphasizes [sic] with a victim, the more likely one is to contemplate how the victim
might have behaved otherwise and therefore to blame the victim."); see also Nyla R. Branscombe et aI.,

Rape and Accident Counterfactuals: Who Might Have Done Otherwise and Would It Have Changed the
Outcome?, 26 J. ApPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 1 042 ( 1 996); Christopher T. Burris & Nyla R. Branscombe,
Racism, Counterfactual Thinking, and Judgment Severity, 23 J. ApPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 980 ( 1 993);
Christopher G. Davis et aI., Self-Blame Following a Traumatic Event: The Role of Perceived Avoidabil
ity, 22 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 557 ( 1 996) (attributing respondents' self-blame for spinal
cord injury to perceptions of avoidability); Michael W. Morris et. aI., Choosing Remedies After
Accidents: Counterfactual Thoughts and the Focus on Fixing "Human Error", 6 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. &
REv. 579 ( 1 999).
308. KUNDA, supra note 6, at 145; see also, e.g., Victoria Husted Medvec, Scott F. Madey & Thomas
Gilovich, When Less Is More: Counterfactual Thinking and Satisfaction Among Olympic Athletes, 69 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 603 ( 1 995).
309. KUNDA, supra note 6, at 152 (discussing D. Kahneman & D.T. Miller, Norm Theory, Comparing
Reality to Its Alternatives, 93 PSYCHOL. REV. 136 ( 1 986»; see also Robert A. Baron, Counterfactual

Thinking and Venture Formation: The Potential Effects of Thinking about " What Might Have Been, "
15 J. Bus. VENTURING 79 ( 1 999) (summarizing some of the causes and effects of omission bias).
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action more than inaction. Over time, however, our perceptions and preferences
seem to switch. In the realist words of Ziva Kunda, "In the short term our
actions seem more regrettable, but in the long run our failures to act cause us
,,
the most grief. 3 1 0 And this again can be explained by some of the same
tendencies underlying the fundamental attribution error. After a bad outcome,
our actions remain cognitively salient in our memories while any situational
constraints that might have influenced those actions remain faded (or quickly
fade).3 1 1 It becomes harder to counterfactually imagine not acting, so we
experience less regret about the outcomes of those actions? 1 2 Similarly, when
we remember a harmful event resulting from our inaction, what remains starkly
available in our minds is our own failure to act. As the situational constraints
grow more distant, so do our reasons for inaction, and our self-regret is more
severe.3 1 3 "In retrospect, we think we could have handled with ease tasks that at
,,
the time seemed all but impossible. 3 1 4 We do not, therefore, have a single,
stable disposition across our changing evaluation of our own behavior.
Unsurprisingly, social psychologists have found that we are susceptible to
manipulation by those who want to situationally stoke the counterfactualizing
cognitions that give rise to actions or inactions.3 1 5 As one social psychologist,
introducing a journal issue dedicated to the topic, put it:
Pointing out to individuals that they might have done something in the past
that would make their present more desirable may motivate them toward
decisions that would bring about more desirable states in the future. Or,
pointing out how an action might have resulted in a worse state of affairs
might motivate individuals toward a cautious outlook that minimizes the
chances of future undesirable states. The manipulation of consumer emotions
by marketers has long been a stable of successful advertising . . . . [C]ounterfac
tual thinking might be an effective tool for manipulating emotions . . . .3 1 6
3 1 0. KUNDA, supra note 6 , a t 1 54; see also JANET LANDMAN, REGRET: THE PERSISTENCE O F THE
POSSIBLE ( 1 993); Abigail J. Stewart & Elizabeth A . Vandewater, "If I Had It to Do Over Again . . . :
Midlife Review, Midcourse Corrections, and Women s Well-Being in Midlife, 76 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 270 ( 1999).
3 1 1 . See ROBERT A. BARON & DON BYRNE, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 95 ( 1 0th ed. 2004).
3 1 2. See id.
3 1 3 . See Thomas Gilovich & Victoria Husted Medvec, The Experience of Regret: What, When, and
Why, 1 02 PSYCHOL. REv. 379 ( 1 994); Thomas Gilovich & Victoria Husted Medvec, The Temporal
Pattern to the Experience of Regret, 67 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 357 ( 1 994).
3 1 4. KUNDA, supra note 6, at 155. This phenomenon is undoubtedly related to our tendency to
"

generate counterfactuals with respect to other behavioral choices that other people could have made,
rather than envisioning alternative situations that they might have faced when choosing.
3 1 5. See, e.g., John J. Hetts et aI., The Influence of Anticipated Counterfactual Regret on Behavior,
1 7 PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 345 (2000); Janet Landman & Ross Petty, "It Could Have Been You ": How
States Exploit Counterfactual Thought to Market Lotteries, 17 PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 299 (2000); Ann
L. McGill, Counterfactual Reasoning in Causal Judgments: Implications for Marketing, 17 PSYCHOL. &
MARKETING 28 1 (2000); Michael Tsiros & Vikas Mittal, Regret: A Model of Its Antecedents and
Consequences in Consumer Decision Making, 26 J. CONSUMER REs. 401 (2000).
3 1 6. Neal J. Roese, Counterfactual Thinking and Marketing: Introduction to the Special Issue, 17
PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 277, 278-79 (2000) (citations omitted).

THE SITUATIONAL CHARACTER

2004]

71

Much has been written about counteIfactual thinking,3 17 its effects, and even its
functionality.3 1 8 Still, the relentless part that our "what ifs," "if onlys," "but fors,"
"would'ves," and "should'ves" play in our consciousness remains in many ways
unexplained. CounteIfactual imaginings can plague our present choices with fear and
our future evaluations of our present choices with regret. Still, they "force themselves
,,
upon us with undeniable strength, 3 1 9 making it difficult to ignore, among other
things, how much nicer it would have been if the milk had not spilled. That strength
suggests the power of our internal situations over our own seemingly dispositional
mental lives, our thinking, and our decisionmaking.
3 . Defending our Knowledge Structures
A later section describes in some detail the influence of "motivation" on our
attitudes, cognitions, and behavior.320 This section briefly discusses the phenom
enon as it applies to our knowledge structures.

a. Where Motive Meets Knowledge Structures
"If a man is offered a fact which goes against his instincts, he will
scrutinize it closely, and unless the evidence is overwhelming, he will refuse to
believe it. If, on the other hand, he is offered something which affords a
reason for acting in accordance to his instincts, he will accept it even on the
slenderest evidence. "
- Bertrand Russe1l32 I
Four stages of adopting new ideas: "The first is, 'It's impossible. ' The second

is, 'Maybe it 's possible, but it 's weak and uninteresting. ' The third is,
and I told you so. ' The fourth is, 'I thought of itfirst. ' "

'It

is true

- Dean Radin322

3 1 7. See. e.g., THE CENTER FOR COUNTERFACTUAL STUDIES, at http://www.sfu.calcounterfactuaU
cfbib.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2004) (collecting papers on this topic); Dale T. Miller & W. Turnbull,
The Counterfactual Fallacy: Confusing What Might Have Been With What Ought To Have Been, in LI FE
CRISES AND EXPERIENCES OF Loss IN ADULTHOOD (L. Montada et a!. eds., 1992).
3 1 8. The commentary ranges from a solidly felt sense of "how immeasurably poorer our mental lives
would be if we didn't have this creative capacity for flipping out of the midst of reaility into soft 'what ifs!,"
DoUGLAS HOFSTAD1ER, GoDEL, EscHER, BACH: AN ETERNAL GoLDEN BRAID 643 (1979), to a more sober
rationalization of this mode of thinking in our lives (anticipatory regret, for example, may lead us to closely
scrutinize important choices rather than make decisions willy-nilly). There also appears to be evidence that
some mental diseases are associated with an inability to engage in counterfactual thought.
3 1 9. KUNDA, supra note 6, at 157.
320. See infra Part III . C. 2 (discussing the assumption in economics that rational actors would ignore
sunk costs).
32 1 . BERTRAND RUSSELL, PRoPOSED ROADS TO FREEDOM: SOCIALISM, ANARCHISM AND SYNDICALISM 147
( 1 9 19).
322. Dean Radin is quoted in Chip Brown, They Laughed at Cali/eo Too. N.Y. TIMES. Aug. 1 1 , 1 996,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 1 6.
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This section returns to the topic of knowledge structures to further discuss the
human tendency to persistently defend our knowledge structures, even when
confronted with significant evidence that calls them into question. The history
and evolution of legal economics illustrates the distorting loyalty of even social
scientists to favored theories and beliefs. Above, we noted the benefits that
result from using knowledge structures to organize new information in a
cognitively efficient way.323 It is largely because of those benefits that we are
motivated to protect our beliefs and our way of understanding the world and to
reject alternatives. Thus, one can think of our knowledge structures (and
resultant "knowledge") as valued cognitive gold-which, in a way, they are. An
important question is how do we manage to protect our wealth from being
replaced or debased with fools' gold? How do we maintain our knowledge
structures and our sense that we have a solid grasp on the "truth," when the
truth is itself so slippery and elusive and when alternative claims to "truth"
compete for our allegiance?
We have already indicated one key defense. Because of the unseen or
situational nature of our knowledge structures, we tend to experience our beliefs
as emerging almost entirely from an unbiased assessment of evidence from
reliable sources. Being blind to our interior knowledge structures allows them to
influence our cognitive processes undetected. If we do not see them, we do not
attempt to monitor them or influence them?24
But our interior defenses are made stronger still by the very slipperiness of
what "is" -the ambiguity of so much of our social realities?25 Insofar as reality
is ungraspable, so too is proof that any one handle on it is illUSOry. Around our
golden knowledge structures are moats that operate to keep out threatening
evidence and, with drawbridges selectively lowered, to allow in any evidence

323. See supra text accompanying notes 1 89-203.
324. And that tendency is, again, a symptom of the interior fundamental attribution error: we
"consistently fail to make sufficient allowance for the role that construal plays in determining behavior,
a failure with profound personal and social consequences." Ross & NISBETI, supra note 6, at 1 2 . For
instance, we do not "recognize the degree to which [our] understanding of stimuli is a result of an
active, constructive process, rather than a passive reception and registering of some external reality." [d.
Similarly, we tend to underestimate the variability of situational construal across time and across
people, and thus tend to be overconfident in our behavioral predictions regarding ourselves and others.
See id.
When this Article was in press, we came across some fascinating work by Professor Dan Simon and
his colleagues on what they call "coherence-based reasoning." See, e.g., Dan Simon, The Third View of
the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making, 7 1 U. C HI . L. R EV 5 1 1 , 520-49 (2004)
(summarizing the automatic cognitive mechanisms that help provide decisionmakers a sense of
confidence in their reasoning); Dan Simon, Chadwick J. Snow, & Stephen J. Read, The Redux of
Cognitive Consistency Theories: Evidence Judgments by Constraint Satisfaction, 86 J. PERSONALITY &
Soc. PSYCHOL. 8 1 4 (2004) (reviewing experiments indicating the bidirectionality of reasoning between
evidence and conclusion).
325. Cf KUNDA, supra note 6, at 1 59 ("Because information about the social world is typically
mixed and inconsistent, we may often be biased toward confirming any hypothesis we entertain about
our own or other people's attributes.").
.
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that reinforces them.326 Confirming features of ambiguous evidence can be
embraced as further support, and disconfirming elements of that same evidence
can be ignored. Given the prevalence of ambiguity (not to mention our ability
and that of others to manufacture ambiguity), our knowledge structures are
generally well-protected.327 As Ziva Kunda explains, echoing Bertrand Russell,
our knowledge structures
may affect not only which memories, beliefs, and rules we access but also the
amount of effort we invest in searching for relevant beliefs and rules in the
first place . . . . When we come across evidence that supports our desired
conclusions, we may accept it at face value. But when we come across
comparable evidence that challenges our desired conclusions, we may evalu
ate it more critically and work hard to refute it.328

Social psychologists have given a variety of names to this process-for
example, confirmatory bias, perseverance bias, hypothesis-based filtering, elas
tic justification, and, more generally, motivated reasoning.329 Perhaps unsurpris
ingly (given the topic), researchers have found a great deal of evidence suggesting
that such devices are extremely powerful. Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross summa
rized the literature in 1 980 as follows:
When people already have a theory, before encountering any genuinely
probative evidence, exposure to such evidence (whether it supports the theory,

326. See Peter H. Ditto & David F. Lopez, Motivated Skepticism: Use of Differentiated Decision
Criteria for Preferred and Non-Preferred Conclusions, 63 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 568 ( 1 992);
Dieter Frey, Recent Research on Selective Exposure to Information, in 19 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL
SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 4 1 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1986).
327. For studies revealing the important role of ambiguity, see, for example, Darley & Gross, supra
note 222; Jason Dana, Roberto A. Weber & Jason Xi Kuang, Exploiting Moral Wiggle Room: Behavior
Inconsistent with a Preference for Fair Outcomes (Working Paper, June 24, 2003), at http://
emlab.berkeley.edu/users/webfac/deUavignaJe2 I 8_f03/Fair.pdf; Christopher K. Hsee, Elastic Justifica
tion: How Tempting but Task-Irrelevant Factors Influence Decisions, 62 ORG. B EHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 330 ( 1 995); Christopher K. Hsee, Elastic Justification: How Unjustifiable Factors Influence
Judgments, 66 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 122 (1996); William M. Klein & Ziva Kunda,
Motivated Person Perception: Constructing Justifications for Desired Beliefs, 28 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 145 ( 1 992); Henry Montgomery, From Cognition to Action: The Search for Dominance in
Decision Making, in PROCESS AND STRUCfURE IN HUMAN DECISION MAKING 23 (Henry Montgomery &
Ola Svenson eds., 1989); Melvin L. Synder et aI., Avoidance of the Handicapped: An Attributional
Ambiguity Analsyis, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2297 ( 1 979); Philip E. Tetlock & Jae n Kim,
Accountability and Judgment Processes in Personality Prediction Task, 52 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 700 (1 987).
328. KUNDA, supra note 6, at 230.
329. For more thorough discussions of the biases and of the evidence, see KUNDA, supra note 6, at
1 1 1 -60 & 223-32; NISB ETT & Ross, supra note 1 29, at 67-89; Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased,
supra note 1 36, at 1 1 95-1 2 1 1 (describing various facets of the "schema-protection" motive); Hanson &
Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously I, supra note 1 26, at 646-54; Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirma
tion Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REv. GEN. PSYCHOL. 1 75 ( 1 998). For a more
thorough discussion of the role of motivation, see infra Part Ill.C.2.

74

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 93 : 1

opposes the theory, or is mixed), will tend to result in more belief in the
correctness of the original theory than normative dictates allow.
. . . When people approach a set of evidence without a theory and then form
a theory based on initial evidence, the theory will be resistant to subsequent
evidence . . . . [and]
. . . When people formulate a theory based on some putatively probative
evidence and later discover that the evidence is false, the theory often
0
survives such total discrediting. 33

The influence of those biases, and others,33 I makes clear one of the great
problems with our schemas: we create them too quickly and maintain them too
loyally. And, again, this problem is not limited to the processes of just lay
scientists: "The tendency of professional scientists to persist in adhering to
theories well past the point at which such adherence can be justified by the
evidence has been observed by many.'.332 We will return to that point briefly
below,333 and more thoroughly in subsequent articles.334 For now, the crux of
our point is that all of us are subject to the same biasing process that we just do
not see.
To be sure, we often see others as biased, prejudiced, vested, incoherent,
inconsistent, or closed-minded?35 But those experiences are schematized as
dispositional quirks, not as a reflection of their deeper interior situations. 336 In
ourselves, we see what every person is presumed capable of--clarity, objectiv
ity, and open-mindedness .337 And we can maintain that self-affirming view-as
do those who we feel should not-in significant part because we do not see the
interior situation.338
As with the other biases, there's a critical kicker to this analysis: exterior

330. NISBETf & Ross, supra note 1 27, at 1 69.
3 3 1 . See, e.g., Mark Snyder & William B . Swann, Jr., Hypothesis-Testing Process in Illteraction, 36
1. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1 202 ( 1 978) (showing how people investigate a hypothesis in a way
that tends to confirm it); see also KUNDA, supra note 6, at 1 1 1-60 (discussing how humans test
hypotheses); SABINI, supra note 8 1 , at 1 69-70 (contending that the choice of hypothesis may be subject
to irrational or nonsensical forces).
332. NISBETf & Ross, supra note 1 29, at 1 68 (citing sources).
333. See infra text accompanying notes 3 39-380.
334. See, e.g., Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 1 36, at 1 239-52 (laying out some
basic predictions about this effect on legal theory); Chen & Hanson, The Illusion ofLaw, supra note 32
(providing evidence confirming those predictions in the basic schemas of legal theory).
335. Cf Lee Ross & Andrew Ward, Naive Realism: Implications for Social Conflict and Misunder
standing, in VALUES AND KNOWLEDGE 103 (Edward S. Reed et aI. eds., 1997) (arguing that individuals
ascribe differences of opinion in others to reliance upon conflicting data, incompetence, or bias).
336. See Emily Pronin, Thomas Gilovich, & Lee Ross, Objectivity in the Eye of the Beholder:
Divergellt Perceptions of Bias in Self Versus Others, I I I PSYCHOL. REV. 781 (2004).
337. Cf Emily Pronin et ai., The Bias Blind Spot: Perceptions of Bias in Self Versus Others, 28
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. B ULL. 369, 374-76 (2002) (reporting that survey respondents had
difficulty recognizing their own susceptibility to biases and claimed to possess more positive character
istics-such as objectivity-than the average person).
338. See generally Pronin, Gilovich & Ross, supra note 336 (describing our unseen mechanisms for
responding to evidence or arguments that conflict with our own schemas).
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situation, which we began by emphasizing our failure to appreciate, can wield
an immense influence over which schemas we adopt, which we reject, and how
and when we apply them. And that process is itself guided in part by the
operation of interior schemas functioning below the level of our conscious
awareness. Furthermore, once our schemas are in place, exterior situation can
provide us the evidence and ambiguity we need to sustain them.

b. Economics: A Preliminary Case Stud/39
"The power of theory to organize information and guide inquiry is great
and is the core of validity in the adage that you can 't beat a theory except with
a better theory. "
- Richard Posner340

"New ideas encounter formidable obstacles, the foremost being indiffer
ence, but also the new ideas will often conflict with old ideas or clash with
apparently contradictory experience. "
- George Stigler34 1

Because, as we argued above, people have a stereotyped view of schemas
(providing further evidence of their power and presence), we have thus far
focused most of our attention on the most salient group concepts and have
virtually ignored most of schemas ' other, more general distorting effects. (The
tendency should now be, we hope, a familiar one.) No human inference process
is without schematic structuring, and none is insulated from schematic distor
tions.342 Indeed, there is significant evidence that the reasoning of professional
scientists, despite their presumed role as purveyors of objective truth, is like
wise distorted. Much of what is known about the structure of scientific revolu
tions (to borrow Thomas Kuhn's phrase)343 is just one manifestation of a far
more general human tendency to create, defend, and, when forced to, abandon a
favored schema or knowledge structure. Here, we will use the real-world
example at hand-the schema-driven history of the role of choice biases in

339. In a related project, one of us, with Ronald Chen, is exploring some fundamental ways in which
knowledge structures are distorting law and legal theory. See Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased,
supra note 1 36; Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Distribution Versus Efficiency: Missing the Taste of the
Pie (unpublished manuscript, on file with the authors) [hereinafter Chen & Hanson, Taste of the Pie).
340. Posner, supra note 249, at 278.
34 1 . GEORGE J. STIGLER, MEMOIRS OF AN UNREGULATED ECONOMIST 8 ( 1 988).
342. See C. Neil Macrae, Alan B. Milne & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Stereotypes as Energy-Saving
Devices: A Peek Inside the Cognitive Toolbox, 66 1. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 37 ( 1994).
343. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIAC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970).
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economics and legal economics.344 This partial case study illustrates not only
the distorting effects of knowledge structures, but also how their effects bedevil
policy analysts, including legal economists.

i. Knowledge Structures in the Analysis of Temporal Effects
Consider the history of social scientific analysis of the effects of time on
judgment-a history that we already hinted at above. At least since Adam Smith
and well before the emergence of neoclassical economics, economists have
been interested in intertemporal decisionmaking. The early economists sought
to identify and examine the often-conflicting "sociological and psychological
,,
determinants of these choices. 345 In the early nineteenth century, for example,
John Rae wrote about the affective attractiveness of immediate consumption as
compared to the displeasure of saving:
Such pleasures as may now be enjoyed generally awaken a passion strongly
prompting to the partaking of them. The actual presence of the immediate
object of desire in the mind by exciting the attention, seems to rouse all the
faculties, as it were to fix their view on it, and leads them to a very lively
conception of the enjoyments which it offers to their instant possession. 346

And around the same time economic theorist N.W. Senior wrote that "[t]o
abstain from the enjoyment which is in our power, or to seek distant rather than
,,
immediate results, are among the most painful exertions of the human will. 347
Thus, the sort of variability of preferences to which neoclassical economists
have long been blind had not only been identified by economists a century
before, but had also been explained by them. Strikingly, both Rae and Senior
intuited what social psychologists more than a century later came to call
immediacy. 348
Similarly, toward the late 1 800s, some economists even began to write about
the effects of heuristics in human cognitions. In 1 889, Eugen von Bohm
Bawerk wrote:
It may be that we possess inadequate power to imagine and to abstract, or that
we are not willing to put forth the necessary effort, but in any event we limn a
more or less incomplete picture of our future wants and especially of the

344. For a related and more complete examination of the i nfluence of knowledge structures on law
and economic analysis of policy, see Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 1 36; Chen &
Hanson, The Illusion of Law, supra note 32; Chen & Hanson, Taste of the Pie, supra note 339.
345. Frederick, Loewenstein & O' Donoghue, supra note 153, at 35 1 .
346. JOHN RAE, THE SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF CAPITAL 1 20 ( 1834), quoted in Frederick, Loewenstein
& O'Donoghue, supra note 1 53, at 353.
347. NASSAU W. SENIOR, OUTLINE OF THE SCIENCE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 60 ( 1 836), quoted in
Frederick, Loewenstein & O'Donaghue, supra note 1 53, at 353.
348. See supra text accompanying notes 1 66--70.
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remotely distant ones. And then there are all those wants that never come to
49
mind at all. 3

Thus, not only were these early economists developing a psychological
theory to explain real human behavior,350 the theory they were developing-of
a comer-cutting and schema-driven cognitive process-anticipated the very sort
of interior fundamental attribution error that we are emphasizing here. In short,
economists were beginning to glimpse something of our interior situation,
particularly with respect to our cognitive miserliness.
But the insight itself makes predictable what would be done with it. There
was then emerging a new brand (or schema) of economics-the far more
technical, simplistic, and axiomatic (and far less realistic) approach that came to
be known as neoclassical economics. In an effort to create a simple way of
thinking about intertemporal choice that comported with the emerging eco
nomic models, Nobel Laureate Paul Samuelson, in a five-page article, offered
the now-dominant discounted utility modee5 1 "[I]n Samuelson's simplified
model, all the psychological concerns discussed over the previous century were
,,
compressed into a single parameter, the discount rate. 352 The new model was
based not upon social scientific analysis but on "little more than introspection
and personal observation" on the part of several economists.353 As Frederick,
Loewenstein, and O' Donoghue explain in their recent account, the path to
theoretical dominance was quick and direct, owing not to realism but to what
we would call schematic biases, a retreat from realism to simplicity:
Samuelson did not endorse the [discounted utility] model as a normative
model of intertemporal choice, noting that "any connection between utility as
discussed here and any welfare concept is disavowed" . . . . He also made no
claims on behalf of its descriptive validity, stressing, "It is completely arbi
trary to assume that the individual behaves so as to maximize an integral of
the form envisaged in [the discounted utility model]" . . . . However, despite
Samuelson's manifest reservations, the simplicity and elegance of this formu-

349. EUGEN VON BOHM-BAWERK, CAPITAL AND INTEREST 268-69 ( 1 889), quoted in Frederick, Loewen
stein & O'Donoghue, supra note 153, at 354. Similarly, in 1920 Arthur Pigou, the economist to whom
Ronald Coase was responding in his famous The Problem of Social Cost, explained that variation of
time preferences resulted from the fact that "our telescopic faculty is defective, and we, therefore, see
future pleasures, as it were, on a diminished scale." ARTHUR C. PtGOU, THE EcONOMICS OF WELFARE
( 1920), quoted in Frederick, Loewenstein & O'Donoghue, supra note 153, at 354 n.2.
350. Cf Frederick, Loewenstein & O'Donoghue, supra note 153, at 355 ("In the early part of the
twentieth century, 'time preference' was viewed as an amalgamation of various intertemporal mo
tives.").
35 1 . Paul A. Samuelson, A Note on Measurement of Utility, 4 REv. ECON. STUD. 1 55 ( 1 937).
Samuelson did most of his pathbreaking work in very short articles, typically styled "notes." It is
telling, we believe, that that the efficiency of his ideas is evident in both their substance and form,
qualities that our readers are likely craving about now.
352. Frederick, Loewenstein & O'Donoghue, supra note 1 53, at 355.
353. [d. at 352.
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lation was irresistible, and the [discounted utility] model was rapidly adopted
as the framework of choice for analyzing intertemporal decisions.
The [discounted utility] model received a scarcely needed further boost to
its dominance as the standard model for intertemporal choice when Tjalling
C. Koopmans showed that the model could be derived from a superficially
plausible set of axioms. Koopmans, like Samuelson, did not argue that the
[discounted utility] model was psychologically or normatively plausible; his
goal was only to show that under some well-specified (though arguably
unrealistic) circumstances, individuals were logically compelled to possess
positive time preference. Producers of a product, however, cannot dictate how
the product will be used, and Koopmans ' central technical message was
largely lost while his axiomatization of the [discounted utility] model helped
to cement its popularity and bolster its perceived legitimacy. 354

The influence of the discounted utility schema continues to be significant,
even among the skeptics and nonbelievers. The theories offered to compete with
the discounted utility model often have been heavily anchored to that model,
although evidence of real human decisionmaking is forcing them to begin to
take into account certain aspects of the situation.355 As we will detail below, the
same is true for the more general rational-actor model in law and economics.356
Thus far, we have indicated two general ways in which economists over the
last half-century have responded to evidence of the lack of realism in the
rational-actor-based discounted utility model. The most common method (and a
key reason that Samuelson's brief note has become such a dominant approach to
positive and normative theory) has been to adopt the basic model without regard
to its realism. That strategy tends to work when economists are not confronted
with anomalous or falsifying evidence. A second method is to acknowledge the
basic model's unrealism and to accommodate the anomalous evidence with as
little violence to the original model as possible.357 That approach, as we' ve
noted, reveals the anchoring effect of our knowledge structures.35 8
There is at least one more general method, a middle way between those two,
which is to acknowledge the supposedly anomalous evidence, but construe it in
a way that renders it confirmatory of the challenged model. 359 This is a
restatement of the confirmatory bias described above.36o The strategy thus takes
what appears to be damaging evidence and transforms it into reinforcing
evidence. But, again, the strategy often reflects not a fair and accurate interpreta-

354. [d. at 355-56 (citations omitted).
355. See id. at 365-73 (discussing alternative models that remain true to the discounted utility
model).
356. See infra Part V.
357. See Frederick, Loewenstein & O'Donoghue, supra note 1 53, at 373.
358. See supra text accompanying notes 20 1 -20.
359. There are, of course, more extreme strategies-such as abandoning the original model in its
entirety. Such alternatives are as rare in practice as they are revolutionary in theory.
360. See supra text accompanying notes 2 1 6-17.
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tion of the evidence, but a motivated attempt to maintain a favored theory.
Richard Posner's response to intertemporal inconsistencies exemplifies that
approach. He takes evidence that most economic behavioralists consider a threat
to the rational actor model's viability and reinterprets it as further support for
that purported model:
[T]he reason for the [intertemporal choice variations] may simply be that I
lack a clear conception of my consumption needs a decade hence; the reason
may, in other words, be the imagination cost . . . . I cannot imagine what
might make me pay in effect a huge interest rate to reallocate consumption [in
the distant future, whereas I can imagine it today] . The fact that knowledge
and imagination are "bounded" just shows, what no rational-choice economist
doubts, that information costs are positive?6 1

Posner thus cleverly explains the phenomenon in terms of now-somewhat
theorized information costs, exhibiting what Dean Radin describes as the "I
thought of it first" stage of accepting an idea?62 Posner's reasoning reflects the
confirmatory bias in its classic form inasmuch as he interprets selective portions
of the ambiguous evidence as consistent with his favored theory, failing to see
that it is also consistent with competing theories or to examine whether other
portions of the evidence can be similarly construed.363
But Posner's construal goes further and reveals what might be called counter
feit confirmation bias. 364 Posner does more than just selectively reinterpret
evidence to corroborate a favored theory. He also fundamentally adjusts the
underlying theory, while falsely claiming that its pre-altered version has been
confirmed. More specifically, Posner conflates information costs, a sliver of
which economists have long included in their basic model, with "imagination
costs," which economists conventionally do not have a place for in their
models.365
Of course, we do not dispute that people have trouble imagining or appreciat
ing factors that are less immediate. To the contrary, as we have been detailing
for 1 .5 articles, that difficulty is a fundamental feature of the situational
character's interior situation. The problem is that conventional economics has

3 6 1 . RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 259 (2001).
362. See supra note 322 and accompanying text.
363. Posner, like all of us, makes a habit of this. For example, he

interprets evidence of downward
sloping demand curves as a valid basis for preferring the rational-actor model over alternative models
(such as the situational character), though it isn't. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 5, at
1 6 1 -63; infra notes 724-30 and accompanying text.
364. This is an un surprising symptom of what we describe below, as counterfeit realism, one of
several inadequate responses by legal economists to the challenge of realism. See infra Part V.c
(describing and addressing economists' responses).
365. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics, 92 AM.
EcON. REV. 460, 461-63 (2002) (describing in his Nobel lecture the reluctance and narrowness with
which economists generally took information costs into account-for the same sorts of reasons that we
describe in this Article).
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generally meant something very different when referring to "information costs"
which is precisely why the insights of behavioralists have been slow in coming
and why the bulk of social psychology and related fields have been ignored. The
conventional assumption regarding the effect of information costs is not, con
trary to Posner's version, that people will be unable to imagine their needs in a
future state of the world, but rather that rational actors will mis-estimate the
risks they face in the current state of the world. Furthermore, economists do not
generally assume, as Posner does here, that individuals will systematically
underestimate risk, but rather that they will mis-estimate randomly such that
they are correct on average.366 Posner himself makes this precise argument
when discussing the general role of information costs on people's consumption
choices.367 And he makes the same sort of argument to help defend his rational
actor theory when he claims that the presence of irrational actors may not alter
the model's prediction regarding downward-sloping demand curves,368 so long
as the irrational actors behave, on average, like rational actors.369 Even accept
ing Posner's elastic definition of "information costs," his argument assumes that
our limited imaginations are not a feature of our interiors that we can adjust for
or control; otherwise, individuals would simply make rule-based (imagination
free) adjustments to help eliminate time effects on their choices?70 Posner is
claiming, not just that "rational actors" have limited imaginations, but also that
they do not recognize that they have limited imaginations. He is, in other words,
implicitly positing the existence of unseen interior situational influences-a
view that we share, but that he cannot plausibly sustain while remaining
otherwise committed to the rational-choice model that he hopes to defend.37 I
In that way, Posner re-fashions the model that he purports to be defending.
This move reveals either the unrealism of the unaltered rational-choice model or
the elasticity and non-falsifiability of that model .372 Relatedly, by focusing so
singlemindedly upon defending the rational actor model against the challenge at
hand, Posner fails to see how his solution creates bigger problems for that
model that were apparently beyond his imagination (or his cognitive budget) at

George J. Stigler, Economists and Public Policy, REGULATION, May-June 1 982, at 1 3,
("[p]eople act efficiently in their own interests. . . . [They] learn all the presently knowable things it
pays them to know-always on average-and act with due regard for this knowledge.").
367. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCJ1JRE OF TORT LAW 273-3 1 \
366. See, e.g.,

16

( 1 987).
368.

Downward-sloping demand curves represent the basic economic axiom that "when the price of
x goes up, the amount of x that the consumer will purchase goes down, and vice versa." ROBERT COOTER
& THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 23 (3d ed. 2000).
369. POSNER, supra note 36 1 , at 26 1 .
370. They could do so simply by rejecting today's preferences that, without obvious reasons,
contradict the preferences that would exist were the same choice postponed until tomorrow. Thus, in
our example above, see supra text accompanying notes 1 53-56, a person could simply re-pose any
choice in a hypothetical future time frame, and make more reliable judgments.
37 1 . See irifra Part v.c. 1 .
372. See infra text accompanying notes 724-49.
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the time?73 But more important for our purposes, his arguments also exemplify
one of the many ways in which all people selectively, unconsciously stretch
their theories in service of a favored knowledge structure.
To more clearly view the influence of counterfeit confirmatory bias in this
episode, consider again the historical context of this debate. By pointing to
people's imperfect imaginations, Posner is unwittingly restating the basic argu
ments of the nineteenth-century economists, particularly those of Bohm
Bawerk.374 Bohm-Bawerk looked to psychology and sociology in an effort to
generate a realistic portrait of the human agent, untethered to the strictures of
the formal rational-actor model. 375
Scholars who, a half-century later, adopted Samuelson and Koopmans' dis
counted utility model for explaining intertemporal decision making were reject
ing the realism undergirding Bohm-Bawerk's argument for the sake of embracing
the elegance and simplicity of the rational choice model.376 Thus Posner, in the
name of maintaining the rational-choice model, is falling back on the very same
realism that was rejected in the name of adopting that model. This is the same
Posner who has argued repeatedly in the face of criticisms that simplicity and
elegance are the touchstones of good science,377 and the same Posner who
frequently admonishes that "[i]n theory-making, descriptive accuracy is pur
chased at a sacrifice of predictive power.'0378
But Posner does not maintain the simplicity or predictive power that he
claims to value. At best, he preserves merely the appearance of such qualities by
altering the once-simJne theory to house evidence that had previously been
rejected as too cumbersome to accommodate. It is not the theory's capacity for
accommodation that has changed, but the weight, clarity, and prominence of the
anomaly. Although Posner provides no meta-theory to explain when to relin
quish reductionism for the sake of realism, the meta-theory is revealed in his

373. For other criticisms of the nonfalsifiability of Posner's theoretical commitments, see Christine
lolls, Cass R. Sunstein, & Richard Thaler, Theories and Tropes: A Reply to Posner and Kelman, 50
STAN. L. REV. 1 593, 1 595 ( 1 998) ("Throughout Posner's commentary, he goes through the following
ritual. He discussses one of the phenomena we identify as problematic for economic theory; he offers a
modification or elaboration on the standard theory that could, in principle, be consistent with this
phenomenon; and then he declares victory. Posner seems to think that the fact that it is possible to tell a
rational choice story consistent with the data is sufficient to establish that this explanation is the correct
one. This is obviously a fallacy. In no case does he offer evidence to suggest that his preferred
explanation is correct, nor even a test that would, in principle, discriminate between his explanation and
ours. For those of us who believe in falsifiability, this is an unfortunate omission."); Hanson, Reyes, &
Schlanger, supra note 43 (arguing that Posner's positive theory of tort law is non-falsifiable).
374. See supra text accompanying notes 345-50.
375. See supra text accompanying note 349. See generally Benforado & Hanson, The Costs of
Dispositionism, supra note 47 (comparing and contrasting Posner's narrow, dispositionist approach to
legal theory with Guido Calabresi's relatively situationist approach).
376. See George Loewenstein, The Fall and Rise of Psychological Explanations in the Economics of
Intertemporal Choice, in CHOICE OVER TIME 3 (George Loewenstein & 10n Elster eds., 1 992).
377. See infra text accompanying note 725.
378. POSNER, supra note 36 1 , at 263; see also id. at 264 ("Explanation and prediction must not be
confused.").
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practice. The meta-theory, which is found in the human interior situation, is to
take into account only as much anomalous evidence as one's prevailing knowl
edge structure must, and to do so in a way that salvages as much of that
knowledge structure as possible.
It is important to recognize a likely effect of-and, perhaps, motive behind
the counterfeit variation of confirmatory bias. Changing a theory, while pretend
ing not to, in order to explain what would otherwise be disconfirming or
falsifying evidence, allows for the pre-altered theory to be applied in unexam
ined form in other contexts. For example, Posner does not feel compelled at the
end of his treatment of intertemporal judgments to rethink all areas of economic
analysis to determine the possible influence of "imagination costs." He is able to
pretend that the rational-actor model, in unaltered form, has fully survived the
skirmish with realism . The strategy further permits him to criticize those
scholars who, in response to evidence of realism, call for new theories (with
new names). Thus Posner claims that "behavioral economists tend to give up on
,,
rational-choice economics too soon. 379 Of course the point is that Posner, too,
has given up on rational-choice economics. It is just that he has done so in a
way that allows him to maintain the legitimating mantle of a longstanding
theory and to fall back on the simplified model without justification.
In short, by engaging in the confirmatory bias-in both its classic and
counterfeit forms-Posner has avoided the implications of the very "imagina
tion costs" that rescued his rational actor model. If Posner were serious about
imagination costs, he would be forced to recognize what those applying social
science have, often to their own surprise, discovered and demonstrated: The
limits of human imagination are not a factor that kicks in or should be relied on
or explained away selectively. Instead, they are a permanent condition of our
interior situations, an unseen condition that should be at the core of our
understandings of human actors and, in tum, our legal theories.
Economists, spurred by the importuning of economic behavioralists, may
appear to be approaching another revolution (or counter-revolution) in the
spiraling trajectory of their thinking about intertemporal choices?80 It is diffi
cult to read that history, however, without seeing the economizing and distorting
role of schemas or knowledge structures channeling and shaping that thinking.

ii. The Focus on Choice Biases
But there is more to be observed about the silent influence of interior
situational forces over economists' experiences with choice biases. There is

379. See id. at 260.
380. Frederick, Loewenstein,

and O'Donoghue argue compellingly that the old "idea that intertempo
ral choices reflect an interplay of disparate and often competing psychological motives . . . should be
resurrected," because doing so "will help us to better understand and better explain the intertemporal
choices we observe in the real world." Frederick, Loewenstein & O'Donoghue, supra note 1 53, at 393.
Put differently, they, like us, are calling for a critical realist scientific revolution-though theirs is a far
narrower agenda.
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another, more general way in which prevailing knowledge structures in eco
nomic and legal economic theory have evaded the most threatening implications
of social psychology. It is no coincidence that, as noted in the previous section,
it is choice biases that have been taken relatively seriously38 I by economists and
legal economists. New subfields-behavioral economics and law and behavioral
ism-have emerged in an effort to incorporate the choice biases into tractable
economic models.382
Indeed, Daniel Kahneman, one of several founders of behavioral economics,
won the 2002 Nobel Prize in Economics. The economics establishment cel
ebrated his choice-based work precisely because it was so directly relevant and
easily incorporated into many traditional, dispositionist economic models.383
Choice biases focus on choice-the center of neoclassical economic theory.
Thus, the behavioralist studies revealing choice biases are intended less to
create a new general understanding of how humans think and more to reveal the
flaws in the simple rational-actor and self-interest models of traditional econom
ics.
The narrowness of choice biases makes them the most straightforward and
accessible means of disproving the predictions of unrehabilitated economic
theory?84 With such discrete, clear anomalies, behavioralists pose the most
immediate challenge to conventional economic models. But such anomalies are
also the least damaging to, or the most easily accommodated by, models that
continue to take preferences and choices as the centerpiece of human activity.
3 8 1 . Though not very seriously and not without substantial resistance. See infra Part IV.
382. See infra Part V; see also Daniel Altman, A Nobel that Bridges Economics and Psychology,
N.Y.TIMES, Oct. 1 0, 2002, at C I ("Behavioral economics and experimental methods have become hot

topics for graduate students in some of the nation's top economics departments. 'Many of the best and
the brightest young graduate students are interested in these issues, and they're getting good jobs,'
[University of Chicago] Professor [Richard] Thaler said. Universities in the United States, Europe,
Israel and Japan have opened centers dedicated to behavioral and experimental economics in the last
few years. David I. Laibson at Harvard credited the rapidly rising interest in the subject to the strength
of its science. 'The field is based primarily on work that reflects real people's choices,' he said. 'In that
sense, the findings have an inherent validity."').
383. See Jon E. Hilsenrath, Nobel Winners For Economics Are New Breed, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1 0,
2002, at B I (noting that "[t]he Nobel committee praised the 68-year-old professor for 'having
integrated insights from psychological research into economic science, especially concerning human
judgment and decision-making."'). Kahneman's "prospect theory"-the work that many believe led to
the Nobel Prize-is itself a dispositionist method of predicting consumer choices. It is, in other words,
an important and seminal contribution to weak-form realism. See infra Part V.C.4 (discussing weak
form realism).
384. So it is that Richard Thaler, one of the most prominent of economic behavioralists, has based
his important work on producing "convincing anomal[ies)" by finding "facts that contradict" the crisp
predictions that flow from economics' "two key assumptions [of] rationality and self-interest." RICHARD
THALER, WINNER 'S CURSE 2 ( 1 992); see also POSNER, supra note 36 1 , at 264 (behavioralism "is defined
by its subject rather than by its method and its subject is merely the set of phenomena that rational
choice models (or at least the simplest of them) do not explain"); Andreas Ortmann & Gerd Gigerenzer,
Reasoning in Economics and Psychology: Why Social Context Matters, in COGNITION, RATIONALITY, AND

(Manfred E. Streit et al. eds., 2000) (emphasizing the significance of
"heuristics-and-biases" research for "identifying ever new anomalies, or systematic deviations from
predictions of standard economic (game-theoretic) models").
INSTITUTIONS 1 3 1 , 1 33-34
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By focusing on choice biases, behavioralists do not investigate, much less
challenge, the role of choice in the model, only the particular version of choice
calculus conventionally assumed. Anomalies have thus been both easy to find
and easy to present without implicating a far more thorough indictment of the
entire economic paradigm that social psychology, taken seriously, would yield.
Economists and economic behavioralists have thus been able to maintain their
assumption about preference-driven, choice-making actors, while disputing only
the extent to which that actor operates according to more or less rigid rationality
assumptions. By focusing on choice biases, in other words, economists have
been able to ignore the situation.385
But this is not a dispositional critique. We are not saying-nor do we
believe-that economists ignore situational influences consciously or deliber
ately. They have been ignoring it because of the situation-their interior situa
tion (and, arguably, their exterior situation, which rarely places them in direct
contact with individuals or ideas that would challenge their dispositionist
axioms). Their shared knowledge structures, for example, have distorted what
they see and how they construe what they see.386 And, because their knowledge
structure is itself situational, they have no reason to doubt what they think they
see-that is, dispositional choice.
As this discussion helps to demonstrate, professional scientists and lay
scientists are bedeviled by the same situation. Knowledge structures and sche
mas are all around us, guiding our every, or most every, thought, and simulta
neously assisting and distorting what we "know." The coloring concepts and
theories we employ can lead us to focus on irrelevant details in our environ
ment, to overlook the relevant details, and to misunderstand our world.387 As we
hope the reader has already recalled (with the aid of the knowledge structure
that we are attempting to create), that is precisely the mechanism behind the
exterior and interior fundamental attribution errors.
4. Summary
Where lay people and economists see "thinking," they vastly overstate its
significance and vastly understate the interior situation of our thinking-that is,
our unseen cognitions. Social psychology and related fields make clear that all
of our cognitive processes are more or less influenced by unseen and distorting
influences, from heuristics and framing effects on one hand to schematic and
attributional processes on the other. And all of those unseen cognitions and
cognitive processes render us more or less vulnerable to outside manipulation
indeed, the experiments revealing the cognitive phenomena simultaneously
385. See infra Part V (providing a more general critique of this type).
386. As we have already hinted, other interior situational features-such

as motivation-may have
also contributed to this tendency.
387. See KUNDA, supra note 6, at 20. See generally Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra
note 1 36, at 1 1 55-1 2 1 6 (describing those and many other distorting influences of knowledge schemas
and categories).
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reveal the extent to which they can be tapped through exterior situation.
In short, this section has shown some of the ways in which, although it is true
that we experience ourselves thinking, we do not think the way we think we
think. There is more to the situation. And, as the next section illustrates, we
have barely scratched the surface of our interior situations.

C. ATTITUDES (vs. "PREFERRING")
The previous section focused on the situation of our "thinking. " This section
focuses on the situation of our attitudes or "preferences." This section leads to
the same sort of conclusion: although it is true that we experience ourselves
preferring, there is more to the situation than what we perceive, and thus more
to the meaning of preferences than most of us, legal economists and policy
makers included, have appreciated.

1 . Some Evolution of the Concept

a. The Traditional View-Stable and Causal
We begin by reminding our readers of attitudes , the name that social psycholo
gists have given to the concept that economists have called preferences. Tradition
ally, attitudes were as central to the theories of social psychologists as preferences
are to economists-and their centrality played a very similar role. In 1 954
Gordon Allport claimed, "this concept is probably the most distinctive and
,,
indispensable concept in contemporary American social psychology. 3 88 More
recently, Richard Eiser claimed that
[t]he term ' attitude' is probably used more frequently than any other in social
psychology. There are few theories in which the concept is not explicitly or
implicitly introduced, and few experiments in which attitudes are not involved
somewhere among the dependent variables. 389

Preferences are similarly central to economic theories?90 One important
difference is that while economists have, for decades, complacently assumed
the actuality of their pre-theoretic concept of preferences, social psychologists
have, for nearly a century,39 1 painstakingly applied scientific methods to test
and better understand their concept of attitudes.
Economists assume preferences are stable and exogenous-by which they

388. Gordon W. Allport, The Historical Background of Modem Social Psychology, in HANDBOOK OF
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 3, 43 (Gardner Lindzey ed., 1 954).
389. J. RICHARD ElSER, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: ArrITUDE, COGNITION, AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 1 1 ( 1 986).
390. See infra Part V.
39 1 . For a description of some of the earlier, classic studies on the relationship (or surprising lack of
relationship) between attitudes and behavior, see ElSER, supra note 389, at 52-53; FISKE & TAYLOR,
supra note 72, at 530--3 2.
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essentially mean dispositional.392 What social psychologists have learned about
attitudes by studying them reveals attitudes are malleable and, for the most part,
endogenously determined-by which we mean internally and externally situ
ational.
Before describing the situational nature of attitudes, it is worth highlighting
that even social psychologists initially believed or expected to find that there
was a dispositional "there" there. For example, Allport, in 1935, defined "atti
tude" as "a mental and neural state of readiness, organized through experience,
exerting a directive and dynamic influence upon the individual 's response to all
,,
objects and situations with which it is related. 393 In 1 948, Krech and Crutch
field wrote "[a]n attitude can be defined as an enduring organization of motiva
tional, emotional, perceptual, and cognitive processes with respect to some
,,
aspect of the individual's world. 394 Those definitions reflect an old, now
largely rejected, version of attitudes-as "involving beliefs, feelings, and dispo
,,
sitions to act. 395

b. The Modern View-Neither Stable nor Causal
It has only been through extensive social scientific efforts to pin them down
that social psychologists have come to discover just how situationally contin
gent attitudes really are:
When one looks at those studies that have attempted directly to compare
verbal expression of attitude towards a group or issue with other attitude
relevant behaviours, a rather confused picture emerges. Sometimes the verbal
measures provide quite good predictors of the specific kinds of behaviour
under investigation, but very often they seem to allow no such prediction at
all?96

In response to the "many examples where measures of attitude and behaviour
fail to correlate, or where correlations are found which are ambiguous with
respect to the direction of causality," most social psychologists have maintained
their allegiance to the concept of attitudes, but changed its definition?97 More
specifically, "theorists seem to be moving toward a conception of attitudes as
evaluations that are related in complex ways to beliefs, feelings, and actions.
This newer approach allows the question of the relation of attitudes to behavior,

392.
393.
\ 935).
394.
( 1 948).
395.
396.
397.

See infra Part V.A.

Gordon W. Allport, Attitudes,

in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 8 IO

(Carl Murchison ed.,

DAVID KRECH & RICHARD S . CRUTCHFIELD, THEORY AND PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1 5 2
SABINI, supra note 8 1 , at 527.
ElSER, supra note 389, at 52.
[d. at 53.
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,,
for example, to be an empirical rather than a definitional issue. 398
And what the empirical evidence has shown is, first, that "attitudes" as
traditionally conceived-and as they are imagined by most policy analysts and
policymakers--do not reveal themselves as stable determinants of human behav
ior and, second, that exterior situation has an immense influence over the
interior relationship between attitudes and behavior. As Allan Wicker put it in
his summary of the evidence more than thirty years ago, there exists "little
evidence to support the postulated existence of stable, underlying attitudes
within the individual which influence both his verbal expressions and his
,,
actions. 399 And, more recently, Fiske and Taylor summarize the role of situa
tion by asking:
Why should seemingly trivial aspects of a situation have such a clear impact
on people's behavior? Why should it matter what you temporarily access
about your past behaviors or beliefs? S ituationally induced salience can put
relevant attitudes . . . in the mental foreground, making them more available
as guides to action . . . . What is salient defines the situation for the individual,
reducing ambiguity and inconsistency . . . ; it tells you what should be
relevant to your behavior if you are uncertain of what to do. Finally, when
[your] global attitudes . . . are made salient, responsibility for behaving
consistently with one's attitude will loom large. . . . To predict which cogni
tions will cohere with behavior, then, one must know which factors in a
4OO
situation are salient.

Again, the exterior situations interact with our interior situations-all outside of
our conscious perception and all while we perceive ourselves to be acting
according to our thoughts and preferences.
To be sure, we have some articulable attitudes. B ut even those attitudes are
far more situationally contingent than we appreciate. And any situation in which
we report or perceive our attitudes will rarely correlate with our actual behavior
in other situations, or even our reporting or perception of our attitudes in other
situations . Our failure to appreciate the role of our interior situations further
interferes with our dispositionist expectations that attitudes will define our
behavior. The following subsection offers a more thorough, though still sum
mary, examination of the interior situation giving shape to our attitudes.

c. The Emerging View-Implicit and Automatic
While social psychologists first believed attitudes to be outside the reach of

398. SABINI, supra note 8 1 , at 527-28. This newer approach to attitudes helps to illustrate the
contribution that social cognition has made to its primary antecedent, social psychology. See FiSKE &
TAYLOR, supra note 72, at 464 ("Social cognition's main contribution to the field of attitude research has
been a fine-grained analysis of the mediating processes involved in attitude formation and change.").
399. Allan W. Wicker, Attitudes Versus Action: The Relationship of Verbal and Overt Behavioral
Responses to Attitude Objects, 25 J. Soc. ISSUES 4 1 , 75 ( 1 969).
400. FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 72, at 53 1 -32.
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measurement, they have come to see that "attitudes"-an individual's assess
ment of an object along a favorable-unfavorable dimension--could be measured
and did influence people's feelings, cognitions, and behavior. Again, attitudes
were long a cornerstone concept in social psychology, and their measurement,
through a variety of self-report mechanisms such as feeling thermometers and
questionnaires, became one of the major preoccupations of social psychology.
B ut emerging out of those then-revolutionary views of attitudes as measurable
is what today some describe as "an orthodoxy," which has made difficult the
recognition of a less visible (more situational), but still measurable, type of
attitude.401
In the last several years, social psychologists have encountered "new, previ
ously undetected forms of attitudes" that "elude conscious awareness, seem
,,
oblivious to conscious intention, and defy conscious control. 402 Perhaps be
cause of the recentness of the findings, they go by a number of names, including
implicit attitudes, "automatic thoughts and feelings," "unconscious thoughts,"
,,
,,
"unconscious social cognition, 403 and "automatically activated attitudes . 404
Whatever their name, the phenomena are revealed through new methods that,
very loosely, involve measuring the speed and strength with which people
automatically make associations between objects and attitudes.405 Through such
work, psychologists have found that the evidence regarding our worst tenden
cies-including stereotyping and prej udice-suggests that they
operate via the rou'6.ne mechanisms of perception, memory, categorization,
and decision-making. Just as those processes operate outside awareness,
control, intention, and self-reflection, so do their more value-laden versions
concerning stereotypes and attitudes about individual humans and the social
groups to which they belong.406

The best evidence further indicates that "our minds contain knowledge about
social groups (stereotypes) and attitudes (prejudice) toward them-whether we
,,
want to or not. 407 And that knowledge and those attitudes are influencing us
even if we don't want them to, and despite our best conscious efforts to prevent
it.408 The findings are so disturbing that even social psychologists have strongly
resisted them "with a passion atypical of the sterility of normal academic

40 1 . See Banaji, Implicit Attitudes, supra note 1 05, at 1 1 7, 1 1 8. For a discussion of whether implicit
attitudes are indeed attitudes or are something else, see id. at 1 20-3 1 .
402. Id. at 1 1 8.
403. Banaji, Ordinary Prejudice, supra note 1 05 , at 8.
404. Banaji, Implicit Attitudes, supra note 105, at 1 1 9.
405. See William A. Cunningham, Kristopher J. Preacher & Mahzarin R. Banaji, bnpiicit Attitude
Measures, 1 2 AM. PSYCHOL. Soc. 1 63 (200 1 ) (describing and assessing the various related techniques).
406. Banaji, Ordinary Prejudice, supra note 1 05 , at 9 .
407. Id.
408. See id.
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,,
exchange. 409
The work on these newly discovered forms of attitudes is a collaborative
effort among numerous social psychologists at nearly as many universities.4 l O
Rather than recount that effort here, w e will simply highlight some of the key
findings that have come out of the work. First, researchers have found that
people . have stronger "automatic preferences" for groups with which they
associate themselves-what social-psychologists call "in-groups"-than they
do for "out-groups," or people with whom they do not associate. Those findings
are nof uniform, however, for it has also been demonstrated that individuals
who identify with groups that are dominant within the larger culture have
stronger automatic in-group preferences than do individuals from less dominant
groups. So, for example, white Americans appear to have a stronger implicit
in-group preference than do African-Americans. Further, stereotypical "knowl
edge" about different social groups, whether more or less dominant, is activated
automatically-such that, for example, the terms "black" and "athlete" are
implicitly associated.4 1 1
Perhaps the most staggering insight of the implicit attitudes research is that
the human mind does all this--conjuring stereotypical and dubious associations
that give shape to our attitudes-outside our conscious awareness. What is
more, as is true with every situational phenomenon, our implicit attitudes are
subject to external situational influence. The very studies evoking implicit
attitudes demonstrate that point. Such studies have also demonstrated that
exposure to unfamiliar or counter-stereotypical associations can temporarily
reshape implicit attitudes; with the right situational manipulations, for example,
subjects begin to automatically associate the terms "strong" and "female," or
,,
"black" and "good. 4 1 2 In sum, the important research indicates some of the
ways that our attitudes are formed and altered by forces beyond our conscious
awareness.4 1 3
The scholars working i n the burgeoning field o f implicit attitudes admit to
being quite "taken aback" by many of their own findings.4 1 4 And, in reconciling

409. Banaji, Implicit Attitudes, supra note 1 05 , at 1 1 8 ; see also id. at 1 1 9 (explaining that "issues
and questions raised by experts and lay audiences appear to be equal in sophistication"); John A. Bargh,

The Cognitive Monster: The Law Against the Controllability of Automatic Stereotype Effects, in
DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 361 (Shelly Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds., 1 999).
4 1 0. A useful description of the work, as well as a collection of the relevant evidence, is available at
http://projectimplicit.net (last visited Nov. 1 6, 2004).
4 1 1 . Those implicit patterns are evident in both individuals who are members of the group that is
automatically associated with some quality, and for individuals who are outside the group. For an
illuminating review of the evidence of a "pro-white preference," see Banaji, Implicit Attitudes, supra
note 105, at 1 37-45.
4 1 2. See Banaji, Ordinary Prejudice, supra note 1 05 , at 9-10.
4 1 3. For more extensive discussions of that research, see Jason Mitchell, Brian Nosek & Mahzarin
Banaji, Category Salience Determines Implicit Attitudes Toward Black Female and White Male Targets
(Paper presented at the First Annual Meeting of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology,
Nashville, Tenn., 2000), available at http://projectimplicit.net/nosekltalklSPSP.mitchell.handout.2000.doc.
4 1 4. See, e.g., Banaji, Implicit Attitudes, supra note 1 05, at 1 36.
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that surprise with their findings, they emphasize, as do we (though in slightly
different terms), the parallel between our inability to see highly influential
features of our exterior situations and our inability to see such features of our
interior situations:
Just as social psychology's demonstrations of the power of social situation
revealed something stunning and even jarring about the ordinary nature of
horrific behavior, research on unconscious social cognition has the potential to
nudge us similarly toward unappealing conclusions about ourselves: that the
stuff in our minds about ourselves and other humans, about our social groups
and theirs, can be activated automatically and that once activated they can
potentially produce psychologically and socially beneficial and harmful ef
4 5
fects. 1

That we resist recogmzmg or accepting such "stunning and even jarring"
evidence about "the stuff in our minds" is in part the consequence of another
element of our interior situations: motivation.

2. Motivation
To more completely understand our attitudes, such as they are, it is necessary
to understand the role of motivation. Social psychologist Bernard Weiner claims
,,
that "motivation lies at the heart, the very center, of psychology. 4 1 6 In the
previous section we cited social psychologists claiming that "attitudes" were at
the core of their discipline.4 1 7 And, as this section will help show, the two
claims are not necessarily inconsistent, for motivations may well be at the heart
of our attitudes.
We might put the point slightly differently and claim that motivation lies at
the heart of our interior situations. We have already suggested some of the
effects of motivation on our cognitions. For instance, we argued that people
were motivated to construe their world in a way that confirmed their knowledge
structures, theories, or schemas.41 8 But we can go further. Motivations influence
not only what "data" we focus on and how we interpret ambiguous evidence,
but also which knowledge structures, theories, or schemas we unconsciously
embrace to begin with.4 1 9 Motivations likewise have a significant influence on
our attitudes-what our attitudes are at any given moment and how tenaciously
we will resist altering them. And motives, like attitudes, are easily mistaken as
,,
"preferences" inasmuch as they "are the motor for behavior. 42o

4 1 5 . Banaji, Ordinary Prejudice, supra note 1 05 , at 1 0.
4 1 6. BERNARD WEINER, HUMAN MOTIVATION: METAPHORS, THEORIES, AND RESEARCH I ( 1 992).
4 1 7 . See, e.g., supra note 384 and accompanying text.
4 1 8. See supra Part III.B. I .a.
4 1 9. See Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 1 36, at 1 1 39- 1 2 1 8 (describing those
effects).
420. FISKE, supra note 233, at 14.
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It is not just that our minds have a mind of their own (as the previous analysis
has indicated), it is also that those inner minds have a motivation-actually, a
whole set of motivations-of their own.42 1 In this section, we will describe a
sample of findings concerning those motivations and some of the interior
tensions caused by their coexistence.
Motivations are catalogued and categorized in different ways by different
scholars. In our review of the relevant literatures, four general types of motiva
tions stand out as particularly significant aspects of the situational character's
inner life: (a) the motive to understand; (b) the motive to self-affirm; (c) the
motive to simplify; and (d) the motive to cohere.422 As our review of more
specific motives will reveal, motivations can be, and often are, in tension with
one another. The motive to understand, for example, is often in tension with the
motives to self-affirm and simplify. The motive to cohere, then, pushes us to
reconcile our conflicting motivations by altering exteriorly and interiorly our
cognitions, attitudes, or behavior. But we are getting ahead of ourselves. It aids
comprehension to first review one motive at a time.

a. Motive to Understand
Social psychologists, as indicated above, sometimes describe people as intui
tive scientists because of people's strong desire to understand their worlds.423
That motive makes sense: satisfying it helps people to predict and control their
world (or at least enjoy the comfort that comes from believing they can).424
In light of that explanation, it may seem more accurate to describe the motive
as one of prediction and control, a motive that reveals itself as a desire to make
sense of the world. To be sure, the motive to control is a robust one-though it
will get short shrift in this Article. B ut social psychologists have not framed it
that way, we suspect, because people's desire to understand seems often to exist,

42 1 . We have chosen to place the topic of motivation under the larger heading of attitude not
because the effect of motivations is limited to our attitudes, but because there is no clear limit and they
needed to go somewhere. We are motivated to include motivations but our schema-which, necessarily,
cannot be up to the task of representing our interior situations--does not have a definite place for them.
So, to include them, we will force our schema to accommodate our motive. The difficulty of
categorizing motivation is not unique to us-nor is our reaction. Cf SABINI, supra note 8 1 , at 1 67
(noting that the classification of motivations is "not so obvious[]"). In any event, our main thesis
regarding the impact and importance of the situation is not harmed-indeed, it is probably ad
vanced-by evidence that the situation is actually more complex than our construct suggests.
422. Cf FISKE, supra note 233, at 15 (dividing motive into "belonging, understanding, controlling,
enhancing self, and trusting others" (emphasis omitted» ; FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 72, at 2 1 1 -26
(breaking down motivational processes into the motives for "accuracy," "self-enhancement," and
consistency); David A. Dunning, On the Motives Underlying Social Cognition, in EMOTION AND
MOTIVATION 137, 1 54 (Marilynn B. Brewer & Miles Hewstone eds., 2004) (similarly dividing the
motivational processes into the desires for "knowledge," "affirrn[ation]," and "coherence").
423. See supra text accompanying notes 1 84-86; see also KUNDA, supra note 6, at 141 (describing
our motive to understand our world and to find an understanding grounded in reasons).
424. See FISKE, supra note 233, at 1 7- 1 8. For an early rendition of this explanation for the motive,
see HEIDER, supra note 1 84. See generally Hanson, Reyes, & Schlanger, Attributional Positivism, supra
note 43 (reviewing that and subsequent explanations).

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

92

[Vol. 93: 1

at least in muted fonn, even when their prospect of controlling or even
predicting is remote.425
Consider a pair of experiments providing a pure illustration of the motive to
understand. In one study, subjects were shown from zero to three pictures of
different body parts (hands, feet, and torso) of a man or woman. After viewing
all of the selected pictures, the subjects were given the choice of either seeing a
picture of the entire person or receiving a small sum of money as a "bonus
,,
payment. 426 Those subjects who saw more body parts preferred to see the
picture of the entire person.427 To be clear, subjects had no obvious personal
stake in seeing the picture other than a desire to "see the full picture"-a desire
to know.
In the second experiment, subjects in one group were told that they would be
asked ten geography questions.428 Then, prior to hearing the geography ques
tions, the subjects were asked if they would prefer to receive, after completing
the test, a candy bar or the answers to the questions. A second group of subjects
was first asked the questions, and then given the choice between the candy bar
and the answers. As the experimenters predicted, three-quarters of the subjects
who were offered the choice before being asked the questions chose the candy
bar-illustrating the well-known craving for chocolate in the bellies of the
subjects.429 However, in the second group, who actually heard the questions
before being offered the choice, half of the subjects chose to receive the
answers instead. Hearing the questions stimulated the not-so-well-known crav
ing for understanding in the minds of the subjects.43o
In a quite famous study, Ellen Langer had experimental confederates ap
proach strangers about to begin making copies at a library copy machine and
ask if they could cut in.43 1 When the confederates provided no reason for
cutting, saying only "Excuse me, I have five pages. May I use the Xerox
machine?," sixty percent of the subjects honored the request. When would-be
cutters provided a reason, however, saying "Excuse me, I have five pages. May

425. We want to be careful not to overstate our point. The perceived inability to control a force,
event, or outcome may sometimes weaken our interest in understanding it. Indeed, a major source of
dispositionism is, we believe, the widely held sense that situation is, insofar as it is recognized at aU,
presumed immune to any individual's choices. People tend to accept that which they perceive as fixed,
and the belief that people should simply accept and make the most of their situation is a cultural truism.
426. George Loewenstein, The Psychology of Curiosity: A Review and Reinterpretation, 1 1 6 PSY
CHOL. B ULL. 75, 90 ( 1 994).
427. Id.
428. See George Loewenstein,

Drazen Prelec, & Catherine Shatto, Hot/Cold Intrapersonal Empathy
Gaps and the Under-Prediction of Curiosity I , 10 ( 1 997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
429. Id.
430. See id.

As stated by the authors, "people have limited introspective access to the factors that
influence judgment and decisions . . . and, consequently . . . they cannot 'undo' the effects of informa
tion received." /d. at 1 6.
43 1 . For a fuJI account of the study, see EUen Langer et aI., The Mindlessness of Ostensibly
Thoughtful Action: The Role of "Placebic " Infonnation in Interpersonal Interaction, 36 J . PERSONALITY
&

Soc.

PSYCHOL. 635 ( 1 978).
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I use the Xerox machine because I ' m in a rush?," fully ninety-four percent of
the subjects acceded.432 Thus, when subjects were offered a good reason, they
were far more willing to give up their spot. People want reasons.
But what Langer did next revealed even more about our desire to understand.
When her confederates provided a meaningless reason (a "placebic" reason),
subjects were just as willing to consent to the request as they were when the
cutters had given a good reason. More precisely, when asked "Excuse me, I
have five pages. May I use the Xerox machine because I have to make copies?,"
ninety-three percent of the subjects acceded.433 In other words, an empty reason
can be as effective as a good reason in situations where both are significantly
more influential than no reason.434 People want reasons so badly that they will
sometimes settle for the mere appearance of a reason.435
Relatedly, the reasons we provide for our own conduct are often demonstra
bly inaccurate, even as they seem to confirm our self-concepts as attitude
driven.436 In a series of experiments, Timothy Wilson and his colleagues have
shown that, far from being stable predictors of behavior, attitudes can be
manipulated simply by prompting people to consider their reasons for holding
them. In a typical study, subjects asked to contemplate their reasons for liking or
disliking a variety of posters (prior to selecting one to keep) expressed less
satisfaction with their choice when contacted weeks later by phone than did
subjects who were not asked to consider their reasons.437 According to Wilson,
that "introspection effect" results from the fact that our reasons are not plucked
from a garden of stable attitudes within us; rather, they emanate from our
motive to have reasons, which, in tum, leads us to focus on the most "plausible,
accessible, and easy to verbalize" "reasons" available.43 8

432. [d. at 637 & tbl. l .
433. Id.
434. The results of this study have been somewhat controversial. Compare Valerie S. Folkes,
Mindlessness or Mindfulness: A Partial Replication and Extension ofLanger, Blank, and Chanowitz, 48
J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 600 ( 1 985), with Ellen Langer et aI., Mindlessness-Mindfulness in
Perspective: A Reply to Valerie Folkes, 48 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 605 ( 1 985).
435. See Jonathan St. B.T. Evans & P.e. Wason, Rationalization in a Reasoning Task, 67 B RIT. 1.
PSCHOL. 479 ( 1 976) (describing and demonstrating how people's account of their own thought processes
reveal little about their actual thought processes-and instead reveal our motive to cohere).
436. As we'll see below, this experiment reveals more motives beyond just a desire to understand.
See infra Part 1I1.E. 1 .
437. See Timothy DeCamp Wilson et aI., Introspecting About Reasons Can Reduce Post-Choice
Satisfaction, 1 9 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 33 1 ( 1 993).
438. See Timothy D. Wilson, Sarah D. Hodges & Susan J. LaFleur, Effects of Introspecting About
Reasons: Inferring Attitudes from Accessible Thoughts, 69 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1 6, 1 6
( 1 995).
That desire for reasons, and the tendency to focus on the salient and simplistic, reflects and helps to
reinforce dispositionist schemas in Western cultures. The need for "reasons" would seem to be
heightened by dispositionism, inasmuch as people are presumed to act according to the "reasons"
generated by the interplay between their thinking, their preferences, and their will. In a dispositionist
culture, we need to make sense of our behavior in a way that our fellows and we ourselves can
understand. We need dispositionist reasons. The desire to have reasons also reinforces dispositionism,
because dispositionism is the most salient and simplistic place to begin when creating reasons. That is,
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Social psychologists have long recognized that our desire to make sense of
our world is one of our strongest desires. But it does not operate independently
of many other features of our interior situation, including our other, sometimes
conflicting motives. It is important to resist the temptation to view those
components of the situational character's interior as just discrete and incidental
ambivalences in a dispositional actor's preference rankings. After all, the mo
tives we are discussing here generally operate outside of our conscious aware
ness. It is for this reason that we are so easily persuaded by the illusion of our
own articulated reasons, and treat them, unreflectively, as truly the causal
wellspring of our behavior. This habit of reason-seeking and reason-offering is
deeply ingrained in us, running through unseen canyons of our interior situation,
and leaving us vulnerable to exterior manipulation.
As Ellen Langer's simple experiment illustrates, such situational influences,
and the motives behind them, help determine how our motive to understand is
satisfied. There are other interior motives, however, that also play a role. Our
desire for understanding is closely related to the motive to be correct in our
understanding-the motive to be accurate (or to perceive ourselves as accurate).
That motive can strongly influence the nature of our mental processes-for
example, the extent to which we rely on activated knowledge structures.439
When our motive for accuracy is strong, our minds become more focused, we
are more calculating and diagnostic in our evaluations, and we rely less on
general heuristics.440 The motive to be accurate, however, is not the only thing
that drives our understanding, for our drive for accuracy is often confounded by
more solipsistic ventures supporting a very powerful motive well studied by
social psychology-the motive for self-affirmation.

b. Motive to Self-Affirm
At virtually every level of their existence, people tend toward self-affirming
attitudes and cognitions. There are different ways of describing this motive.
Susan Fiske summarizes it by stating that "[a]ll else being equal, people
basically like to feel good about themselves . . . ; they like to feel that they are
,,
good and lovable. 44 1 David Dunning stresses that "[i]f there is any theme that
emerges again and again in social psychology it is that the [situational charac-

because the notion that human behavior reflects thinking, preferring, and willing is so widely accepted.
and because that notion so easily explains (albeit tautologically) most behavior, dispositionism also
quite naturally becomes the "reason" people settle on when they seek to explain, understand, predict, or
control human behavior. Absent that schema, the goals of explaining behavior, assigning responsibility,
and altering conduct seem complex and intractable. Similar dynamics help to explain why the
dispositionist reasons offered for individual conduct in this culture tend to boil down to simple, often
materialistic, notions of self-interest. See Dale T. Miller, The Norm of Self-Interest, 54 AM. PSYCHOLO
GIST 1 053 ( 1 999) (describing ways in which the schemas or norms of self-interest are self-fulfilling).
439. See Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 1 36, at 1 1 82- 1 2 1 1 .
440. See Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 1 08 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 48 1 -82 ( 1 990).
44 1 . FISKE, supra note 233, at 22.
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,,
ter] is a prideful one. 442
This motivation can be at odds with, and often overwhelms, accuracy mo
tives. Research has shown that our pride is routinely misplaced, and that the
impressions we form and maintain of ourselves have been widely demonstrated
to be more self-affirming than accurate. Our self-conceptions are thus "falsely
,,
positive. 443
The motive for self-affirmation is aided by the confirmatory bias. We enter
tain a view of ourselves that is favorable, and in our mental life we search for
and highlight evidence that will tend to confirm rather than disprove that
view.444 And we do that with respect to our individual selves, the groups with
which we identify, and the systems of which we are part.

i. Individual
On the individual level, "research . . . shows that people[] . . . are heavily
influenced by the need to feel good about themselves and to maintain self
esteem ' " . [R]esearch suggests that the impressions that people hold of
themselves may be falsely positive and somewhat exaggerated with respect to
,,
their actual abilities, talents, and social skills. 445 People are "eager to affirm
,,
. . . [that they are] competent, masterful, successful, and moral indvidual[s] . 446
As those conclusory statements suggest, there are innumerable studies reveal
ing people's tendency to hold unrealistically rosy self-conceptions. This is why
this motive is described as the motive to self-affirm-not a motive to under
stand oneself accurately, but rather a desire to feel good about oneself. In one
study, researchers led a group of subjects to believe that extroversion was
correlated with success and a second group to believe that introversion was.447
Later, the first group of subjects reported themselves to be extroverts, and the
second group claimed to be introverts. No matter the requisite personality trait,
then, people found a way to see (or portray) themselves as poised for success.
The mechanism making those optimistic beliefs possible were, of course,
hidden below the horizon of interior situations. According to the scholars
conducting the experiments, the mechanism is similar to confirmatory bias, but
here the relevant data was found in each person's memory of herself. The
motive to be viewed as successful made salient those memories of extroversion
or introversion that could confirm the desired personality trait.

442. David Dunning, On the Motives Underlying Social Cognition, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: INTRA INDIVIDUAL PROCESS 348, 352 (Abraham Tesser & Norbert Schwarz eds.,
200 1 ).
443. See FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 72, at 2 1 2-16; see also A.G. Greenwald, F.S. Bellezza, & M . R .
Banaji, Is Self-Esteem a Central Ingredient of the Self-Concept?, 14 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 34 ( 1 988); Kunda, supra note 440, at 485-86.
444 . See KUNDA, supra note 6, at 1 1 9.
445. FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 72, at 2 1 2- 1 3 .
446. Dunning, supra note 442, a t 352.
447. Rasyid Sanitioso, Ziva Kunda & Geoffrey Fong, Motivated Recall ofAutobiographical Memory,
59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 229 ( 1 990).
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The tendency towards optimism is ubiquitous in human self-perception. Neil
Weinstein has devoted a significant portion of his impressive career to showing
how people perceive themselves to be less likely than others to experience
negative outcomes and more likely than others to experience positive out
comes.448 College students are six times more likely to think that they will have
above average job satisfaction than below average and six times more likely to
think they have an above average chance of being homeowners than a below
average chance.449 Ninety-seven percent of consumers think they have a better
than-average ability to avoid power mower or bicycle accidents.45o And ninety
percent of drivers consider themselves to be better-than-average drivers.45 1 Our
optimism bias and perception of a just world may even transcend to the
heavens- literally. Polling shows that while 90% of Americans believe in
heaven, only 73% believe in hell. As Weinstein might predict, even some
believers skew their odds for a positive outcome in the afterlife: a full 94% of
those who believe in heaven think they have fair-to-excellent chances of going
to heaven, while a paltry 6% of those who believe in hell think they' l l end up in
hell.452 Although proving those estimates wrong is, at this stage of our research,
difficult, they do seem a bit skewed in the direction that we would predict.
Whether in avoiding accidents or achieving success here or hereafter, we
humans tend to be optimistic souls.
For our purposes, and perhaps for legal theory generally, one of the most
revealing manifestations of our self-affirming tendencies is what social psycholo
gists call the illusion of control: People believe themselves to exercise more
control over their environments than they actually do-an illusion that itself
reflects an underlying motive to exercise control. In one demonstration of that
illusion, Ellen Langer and Jane Roth asked subjects to predict the outcome of a
series of thirty coin tosses.453 All subjects were led to believe that they guessed
correctly fifteen times (half the guesses), but some subjects were led to believe
that their first four guesses were correct, while others were led to believe that
four of their first five were incorrect. Those with early success rated their own
overall performance more highly than did the less initially successful subjects

448. See, e.g. , Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Susceptibility to Heath Problems:
Conclusions from a Community-Wide Sample 10 J. BEHA V. MED. 48 1 ( 1 987).
449. Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 3 9 J . PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 806, 8 1 0 ( 1 980).
450. W. KIP VISCUSI & WESLEY A. MAGAT, LEARNING ABOUT RISK: CONSUMER AND WORKER RESPONSES
TO HAZARD INFORMATION 95 ( 1 987).
45 1 . OIa Svenson, Are We All Less Risky and More Skillful than our Fellow Drivers?, 47 ACTA
PSYCHOLOGICA 1 43, 1 46 ( 1 98 1 ). Retrospectively, too, we tend to be optimistic in our contributions to
joint products. See Michael Ross & Fiore Sicoly, Egocentric Bias in Availability and Attribution, 3 7 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 322 ( 1 979).
452. Russell Shorto, Belief by the Numbers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1 997 §6, at 60 (Magazine)
(summarizing poll data).
453. See Ellen J. Langer & Jane Roth, Heads I Win, Tails It 's Chance: The Illusion of Control as a
Function of the Sequence of Outcomes in a Purely Chance Task, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
95 1 ( 1 975).
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and were similarly biased in predicting their likely performance in future tosses.
Significantly, subjects in the first group tended to see themselves as good (not
lucky) guessers and subjects in the second group tended to see themselves as
bad (not unlucky) guessers. In other words, subjects in both groups fel l easy
prey to the fundamental attribution error-failing to see the role of randomness
in the situation and wrongly attributing perceived success or failure to their skill
dispositions. The illusion of control is revealed not only in the tendency to
dispositionalize the random event, but also in the fact that forty percent of all
the subjects believed that they could enhance their performance at guessing
random outcomes through practice, and twenty-five percent felt that their
performance would be hampered by distraction.454
In a second demonstration of the illusion, Langer gave office workers tickets
for a random lottery.455 Some of the workers were able to choose their ticket,
while others had their ticket assigned. All workers were then given the option of
trading their ticket in for another ticket in a different lottery with better odds.
Langer found that the first group of subjects (those who had chosen their ticket)
were significantly less likely to exchange their ticket than were the second
group of subjects. As she concluded, subjects were apparently under the illusion
that by choosing their tickets they had increased their chances of winning the
first lottery. Put differently, they believed that their choice had given them some
control over what was, in fact, random-that is, situational.
Some social psychologists have suggested that such self-affirming motives
may contribute to the exterior and interior situational blindness that we have
been highlighting. Thus, one can interpret through that lens the situational
blindness exhibited in the study discussed above,456 in which subjects were told
about the Milgram experiments and then asked to estimate how they would
have behaved as one of Milgram's subjects. Most individuals believed that they
would not have administered powerful shocks, a result that reveals the hidden
influence of both exterior situation (pressures to conform) and interior situation
(motive to self-affirm). As Mahzarin Banaji recently explained:
[T]he discovery that . . . the immediate situation may have [its] influence
outside consciousness is hard to contend with . . . . The inability to draw the
parallel to oneself, to realize the possible lack of control over one's thoughts
and actions is stark and, I would add, psychologically interesting in its own
right. It is difficult to see the power of the situation in oneself when the

454. /d. at 956.
455. Ellen J . Langer, The Illusion of Control, 32 1. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 3 I l ( 1 975).
456. See supra text accompanying notes 1 66-70. But see Robert J. Wolosin et a!., Predictions of
Own and Other 's Conformity, 43 J. PERSONALITY 357, 376 ( 1 975) (reporting that oberserver subjects
were not only able to preduct the degree to which participant subjects would conform to bogus
estimates of how many times they had heard and auditory tone but were also able to predict their own
degree of conformity if they were the participants).
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outcome is unpalatable, just as it is difficult to see the influence of any cause
that is not immediate. 457

As with the other elements of our interior situation, the illusion of control
and the underlying motive for control-renders us susceptible to manipulation
through our exterior situations. We tend to accept the frame of those who tell us
we are in control, even when our control is limited.458 The illusion of control
reveals how our motives for self-affirmation often coincide with our disposition
ism.459 Indeed, the view of our "self' that we each seem to be attempting to
affirm is very often that of a dispositional actor.460
Sometimes, though, our self-affirming motives can conflict with our disposi
tionism-that is, there are instances, such as following a failed or disappointing
performance, that we look to situation for causal attributions in order to avoid
the disheartening conclusion that that failure reflected our own dispositional
shortcomings.46 I One experimenter interviewed politicians several months after
an election. The winners attributed their performance largely to dispositional
factors such as hard work, perseverance, skill, planning, and strategy. The
losers, on the other hand, looked to situation, and attributed their performance to
the politics of the district, their opponents' name recognition, to their lack of
money, and so on.462 The groups thus revealed the two-sided nature of the
self-serving attributions: "a ' self-enhancing bias' (attributing success to internal
relative to external causes) and a 'self-protecting bias' (attributing failure to
,,
external relative to internal causes). 463
Our desire for self-protection is so great that people often engage in situ-

457. Banaji, Ordinary Prejudice, supra note 1 05, at 8.
458. See Hanson & Kysar, The Joint Failure, supra note 298

(describing the ways in which cigarette
manufacturers tapped into consumers' illusion of control); Benforado, Hanson & Yosifon, Broken
Scales, supra note 54 (making a similar point with respect to restaurant industry); Hanson & Yosifon,
The Situation, supra note 5, at 285-99 (describing how scholars recognize only the most palpable
situational restrictions on volition); see also Chen & Hanson, The Illusion of Law, supra note 32, at
99- 1 05 (describing the market's "illusion of freedom").
459. Or perhaps it is as accurate to say that our dispositionism is partially a reflection of our motive
for control, or that our self-affirming illusion of control partially reflects our dispositionism. The causal
relationships are, we suspect, multidirectional.
460. See Steele, supra note 86, at 262 (describing our motive "to maintain a phenomenal experience
of the self-self-conceptions and images-as adaptively and morally adequate-that is, as competent,
good, coherent, unitary, stable, capable of free choice, capable of controlling important outcomes, and
so on").
46 1 . See SABINI, supra note 8 1 , at 1 67 .
462. John W. Kingdon, Politicians ' Beliefs About Voters, 6 1 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1 37, 1 4 1 ( 1 967),
cited in MILES HEWSTONE, CAUSAL ATTRIBUTION: FROM COGNmvE PROCESSES TO COLLECTIVE BELIEFS
57-58 ( 1 989).
463. HEWSTONE, supra

note 462, at 58. These self-serving biases exemplify two occasions-and
there are others-in which individuals are particularly likely to make situationist attributions. Even in
those circumstances the attribution will be limited to only a tiny portion of the situation, as we have
defined that concept, and is prone to inaccuracy inasmuch as it is motivated by the motive to self-affirm
and not the motive for accuracy. See generally Hanson, Reyes, & Schlanger, Attributional Positivism,
supra note 43.
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ational manipulation in order to "self-handicap" prior to accepting a chal
lenge.464 In one intriguing experiment purportedly about the performance effects
of certain drugs, college students were given a choice to take either performance
enhancing drugs or performance-inhibiting drugs before performing either a
simple or a difficult task. The group facing the simple task opted for the
performance-enhancing drugs. The group facing the difficult task tended to
prefer the performance inhibiting drugs. The second group seemed to want an
excuse for their anticipated failure.465 In circumstances where we are uncertain
of our own ability to perform well, we will often unconsciously create situ
ational factors (or the appearance of such factors) on which we can hang
responsibility for our failures.466
Indeed, one common way of avoiding threats to our self is to avoid the
situation altogether in which such a threat might occur. For instance, we might
avoid the threat posed by an exam that purports to measure our intelligence by
avoiding the test altogether. More SUbtly, we can temper the threat by altering
our attitudes about its significance. If, for example, we' re worried about how
well we will perform on such an exam, we may subconsciously find a way to
make "book smarts" an unimportant feature of our identity.467 By such handicap
ping--disengagement and disidentification-we protect not just the image that
others have of us, but also our image of ourselves.468 Indeed, the subjects in the
study discussed above self-handicapped to the same extent regardless of whether
they believed anyone would know how well they performed the task.469 That
we manage to fool even ourselves,47o reveals just how well hidden our motiva-

464. See, e.g., Dunning, supra note 442, at 357.
465. See Steven Berglas & Edward E. Jones, Drug Choice as a Self-Handicapping Strategy as a
Response to Non-Contingent Success, 36 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 405 ( 1 978). For a review of
other studies of self-handicapping, see FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 72, at 235-38; SABINI, supra note
8 1 , at 205-07.
466. The example in the text arguably involves not situational manipulation, but manipulation of
attributions from the stable disposition of intelligence to the non-stable disposition of intoxication.
Those attributions are less threatening to the self, because they are ostensibly temporary. Similarly,
individuals might want to attribute some embarrassing behavior to temporary dispositions (for example,
choice)-"I meant to do that"-rather than to stable dispositions (for example, ignorance or dimwitted
ness). In any event, the basic motive is the same, and social psychologists have shown that we adopt the
same handicapping strategy by manipulating attributions from dispositions to situation. See, e.g., James
A. Shepperd & Robert M. Arkin, Behavioral Other-Enhancement: Strategically Obscuring the Link
Between Performance and Evaluation, 60 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 79 ( 1 99 1 ).
467. Cj Steele, supra note 1 00, at 50 (explaining and reviewing evidence that one way to protect
against stereotype threat, see supra text accompanying notes 252-65, is "by ceasing to care about the
domain in which the stereotype applies"). For a more complete discussion of disidentification strategies
including domain and group disidentification and less drastic types of selective disidentification, see
Emily Pronin, Claude M. Steele & Lee Ross, Identity Bifurcation in Response to Stereotype Threat:
Women and Mathematics, 40 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 1 5 2 (2004).
468. See Berglas & Jones, supra note 465.
469. See id.
470. Another possible explanation for such behavior is, not so much that people are attempting to
trick themselves, but that people have, through the course of experience, generally pursued a goal that
has become habituated. Social psychologists call those habituated motives nonconscious goals or
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tions are within our interior situations.47 I

ii. Group
Individuals engage in the same kind of motivated reasoning regarding the
institutions, groups, and situations with which they identify as they do with
regard to themselves. This is hardly surprising. Our motivation to maintain a
positive view of ourselves encourages us to maintain a positive view of the
groups with which we are affiliated. And so, as a general matter, we do. Social
psychologists have referred to that tendency (which is popularly known as
everything from "patriotism" to "racism") as the "ethnocentric" or "group
serving" bias.472
The section on knowledge structures above473 discussed at length various
forms of groupism-the human "tendency to view the world in terms of 'we'
and 'they, ' with at least a working hypothesis that 'we' are somehow better and
,,
more deserving" than "they. 474 Our emphasis in that section was on how
knowledge structures-concepts, schemas, categories, stereotypes, and so on
influence our cognitive processes and perceptions. But a review of that section
should make clear that coupled with the "we-they" schema was a "good-bad"
motivation.475 When the Rattlers and Eagles food-fought with out-group mem
bers and uncritically embraced in-group members, a strikingly powerful and
easily activated motivation was at work.476 "Merely telling [people] that they
are now a group leads them to want to reward their own group more, and to see
its members as having better personalities, nicer looks, less responsibility for
,,
any failures, and more responsibility for successes. 477 The self-serving attribu
tional biases of individuals also appear on the group level as "in-group members
[tend] to attribute internal [or dispositional] causes to positive in-group and
negative out-group behavior and to attribute negative in-group behavior and
,,
positive out-group behavior to external [or situational] causes. 478

automatic goals. See Tanya L. Chartrand & Clara M. Cheng, The Role of Nonconscious Goal Pursuit in
Hope, 13 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 290 (2002). Interestingly, there is research suggesting that such noncon
scious goals can be primed through exterior situation. See id.; Clara M. Cheng & Tanya L. Chartrand,
Self-Monitoring Without Awareness: Using Mimicry as a Nonconscious Affiliation Strategy, 85 J .
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1 1 70 (2003). We discuss the role o f automaticity in greater detail below.

See infra Part III.E. I .
47 1 . See also supra text accompanying notes 256-57 (discussing methods o f coping with stereotype
threat).
472.
473.
474.
475.
476.
477.
478.

FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 72, at 80-8 1 .
See supra Part III.B.2.a.
Ross & N ISBETT, supra note 6, at 40.
See supra Part I1I.B.2.a.
See supra text accompanying notes 2 2 1 -5 1 .
FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 72, at 1 34.
FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 72, at 80-8 1 (citing Miles Hewstone & J.M.F. Jaspars, Intergroup
Relations and Attribution Processes, in SOCIAL IDENTITY AND INTERGROUP RELATIONS 99 (H. Tajfel ed.,
1 982» .
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iii. System (and World)
Our self-affirming motivations extend beyond our self and group identifica
tions. Just as each of us is motivated to believe that "I am good," and, with
respect to our groups, "we are good," so too are we motivated to believe that
"our world is good."
In a pioneering project within social psychology, Melvin Lerner demon
strated that people seek to confirm a ')ust world hypothesis." Through a series
of experiments, Lerner demonstrated that, "we do not believe that things just
happen in our world; there is a pattern to events which conveys not only a sense
of orderliness or predictability, but also the compelling experience of appropriate
ness expressed in the typically implicit judgment, ' Yes, that is the way it should
,
,,
be." 479 And, yes, "people get what they deserve. 4 8o
In one classic demonstration of the phenomenon,48 1 subjects watched another
"subject" (actually a collaborator on videotape) apparently react with pain to a
series of supposed electric shocks. The Milgrarnesque shocks were ostensibly
punishments for errors in a human learning experiment. In one condition, the
observers could, in effect, compensate the victim by reassigning her to a system
in which she would earn money rewards for correct answers instead of continu
ing to receive electric-shock punishments for incorrect answers. In a second
condition, no alternative was offered and observers were led to believe that the
victims would continue to be subject to the painful shocks. Thus, in the former
condition observers were able to (and did) restore justice,482 while in the latter
condition they could only observe their cohort's suffering.
At the end of the experiment, subjects were asked to evaluate the victim. In a
result that has been replicated in numerous experimental settings, observers of
the second condition, which could not be changed, tended to disparage the
victim, whereas observers of the first condition, which was subject to improve
ment, tended to be far more sympathetic to the victim. According to Lerner and
Miller, "the sight of an innocent person suffering without the possibility of
reward or compensation motivated people to devalue the attractiveness of the
victim in order to bring about a more appropriate fit between her fate and her
,,
character. 48 3 In short, we are motivated to resist a perception of injustice either

479. MELVIN J. LERNER, THE BELIEF IN A JUST WORLD: A FUNDAMENTAL DELUSION, at vii ( 1 980).
480. Melvin J. Lerner & Dale T. Miller, The Attribution Process: Looking Back and Ahead, 85
PSYCHOL. B ULL. 1 030, 1030 ( 1 978).
48 1 . See Melvin J. Lerner & C.H. Simmons, The Observer's Reaction to the "Innocent Victim ":
Compassion or Rejection, 4 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL 203 ( 1 966). Our account of the experiment
comes from the summary provided in Lerner & Miller, supra note 480, at 1 03 1 -32.
482. See Lerner & Miller, supra note 480, at 1 03 1 ("[M]ost subjects took advantage of this

opportunity to compensate the victim.").
483. Lerner & Miller, supra note 480, at 1 032. Lerner and Miller also cite numerous studies
replicating those results with diverse populations. See id. As with all motives, this motive is neither
total nor omnipotent. The motive to believe in a just world may be fairly anemic when the perceived
injustice does not implicate the observer. See Isabel COITeia, Jorge Vala, & Patricia Aguiar, The Effects

of Belief in a Just World and Victim 's Innocence on Secondary Victimization, Judgments of Justice and
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by restoring the perception of justice or by altering our perception that an
injustice has in fact occurred.
In our effort to maintain our belief in a ''just world" hypothesis, we tend to
attribute bad outcomes to individual dispositions, because it is generally more
comforting to presume that it is the person who was bad, rather than the
situation. Another chilling, if somewhat dated, study in this area illustrates that
phenomenon.484 Subjects participated in a simulated jury exercise in which a
criminal defendant was said to have raped one of three victims. The victims had
been arrayed along a continuum of "respectability": a virgin ("most respect
able"), a married woman ("respectable"), or a divorcee ("least respectable").
Subjects found the virgin and married woman to be more responsible than the
divorcee for the rape. Presumably, it was easier for subjects to derogate the
divorcee, and to accept that her suffering was compatible with a just world, than
it was for them to accept that the "respectable" married woman and virgin
would, in a just world, suffer such a fate. To maintain their belief in a just
world, subjects needed to find the married woman and the virgin more disposi
tionally responsible for the bad outcomes they suffered:
[T]he knowledge that innocent, highly respectable females can be raped was
particularly threatening to the subjects' belief that the world is just, and to
avoid the threat posed by this type of admission, it was necessary to find fault
with the actions of the victim. Thus, the subjects appear to have tried to
convince themselves that the victim was really not innocent and that she must
485
have contributed, at least in some small but significant way, to her fate.

The same tendency to find fault with the actions of the victim will exist where
the victim is of high social status or personally attractive.486
Lerner's "just world hypothesis" has recently been substantially advanced by
contemporary social psychologists who study the operations and influences of
our thinking about the social systems with which we identify. John T. Jost has,
with numerous collaborators, found that across individuals, and across many

Soc. JUSTICE RES. 327 (2002). Suffering in another part of the world, even if the
victims might seem undeserving, can be attributed to forces well outside of our control and unthreaten
ing to us. On the other hand, there are times when an injustice does implicate us and cannot simply be
laid on the victim. The Oklahoma bombing and the terrorist acts of 9/ 1 1 are good examples. Indeed,
that may well be part of what makes those events so horrifying. Our suspicion is that the word "evil" is
invoked particularly when the events leave us with no way of alleviating or avoiding the harm and no
way of believing that it is deserved.
484. E. Jones & E. Aronson, Attribution of Fault to a Rape Victim as a Function of Respectability of
the Victim, 26 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 4 1 5 ( 1 973). This summary of Jones's and Aronson's
research comes from Lerner & Miller, supra note 480, at 1 034-35.
485. Lerner & Miller, supra note 480, at 1 035.
486. Id. at 1 04 1 . It is important to recall here, as always, that while group and system affi rmation
may be evident in some manner in all people, its strength and the nature of its manifestations may also
differ widely across individuals and across societies. With respect to cross-cultural distinctions in the
situational character, see Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 5, at 250-59.
Deservingness, 14
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kinds of social groups, there is a powerful motive to embrace and justify
existing social systems.487 According to the theory they have developed and
tested, people have a strong desire to "justify and rationalise the way things are,
so that existing social arrangements are perceived as fair and legitimate, perhaps
even natural and inevitable."488 The motive is so strong that it is often pursued
even when doing so conflicts with our other self-affirmation motivations.489
It is hardly surprising that individuals who enjoy high social status want to
justify the system that supports and maintains that status. Legitimating the
system legitimates their own success. But here is the surprising part-low-status
individuals also engage in system justification, particularly when that system is
under threat. And doing so often leads them to hold more positive attitudes
towards high-status individuals than they hold of themselves or members of
their own group. In other words, as strong as our motives may be to affirm
ourselves or our groups, they can take a back seat to our desire to legitimate the
social, political, and economic status quo-to believe, that is, that our social
situation is just.
There is a significant and growing body of evidence demonstrating people's
strong incentive to affirm the status quo. In one experiment, for example, Jost
and his colleagues identified distinct groups of high-status and low-status Jews
in Israel, the former represented by the politically and economically elite
Ashkenazi Jews of European ancestry, and the latter by the much less powerful
and poorer Sephardic Jews of Middle Eastern and African descent.49o The
groups answered questions about a range of social issues confronting Israel and
about the dispositional qualities of social groups in Israel. Two different ver
sions of the questionnaire were used. In the first respondents were primed with a
description of the state of Israeli society that was "low threat"-it described the
current state of affairs in Israel as "good" and prospects for the future as

487. See John T. Jost & Orsolya Hunyady, The Psychology of System justification and the Palliative
Function of Ideology, 1 3 EUR. REV. Soc. PSYCHOL. I I I (2002); John T. Jost et aI., Non-Conscious Forms
of System justification: Implicit and Behavioral Preferences for Higher Status Groups, 38 J. EXPERIMEN
TAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 586 (2002); John T. Jost, Outgroup Favoritism and the Theory of System justifica
tion, in FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN SOCIAL COGNITION 86 (G. Moskowitz ed., 200 1 ); John T. Jost & Diana
Burgess, Attitudinal Ambivalence and the Conflict Between Group and System justification Motives in
Low Status Groups, 26 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 293 (2000); John T. Jost & Mahzarin R.
Banaji, The Role of Stereotyping in System justification and the Production of False Consciousness, 33
B RIT. J . Soc. PSYCHOL. 1 ( 1 994).
488. Jost & Hunyady, supra note 487, at 1 1 9 (emphasis omitted).
489. The concept of system justification has many theoretical forbearers, from Lerner's "just world"
hypothesis in social psychology to the theory of "false consciousness" and dominant ideology in
political economy to the concept of ideology in critical theory, race studies, and feminism. Jost and his
co-authors acknowledge the influence of this work on the development of system justification theory
and argue that the new approach provides a more coherent-and scientifically supported-picture of
this widely recognized reality of our interior situations operates. See, e.g., id. at 1 1 1 - 1 9. For one,
system justification theory is itself not focused on any particular nexus of in- and out-groups (like class
or race or gender), but is meant to provide an explanatory framework that is instructive across, and
within, various situations. See Jost & Banaji, supra note 487, at 1 1 .
490. Jost & Hunyady, supra note 487, at 1 26-28.
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"hopeful." In that version, when responding to the questions about social
groups, high- and low-status Jews exhibited mild in-group favoritism. Members
of each group rated their own group more positively on traits such as intelli
gence, ambition, responsibility, work-ethic, and open-mindedness.49 \ In the
second version of the questionnaire, respondents were primed with a "high
threat" description of Israeli society, one in which the present state of affairs
was described as "precarious" and prospects for the future as "bleak." In that
version, the high-status Ashkenazi Jews continued to exhibit an in-group prefer
ence. But this time, with the social system under threat, the low-status Sephar
dic Jews exhibited an out-group favoritism, rating Ashkenazi Jews higher than
their own group.492 Apparently, where the social system itself is under threat,
the motive to affirm the system can override the desire to affirm even our own
groupS.493
System-justification theory has led to numerous hypotheses. Among them is
the prediction that, under certain circumstances, "members of disadvantaged
,,
groups should have the strongest system justification needs. 494 That hypothesis
has found support from several social psychological studies and from data
collected for other purposes. Indeed, "evidence from five US national surveys
indicat[es] that members of disadvantaged groups show enhanced levels of
,,
system justification. 495 For instance, "low-income Latinos were more likely to
believe that 'the government is run for the benefit of all' than were high-income
,,
Latinos 496 and low-income Americans and African Americans were both "more
likely than others to believe that economic inequality is legitimate and neces
,,
sary. 497
What is behind the system-justification motive? Probably the best explana
tion at this point stems from the "dissonance reduction" tradition. System
affirmation, on this account, serves a palliative function both for high- and
low-status individuals, soothing what would otherwise be irreconcilable ten
sions about one's social condition:
[S]ystem justification, as a set of beliefs and assumptions about the existing
social system, serves a stress-preventing function by allowing the individual
to feel that the social context is stable, understandable, predictable, consistent,
meaningful, and just . . . . We propose that in order to minimize or avoid
certain kinds of stress, such as the stress that comes from perceiving that one
is a victim of discrimination, people are willing to pay other psychological
costs, such as those that follow from blaming themselves for their own

49 1 .
492.
493.
494.
495.
496.
497.

See id. at 1 26-28.

/d.

See id.
/d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

at
at
at
at

1 22.
1 42.
1 42-43.
1 43 .
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misfortune . . . . It seem[s] to offer some measure of consolation to those who
are disadvantaged as well as advantaged.498

There is another way of putting this: We dispositionalize, and attribute
injustice to individual dispositional inadequacies or differences, in order to
avoid the disconcerting possibility that our situations are unjust and, in particu
lar, that our own suffering or disadvantage reflects system-wide injustice. Thus,
in one study, "poor people reported more positive emotion, less guilt, and
greater satisfaction when they felt responsible for their situation then when they
,,
made external (system-blame) attributions for their poverty. 499
For our purposes, one particularly important finding of system-justification
research concerns the pivotal role of stereotyping as a legitimating device. lost
and Banaji argue that system justification theory predicts not only when stereo
types will emerge, but also what form stereotypes will take.5°O Because the
motive is to protect the coherence of the system, the system-justification motive
generates stereotypes of low-status groups that attribute the group's predicament
to the group's dispositions, rather than to the situation. The dispositionalizing
stereotypes need not be negative. Aaron Kay and lohn lost have identified a
series of complementary, positive gender and class stereotypes (e.g. that women
are kind and gentle while men are assertive and strong, and that poor people are
happy and honest while rich people are miserable and dishonest) that increase
support of the status quo without requiring victim derogation. 50 I Through
negative and positive dispositionalizing stereotypes, an unjust system can be
plausibly perceived as a meritocracy.502 And thus, system-affirmation is an
additional influence entrenching our dispositionism.503

498. Id. at 147 (citations omitted).
499. /d. at 145 (citing lAMES R. KLUEGEL & ELIOT R. SMITH, BELIEFS ABOUT INEQUALITY: AMERICANS'
VIEW OF WHAT Is AND WHAT OUGHT To BE 280-83 ( 1 986)).
500. See lost & Banaji, supra note 487.
50 1 . See Aaron C. Kay & 10hn T. lost, Complementary Justice: Effects of "Poor but Happy" and

"Poor but Honest " Stereotype Exemplars on System Justification and Implicit Activation of the Justice
Motive, 85 1. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 823 (2003).
502. Evidence further suggests that the stereotypes enabling us to justify the situation are activated
automatically-"implicitly"-and influence even those of us who reject the explicit renditions. See
Mahzarin R. Banaji & A. G. Greenwald, Implicit Stereotyping and Prejudice, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
PREJUDICE 7 (Mark P. Zanna & lames M . Olson eds., 1 994); lost & Banaji, supra note 487, at 1 5- 1 6
(citing Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled Components, 5 6
1 . PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCH. 5 ( 1 983» .
503. A possible lesson of system justification theory is that, to combat stereotyping and its status-quo
supporting effects, it may be wise to aim less at changing individual dispositions and to focus more on
changing the situation that produces the dispositionalizing impulse. Thus, lost and Banaji conclude that
an important implication of the system-justification approach "is that a most expedient way of changing
stereotypes is to change material reality"-that is, by altering the situation. See lost & Banaji, supra
note 487, at 1 8; Alice H. Eagly & Valerie 1. Steffen, Gender Stereotypes Stem from the Distribution of
Women and Men into Social Roles, 46 1. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 735 ( 1 984); Curt Hoffman &
Nancy Hurst, Gender Stereotypes: Perception or Rationalization?, 58 1. PERSONALITY & Soc. PsYCHOL.
1 97 ( 1 990).
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iv. Summary
In a wide variety of ways, we humans tend to hold self-affirming beliefs and
reach conclusions that at some level we are motivated to hold, while at the same
time we under-appreciate the motives or that tendency, particularly in ourselves.
Each of those motivations reflects and enhances our dispositionism and our
reluctance to appreciate the situation. In other words, self-affirming motiva
tions, hidden out of sight and out of "mind" in our interior situation, wield
tremendous influence over our sense of ourselves, the groups to which we
belong (or do not belong), and the systems in which we live.
c.

Motive to Simplify

The simpler the better-it is difficult to think of a context where that axiom
does not apply. Unsurprisingly, the same is true of our social theories. We prefer
hypotheses that are simple, and we are motivated to bolster such theories and
defend them against more complex altematives.504 We have already provided
substantial evidence of this motive. Our discussions of heuristics and knowl
edge structures suggest that such cognitive tendencies and structures result, at
least in significant part, from that motive-we seek simple cognitions and
schemas because the situation of our minds is such that they operate under
scarce capacity, cognitively, temporally, and conceptually. People thus generally
employ a kind of lay version of the celebrated principle known among profes
sional scientists as Occam's Razor: causal explanations with fewer assumptions
are to be preferred to those with more. Similarly, we prefer simple explanations,
those that can explain the most with as little complexity as possible.505 Because
we discussed several manifestations of this motive above, we will, for the sake
of simplicity, offer no more examples. But a few comments about the interac
tion of this motive with others seem in order.
The simplification motivation may be congruent with-and may even further
some of our other motives, such as our motive for understanding. Yet it is in
obvious tension with other basic motives, such as our motive to be accurate.
Our too-simple interpretive and analytic habits often keep us from accurately
assessing much about our environs and ourselves. Somewhat less obviously,
this conflict between the motive for simplicity and the motive for accuracy may
spill over and cause discord for our motive of self-affirmation. Those basic
motives506 then can conflict with each other. That difficult mixture of motives is

504. See KUNDA, supra note 6, at 141 (discussing the motive to simplify).
505. We believe that this motivation, taken together with our deep capture thesis, suggests some
thing about the kinds of ideas that will be successfully employed in deep capture efforts. More
particularly it suggests a reason for the success of law and economics as compared with more
complicated legal theories.
506. There are of course other motives that have been identified by social psychology, and
refinements of these motives, that we are not reviewing here. Our treatment is meant only to provide an
overview of this area of social psychology, and its implications for the situational character that we are
here attempting to sketch. For a more exhaustive treatment, see Kunda, supra note 440.
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held together by a yet another powerful motive-the motive to cohere.

d. Motive to Cohere
"One might say that this paradox-to be realistic, and at the same time be
guided by high goals-lies at the heart of the problem of morale . . . .
"

- Kurt Lewin507

We humans seek explanations that are coherent, that we can make sense of,
and that can be supported by reasons.508 This coherence motive animates the
relationship and tradeoff among motives. Because we value coherence, the
desire to see it in ourselves dovetails with our motive for self-affirmation. That
powerful driving force in our self-conception has figured prominently in social
psychological research. Inquiry into "cognitive dissonance," for example, has
been a mainstay of the field for decades.509 Often it is the case, as we have
already suggested, that our motivations are in conflict. Though motivated to
view ourselves positively, our behavior can pose problems for that self
conception. There can be many reasons for such dissonance-not least of which
is the fact that we are dispositionist situational characters.
While social psychologists debate some of the details of the cognitive
dissonance dynamic,5 1 0 it is the basic pattern, about which most agree, that best
illustrates the dispositional illusion. The dispositionist sees behavior as reflect
ing little more than thinking, preferring, and willing. From that conception, the
dissonance can be eliminated by bringing behavior into line with those interior
elements. But it can also be, and commonly is, eliminated, by bringing the latter
into line with the former.5 1 1 That basic challenge to dispositionism-that our
behavior influences our beliefs and attitudes-has been a recurring theme in the
cognitive dissonance literature: "Regardless of the exact motivational underpin
nings of dissonance, the evidence clearly indicates that attitudinally discrepant
actions can result in a reanalysis of the reasons why a person engaged in a
certain behavior (or made a certain choice), and cause a person to rethink the
,,
merits of an attitude object. 5 1 2 That subconscious task can be accomplished in
a myriad of ways, from changing our opinions outright to more subtly trivializ-

507. Kurt Lewin, TIme Perspective and Morale, in KURT LEWIN, RESOLVING SOCIAL CONFLICTS:
SELECTED PAPERS ON GROUP DYNAMICS 103 ( 1 948).
508. See KUNDA, supra note 6, at 140.
509. See. e.g., LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE ( 1 957).
5 1 0. For an overview of disputes in the cognitive dissonance literature, see THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 335-37 (Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske & Gardner Lindzey eds., 1 998).
5 1 1 . See generally Paul Thagard & Ziva Kunda, Making Sense of People: Coherence Mechanisms,
in 1998 CONNECTIONIST MODELS OF SOCIAL REASONING AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 3; Paul Thagard, Explana
tory Coherence, 1 2 BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN SCI. 435 ( 1 989).
5 1 2. THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 5 1 0, at 337.
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ing a belief that is incongruent with our behavior. 5 I 3
The important critical realist lesson here is not just that behavior may not
reflect a preference or belief. That much we have said before when describing
how situation can powerfully influence behavior--<iisposition notwithstanding.
The lesson is also that our preferences, such as they are, are themselves
malleable, constructed, and contingent-subject to changes in our behavior and
in our situation. The malleability of our attitudes, combined with our sense that
attitudes are stable, assists us in our motive for coherence. The motive for
coherence, like the motive for affirmation, is manifested at several levels, as we
next explore.

i. Individual
One of the earliest and best-known experiments demonstrating our willing
ness to alter our attitudes in service of our self-image involved manipulating
subjects to act in a manner contrary to their belief. 5 1 4 Subjects were first made
to perform a boring task-moving pegs on a board-5 1 5and then were requested
to tell other potential "subjects" that the task was actually quite interesting and
fun. One group of subjects was paid $ 1 and another, $20 (a substantial sum in
1959). After describing the task, the original subjects were then asked about
how they in fact felt about the experiment. Surprisingly, those who were paid $ 1
reported finding the experiment far more interesting than those who were paid
$20.516 In other words, those who were paid less changed their beliefs about the
tedious task, internalizing their own efforts to persuade subsequent "subjects."
Those who were paid more maintained their original-and arguably more
accurate-belief.
Simpler (dispositionist) models might predict that the less one was paid the
less one would alter her belief about the activity. After all, a small amount of
money would not offer an external signal to suggest, or incentive to believe, that
the activity was worthwhile and worth embracing as such-but such a predic
tion would ignore the motivational significance of self-justification. The sub
jects receiving $20 had a ready means of reconciling the dissonance between
their beliefs and their words to the third-party. Subjects receiving just $ 1 ,
however, faced a bigger problem. Given the minimal payment, some other

S 1 3. See J.W. B REHM & A.R. COHEN, EXPLORATIONS IN COGNmVE DISSONANCE ( 1 966); Linda Simon et
aI., Trivialization: The Forgotten Mode of Dissonance Reduction, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
247 ( 1 99S); cf THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note S 1O, at 336 ("[T]he accumulated
research of dissonance suggests that the negative feelings associated with dissonance can be reduced
not only directly by modifying one of the cognitions involved, but indirectly by virtually any other
means that would make a person feel less unpleasant.").
S 14. See Leon Festinger & James M. Carlsmith, Cognitive Consequences of Forced Compliance, S8
J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 203 ( 1 9S9), available at http://psychclassics.yorku.calFestinger.
S 1 5. Subjects were, for instance, told to carefully turn each peg on a board a quarter turn. After
turning all the pegs once, they were told to turn them another quarter turn. Later they were asked to
remove each peg carefully, and then put them all back. After an hour, they were told they were done.
S 1 6. See Festinger & Carl smith, supra note S 1 4, at 203.
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method of reconciliation was needed, and a subconscious alteration of attitudes
17
provided the necessary consonance.S
Hundreds of experiments have replicated that basic finding.s l s People are
generally averse to being dishonest, and will avoid lying without good reason.
One central lesson of the research on motivated reasoning, however, is that a
ready way to avoid lying is to change beliefs rather than behavior. Dissonance
can be induced or introduced into a circumstance of clarity and consonance, as
it was here when the subject was asked to promote the experiment to another
person. In nonexperimental settings such manipulation can obviously be more
serious, sinister, or exploitative.
As a more recent body of work has demonstrated, a change of attitudes is just
one way to respond to a threat to "one's sense of oneself as an intelligent and
decent person."S I 9
Any thoughts and actions that bring to mind valued aspects of one' s self
concept can also serve to reestablish one's sense of oneself as a worthy
person, even if these are completely unrelated to the counterattitudinal behav
ior. For a scientist, self-worth could be reaffirmed through reading a scientific
journal, for a religious person through prayer, and for an art-lover through a
visit to an art gallery. If, following a counterattitudinal behavior, one is
reminded of these valued aspects of oneself, this will reaffirm one's global
self-worth and, therefore, reduce the need to change one's attitude in the
service of self-affirmation.s 2o

Instead of changing beliefs or lowering our self-image we can reduce the
salience of local negative self-perceptions by searching globally for self
affirming counterexamples. 52 I Or, as Claude Steele expresses it, "[i]n ego
defense, people are concerned with the big picture . . . . It is the war, not the
battle, that orients this system."S22
This desire to see ourselves in a positive light is an important motive behind
what Lee Ross and his co-authors have dubbed "naive realism"-the name

5 1 7. Social psychologists often refer to this

as

the less-leads-to-more effect: the less obvious the

explanation for one's behavior, the more one will tend to alter one's attitudes to make sense of it.

See

BARON & BYRNE, supra note 3 1 1 , at 150.
5 1 8. See ElSER, supra note 389, at 92-99; Ross & NISBEIT, supra note 6, at 66; M. Riess & B.R.

Attitude Change and Responsibility Avoidance as Modes of Dilemma Resolution in Forced
Compliance Situations, 35 1. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 2 1 ( 1 977); see also ElSER, supra note 389, at
Schlenker,

84-89 (reviewing portions of the literature on "intrinsic and extrinsic motivation" and the process of
"overjustification").

5 19. KUNDA, supra note 6, at 22 1 ; see also BARON & BYRNE, supra note 3 1 1 , at 145-46 (describing
other responses, including the more "direct" methods of "acquiring new information that supports our
attitudes or our behavior," trivializing the inconsistency by "concluding that the attitudes or behaviors
in question are not important ones," and the "indirect" tactics of focusing on "positive self-attributes"
or distracting oneself from the dissonance through some activity or even by drinking alcohol).

520. KUNDA, supra note 6, at 22 1 .
5 2 1 . See generally Steele, supra note 86.
522. [d. at 289.
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given to "three related convictions about the relation between [one's] subjective
experience and the nature of the phenomena that give rise to that subjective
,,
experience. 523 First, we naively believe that we see the world as it really
is-through objective, unfiltered lenses. Most of us think that we "get it" for the
same reason that the vast maj ority of us believe that we are above average
drivers-it is self-affirming. Second, it almost goes without saying that anyone
else who is similarly neutral and intelligent will see the world as we do-that is,
accurately. At times, though, we are confronted with views that conflict with our
own, an experience that creates a kind of dissonance. That suggests the third
tenet of naIve realism. When our interpretation of a particular situation appar
ently conflicts with someone else's, something has to give. Because we presume
that we see things as they are, something must be distorting the perceptions of
those who see things otherwise. Social psychological research shows that an
extremely common means of relieving that dissonance is to attribute the gap
between our outlook and theirs to a lack of objectivity on their part. We assume
that there is some dispositional source of their bias-lack of intelligence, or
laziness, or corruption. To be sure, we ourselves will admit to having a
particular vantage point and set of experiences that inform our judgment and
perspective-but as it turns out, our particular background was the path to
authentic insight. 524
This is a key source of our biases: we don ' t believe that we are subject to
them (allowing us to trust our own clear vision) and we are extremely quick to
see them in others (allowing us to distrust others' obscured vision).525 And so it
is that we are quick to see ideological or political bias on the part of our
adversaries and gullibility or vanity on the part of even our friends and family
when they fail to share our worldview.526 And so it is that even scholars from
one field of study are able to write off other fields of research writing on the
same topic. Thus, Richard Posner writes:
Economic theory itself (including the application of the theory to law), at least
when employed for positive rather than normative analysis, has no political
valence. . . . [T]he sociology of law is, as far as I am able to judge, entirely

523. See, e.g., Lee Ross & Andrew Ward, Naive Realism: Implications for Social Conflict and
Misunderstanding, in VALUES AND KNOWLEDGE (Edward Reed et aI. eds., 1 997).
524. See id. ; see also Robert J. Robinson, Dacher Kettner, Andrew Ward, & Lee Ross, Actual Versus
Assumed Differences in Construal: "Naive Realism " in Intergroup Perception and Conflict, 68 J.

PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 404 , 405 ( l 995) (describing naive realism as one's "unshakeable
conviction that he or she is somehow privy to an invariant, knowable, objective reality-a reality that
others will also perceive faithfully, provided that they are reasonable and rational, a reality that others
are apt to misperceive only to the extent that they (in contrast to oneself) view the world through a
prism of self-interest, ideological bias, or personal perversity"}.
525. That asymmetry of attributions is what leads virtually all of us to believe that we are, ourselves,
immune to the manipulative influences of marketing and advertising even as we acknowledge that
advertising does work and that many people are easily manipulated. See JEAN KILBOURNE, CAN'T Buy
My LOVE: How ADVERTISING CHANGES THE WAY WE THINK AND FEEL 27 ( 1 999).
526. See Pronin et aI., supra note 337.
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dominated by scholars of left-liberal bent. So uniform are their politics that
they may unconsciously regard liberalism (in its modem "welfare state"
sense) as part of the definition of their field, disqualifying economics from
contributing to it. 527

They are ideologically motivated. I am not.
NaIve realism, in those ways, helpfully reduces the dissonance that we might
otherwise feel and protects our existing perceptions, including our positive
self-image. Unfortunately, it also is a major part of what renders us biased and
vulnerable to manipulation-precisely what we like to believe we are not.
It bears noting that a particularly common means of counteracting dissonance
is to attribute other people's "distorted" vision to their self-interest, typically a
monetary incentive to a vested interest.528 Indeed, it is that tendency to disposi
tionalize people with self-interest that makes the "boring task" experiment
described above so counterintuitive. When people are presumed to "like" what
they find rewarding, it is jarring to discover that the poorly paid subjects
enjoyed rearranging pegs more than the well-paid subjects. Experiments di
rectly testing this phenomenon have shown that even people whose behavior
reflects attitudes toward a social policy that are out of sync with their own
self-interest will assume that the behavior of others will reflect attitudes that
correspond with self-interest.529
In sum, we see bias there, but not here-and, in either case, disposition
ism.530
ll.

Group
"[Sjocial man lives constantly outside himself and only knows how to live
in the opinion of other[sj . . . .
"

�

Jean Jacques Rousseau53 1

527. Posner, supra note 249, at 274 (emphasis omitted).
528. See Dale T. Miller & Rebecca K. Ratner, The Disparity Between the Actual and Assumed
Power of Self-Interest, 74 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 53 ( 1 998) [hereinafter Miller & Ratner, The
Disparity] ; Dale T. Miller & Rebecca K. Ratner, The Power of the Myth of Self-Interest, in CURRENT
SOCIETAL ISSUES IN JUSTICE 25-48 (Leo Montada & Melvin J. Lerner eds., 1 996).
529. Miller & Ratner, The Disparity, supra note 528, at 58. And this i s true despite evidence that the
actual link between social attitudes and self-interest is often much weaker than we suppose. See David
O. Sears & Carolyn L. Funk, Self-Interest in Americans ' Political Opinions, in BEYOND SELf-INTEREST
147 (Jane Mansbridge ed., 1 990); David O. Sears & Carolyn L. Funk, The Role of Self-Interest in
Social and Political Attitudes, in 24 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 2 ( 1 99 1 ).
530. The tendency of dispositionists to dismiss situational accounts has been dubbed "naive cyni
cism." See Benforado & Hanson, Naive Cynicism, supra note 78. Much of the tort reform movement
and the anti-PC backlash can be understood as a manifestation of naive cynicism. /d. More generally,
na'ive cynicism influences-and is currently dominating-virtually all significant public policy debates.
53 J . JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, A DISCOURSE ON THE ORIGIN Of INEQUALITY ( 1 754), reprinted in JEAN
JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES 3 1 , 1 1 6 (G.D.H. Cole trans., Everyman
1 993).
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The situational character is no island. Our motive for coherence guides not
just our own self-conceptions, but also our conception of ourselves as beings
situated among others in groupings, which in tum provide a powerful guide to
our understanding of ourselves and our world.s32 We are, of course, each a
member of myriad groups, some more prominent than others in our self
conceptions, from families, to workplaces, from nations to townships, from
races to genders, from religions to political parties. Social psychologists have
long studied the relationship between the individual and her group affiliations,
and have been particularly interested in the influence of group identification on
the formation and conception of the self. In the experimental literature, particu
lar attention has been paid to the relationship and potential for dissonance
between personally held beliefs and beliefs attributed to the group.
In analyzing the coherence motive as it plays out in groups , social psycholo
gist Philip Tetlock has proposed a view of what we are calling the situational
character as not so much lay scientists or lay economists striving-within our
limited cognitive budgets-to understand the truth of the world around us or to
maximize our own preferences, but rather as lay politicians, striving to situate
ourselves comfortably and coherently among our relevant identity-group constitu
encies. We are motivated not only to make sense of our own behavior to
ourselves, but also by the pervasive "expectation that [we] will be called on to
justify [our] opinions or conduct to others."s33 Social psychologists have found
that where our desire for approval is high, people predictably "adjust their
public attitudes toward the views of the anticipated audience."s34 This is
understandable and perhaps un surprising for a person motivated to maintain a
favorable, and thus self-bolstering, perception of (and approval by) the groups
with which she affiliates. But our motive for coherence runs deeper; we are not
rationally conspiring dispositional actors, scripting our public performances of
belief while, on the interior, maintaining our own authentic views. To be sure,
such public deceptions do occur, but the deeper tendency documented by social
psychologists is to keep our private beliefs and our public expressions conso
nant. Tetlock writes:
Attitude shifting becomes psychologically costly to the degree that it requires
compromising basic convictions and principles (stimulating dissonance) or
back-tracking on past commitments (making decision makers look duplici
tous, hypocritical, or sychophantic) . . . . [E]vidence . . . indicates that when
these obstacles have been removed, and the facilitative conditions are present,
attitude shifting serves as a cognitively efficient and politically expedient

532. For a more general discussion of our motive for "belonging," see FISKE, supra note 233, at
1 6-17.
533. Phillip E. Tetlock, Intuitive Politicians, Theologians, and Prosecutors: Exploring the Empirical
Implications of Deviant Functionalist Metaphors, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
INTUmVE JUDGMENT 582, 583 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002).
534. /d. at 585.
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means of gaining approval that does not undermine the decision maker's
self-concept as a moral and principled being, or his or her reputation for
integrity in the wider social arena. 535

Again, duplicity is not what drives us, but rather blindness to our interior
situations and the divergence between what we see and what we do not see.
Social scientists have discovered numerous manifestations of our motive for
group coherence. That motive, combined with the self-affirming faith we place
in our own knowledge structures, contributes, for instance, to a phenomenon
that social psychologists have dubbed the "false consensus" effect.536 In a
classic demonstration of that effect, subjects were asked if they would partici
pate in an experiment on different mediums of expression in which subjects
would be required to walk the streets surrounding the university wearing a
,,
sandwich-board placard emblazoned with the slogan: "Eat at Joe 's. 537 After
indicating their willingness to participate, subjects were then asked to estimate
. how other people would respond to the same request. The experimenters found
that those who had agreed to wear the sandwich board estimated that a strong
majority, sixty-two percent, of their peers would do the same, whereas those
subjects who declined predicted that sixty-seven percent would respond as they
did.538 This false consensus effect, a tendency to regard one's own views to be
commonly held by others, has been demonstrated by more than a hundred
empirical studies, over a wide range of topics from particular food preferences
to broad political and social policy views.539
The group-coherence motive combined with dispositionism can yield some
troubling and otherwise perplexing phenomena. Because we are dispositionists,
our perception that certain behaviors are common (or uncommon) leads us to
perceive that the attitudes, preferences and beliefs of others correspond to that
common (or uncommon) behavior. Because we do not ourselves subscribe to
those attitudes, we infer from others' behavior that our attitudes are exceptional.
That dynamic contributes to the tendencies known in social psychology as
"pluralistic ignorance" and "false uniqueness." Both illustrate the power of the
group coherence motive.
Consider the illustration of the famous "Princeton drinking study," the signa-

535. Id.
536. For discussion of the mechanisms behind the false consensus effect see KUNDA, supra note 6, at
399; Steven J. Sherman et aI., Mechanisms Underlying the False Consensus Effect: The Special Role of
Threats to the Self, 1 0 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1 27 ( 1 984).
537. See Lee Ross et aI., The "False Consensus Effect ": An Ego-centric Bias in Social Perception
and Attribution Processes, 35 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 880 ( 1 977) (first reporting this study).
538. Id.
539. For reviews of these studies, see Joachim Krueger, On the Perception of Social Consensus, in
30 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1 63 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 1 998); Gary Marks &
Norman Miller, Ten Years of Research on the False-Consensus Effect: An Empirical and Theoretical
Review, 102 PSYCHOL. BULL. 72 ( 1 987); Brian Mullen et aI., The False Consensus Effect: A Meta
Analysis of 115 Hypothesis Tests, 2 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 262 ( 1 985).
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ture piece in an influential line of work by Deborah Prentice and Dale Miller. 540
Their studies revealed how students misestimated their cohorts' attitudes toward
alcohol consumption and the gap between those attitudes and their own. Specifi
cally, most students actually had a rather negative view of the state of alcohol
consumption on the campus, but incorrectly assumed their fellow students held
more positive views. Almost sixty-six percent of their sample endorsed the
view, the second strictest of five graded options, that "[a]n occasional 'drunk is
okay, as long as it doesn't interfere with grades or responsibilities." Less than
twenty percent endorsed the two most permissive gradations. However, when
asked to indicate what they though their collegiate colleagues ' attitudes were
towards alcohol consumption, more than sixty percent selected one of the two
most permissive gradations-"[a]n occasional 'drunk' is okay, even if it does
occasionally interfere with grades or responsibilities," and "[a] frequent 'drunk'
,,
is okay, if that's what the individual wants to do. 54 1 In other words, the
students exhibited significant pluralistic ignorance.542
Prentice and Miller's study did not end there. They also examined how
pluralistic ignorance might itself influence behavior. The bad news was that
some subjects began to alter their own behavior and beliefs to more closely
correspond with their ignorant perceptions.543 Prentice and Miller attributed that
toubling example of self-fulfilling group perceptions to a basic motive to avoid
dissonance with one's key constituencies. Once again, it is crucial to recognize
that the subjects were not faking their new attitudes. These are not rational
actors operating within stable preferences, altering their conduct through clever
performance while remaining true to their core beliefs. These are situational
characters in whom stable preferences and core beliefs are largely an illusion.
Our behavior and attitudes and the behavior and perceived attitudes of our
groups are all mutually constructed and reconstructed as the situation requires.
As each of us looks out at others seeing disposition and missing situation, we
infer attitudes that do not exist. But, as these studies reveal, our false percep
tions can be tragically powerful as we each seek to bring our own view and
behavior into sync with shared rnisperceptions. Prentice and Miller "believe that
group identification is the root cause for many cases of pluralistic ignorance-

540. See Deborah A. Prentice & Dale T. Miller, Pluralistic Ignorance and the Perpetuation of Social
Norms by Unwitting Actors, in 28 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 161 (Mark P. Zanna

ed.,

1 996).
54 1 . Id. at 169.
542. Prentice and

Miller point out that the phrase "pluralistic ignorance" is an unfortunate one, not
only because it is somewhat inelegant, but also because it does not actually describe the phenomena
well. More than being "ignorant" about others' beliefs, for example, we are actually mistaken about
them. Prentice and Miller stuck with the term, however, because, by the time they were writing, it had
been around in social psychology for more than fifty years. Using the somewhat wrongheaded phrase
helped to illustrate Prentice and Miller's point: "[W]e are simply conceding the well-known social fact
that it is much easier to abide by an established convention than to change it. Moreover, it is precisely
this concession that often gives rise to pluralistic ignorance." Id. at 1 6 1 -62.
543. Id. at 188.
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that individuals often act of a desire to be good group members but interpret
others ' similarly motivated behavior as reflecting personal beliefs and opin
,,
ions. 544
The problem of pluralistic ignorance and the motive for group coherence
distorts many social norms and would seem to have significant implications for
policy and law. The dynamic seems to be at work in creating and reinforcing
gender and sex roles.545 It is also behind the pervasive, dysfunctional classroom
dynamic in which students do not ask questions because they assume that
others ' silence suggests they are themselves alone in their ignorance, thus
contributing to the silence that encourages others to do the same.546 And so it is
that even in most "learning" environments, ignorance begets ignorance. Perhaps
most important, a form of pluralistic ignorance seems to animate the precise
shape that our dispositionism takes in Western cultures-that is, of individuals
devoted primarily to their own material self-interest.547
Understanding the cycles of ignorance can help us break them. Prentice and
Miller found that spreading the word about what most people thought about
alcohol was more successful in discouraging heavy drinking than the notori
ously ineffective (perhaps counterproductive) approach of encouraging students
to not be moved by peer pressure.548
In sum, as these examples demonstrate, our motive for group coherence is a
powerful interior situational influence that, like the others, renders us subject to
manipulation.

3 . Affect
This Section has thus far focused generally on attitudes and motives. Each, as
we' ve seen, could be mistaken (and has been mistaken549) for "preferences" by
policy analysts. As previous sections illustrate, however, our attitudes and
motives are simply not the well-behaved, stable preferences that policy analysts
and policymakers generally assume. Put differently, although the intuitive,
simplified, preference-based dispositionism that is foundational to law and
policy is attractive to us, particularly given its simplicity and self-affirming
implications, it is nonetheless wrong.
544. Id. at 1 63.
545. In addition to their famous drinking experiments, Prentice and Miller also pursued important
studies of the role of pluralistic ignorance in the formation and internalization of gender stereotypes by
children. See id. at 1 88-96; see also Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 1 35, at 1 207- 1 1
(discussing the self-fulfulling effect of schemas, including gender stereotypes).
546. See Dale T. Miller & Cathy McFarland, Pluralistic Ignorance: When Similarity is Interpreted
as Dissimilarity, 53 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 298 ( 1 987). Some social psychologists have
referred to the self-perpetuating nature of the pluralistic ignorance phenomena as the "spiral of silence."
See ELISABETH NOELLE-NEUMANN, THE SPIRAL OF SILENCE, PuBLIC OPINION-OUR SOCIAL SKIN ( 1 984).
547. That claim is the topic of future work. For a fascinating review of social psychological
evidence supporting that claim, see Dale T. M iller, The Norm of Self-Interest, 54 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
1 053 ( 1 999).
548. Prentice & Miller, supra note 540.
549. See infra Part IV.
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We are more or less unaware of the greater part of our interiors, and that
ignorance plays an immense causal role in our behavior. Another important
aspect of our interiors that gives shape to the situational character is emotion or
,,
"affect. 550 Emotion is a topic that most legal scholars and laws acknowledge, if
at all, only when it manifests itself in a blatant and unmistakable way. We are
dispositional actors, according to this view, except in those rare and unfortunate
instances when we are overwhelmed by emotion.55 I
Social psychology reveals that this understanding of "emotion" is, like so
much else regarding our self-knowledge, fundamentally wrong. That bold and
broad claim is the topic of future work,552 so we will provide only a cursory
treatment here.
First, emotions are not just those rare overwhelming feelings we have when
we are being "emotional." Emotions are instead a ubiquitous feature of our
interiors, interacting with virtually all interior situations, including all those we
discuss in this Article.553 Thus, our attributions influence our emotions, and our
emotions influence our attributions.554 Similarly, emotions influence the extent
to which we rely on knowledge structures and precisely which ones we rely
on.555 We have affective responses to virtually everything we see, and those
reactions (of which we are rarely conscious) immensely - influence our behavior
and cognitions.556
Thus, emotion plays an immeasurable role in our day-to-day lives, though we
perceive its role only in the most extreme circumstances when the emotion feels
sufficiently intense to manifest itself in an unmistakable form. It is as though
one were standing on Landsdowne Street on the outside of the "green monster"
at Boston's Fenway Park counting balls that cleared the wall as our measure of
how many times a bat is swung inside the park. Our nearly blind vantage point
leads us to miss the vast majority of swings, and the vast majority of what is
moving the game.
Just as we fail to consciously sense our affective responses to our situation,
we fai l to appreciate just how powerfully the situation moves us. Few would
expect, as social psychologists have demonstrated, that the stock-market tends

550. The study of affect has produced an extensive, and growing, l iterature. See, e.g. , Daniel Gilbert
et aI., Durability Bias in Affective Forecasting, in HEURISTICS AND B IASES, supra note 72, at 292; Norbert
Schwarz, Feelings as Information: Mood Influence Judgments and Processing Strategies, in HEURISTICS
AND B IASES, supra note 72, at 534; Paul Siovic et aI., The Affect Heuristic, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES,
supra note 72, at 397.
55 1 . In fact, the treatment of interior situation is quite analogous to the general treatment of exterior
situation. We acknowledge the "heat of passion," like we do "a gun to the head," but little else. See
David Arkush & Jon Hanson, Situating Emotions (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
552. See id.
553. See Robert B . Zajonc, Closing the Debate Over the Independence of Affect, in FEELING AND
THINKING: THE ROLE OF AFFECT IN SOCIAL COGNmON 3 1 (Joseph P. Forgas ed., 2000).
554. See Hanson, Reyes, & Schlanger, Attributional Positivism, supra note 43.
555. For a description of that interaction, see Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 1 35.
556. See Antoine Bechara, Hanna Damasio, Daniel Tranel, & Antonio R . Damasio, Deciding
Advantageously Before Knowing the Advantageous Strategy, 275 SCIENCE 1 293 ( 1 997).
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to go up on a sunny day-good weather creating pOSItIve affect in human
beings, producing an optimistic expectation of high returns-and down on a
gray day-lousy weather creating a negative affect, producing gloominess.55 7
Beyond that market-measured behavioral response to one unseen affect, which
has been observed in twenty-six different stock exchanges around the world,558
social psychologists have found that our views about our own overall happiness,
or satisfaction with our job, or views of our prospects for future happiness, can
be powerfully influenced by own present emotional state.559
Additionally, social psychologists have shown that by priming subjects with
negative affective influences, such as stories of war or poverty--or by testing
them on rainy days-subjects express far more negative views of totally
unrelated matters, including their own overall happiness, than they otherwise
do.560 Subjects in these experiments are generally unaware of the situational
influences on their own subjective evaluations.56l Influential research in this
area has shown, for example, that merely being exposed to a stimulus-whether
the exposure is conscious or unconscious--can influence a person's positive
affect towards that stimulus on subsequent exposures.562
Thus far, the basic messages of the social psychological research we have
highlighted have been, first, that emotion is omnipresent as an interior influence;
second, that emotion is, whether we are aware of it or not (and usually we are
not), immensely influential over our cognitions, attitudes, and behavior; and
third, that emotion and affect are highly sensitive to exterior situation, including

557. See Edward M . Saunders, Stock Prices and Wall Street Weather, 83 AM. ECON. REv. 1 337, 1 344
( 1 993).
558. David Hirshleifer & Tyler Shumway, Good Day Sunshine: Stock Returns and the Weather 2-3
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.cob.ohio-state.edulfinldice/papers/200 1 /2oo l -3 .pdf
(last visited Sept. I I , 2003).
559. For a summary of studies, see Schwarz, supra note 550, at 534-36.
560. Id. The importance of nonconscious situational influences on affect was discovered and
elaborated in a series of studies by Robert Zajonc and his colleagues. See Robert B. Zajonc, Attitudinal
Effects of Mere Exposure, 9 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. MONOGRAPH I ( 1 968); Robert B. Zajonc,
Feeling and Thinking: Preferences Need No Inferences, 35 A M. PSYCHOLOGIST 1 5 1 ( 1 980); Robert B .
Zajonc & Hazel Markus, Affective and Cognitive Factors in Preferences, 9 J . CONSUMER REs. 1 23
( 1982).
56 1 . Schwarz, supra note 550, at 536-38. Such findings about the nature of situational influences on
our emotional lives obviously have important implications with respect to the potential for the
situational manipulation of affective responses. See Paul Slovic et aI., supra note 530, at 4 1 7 ("As
Epstein observes, 'Cigarette advertising agencies and their clients are willing to bet millions of dollars
in advertising costs that the . . . appeal of their messages to the experiential system will prevail over the
verbal message of the Surgeon General that smoking can endanger one's life, an appeal directed at the
rational system.' Through the workings of the affect heuristic . . . we now have evidence suggesting that
cigarette advertising designed to increase the positive affect associated with smoking will quite likely
depress perceptions of risk." (citing Seymour Epstein, Integration of the Cognitive and Psychodynamic
Unconscious, 49 A M PSYCHOLOGIST 709, 7 1 2 ( 1 994))). See generally Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavior
alism Seriously /I, supra note 1 3 2 .
562. See Robert F. Bomstein, Exposure and Affect: Overview and Meta-Analysis of Research, 1 06
PSYCHOL. BULL. 265 ( 1 989); Robert F. B omstein & Paul R. D' Agostino, Stimulus Recognition and the
Mere Exposure Effect, 63 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 545 ( 1 992).
.
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those elements of the environment of which we are not mindful. Each of those
findings contradicts the basic assumptions of dispositionism.
Still, there is also evidence that in some circumstances our behavior appears
to be controlled by something that looks like careful deliberation and choice
based on the anticipated emotional effect of our choices. We seem to choose
option "A" instead of "B" or c because we expect it to deliver us the greatest
amount of happiness or least amount of displeasure.
The "happiness" or "displeasure" that we seek or repel in this dispositional
mode are, of course, emotions. And here emerges another major flaw in the
dispositionist model. The best evidence about our ability to predict (or even
remember) our emotional states reveals that we are often poor judges of our
own well-being. The problem is not so much that we do not know what will
bring us pleasure or pain. People typically are correct to assume that a new car
will elicit some happiness and that a bad accident will generate unhappiness.
The problem is that, owing to our ineffective forecasting, we vastly overestimate
the intensity and duration of our emotional reactions to such happenings.563
Winning the lottery, landing a good teaching job, and falling in love all may
bring us some joy. Losing a bet, a job, or a lover will certainly bring sadness.
But none of these events will affect us as much as we tend to imagine.564
Because of this impact bias , "common events typically influence people's
subjective well-being for little more than a few months, and even uncommon
events-such as losing a child in a car accident, getting cancer, becoming
paralyzed, or being sent to a concentration camp-seem to have less impact on
,,
long-term happiness than one might naiVely expect. 565
In one study, for example, associate professors were asked to estimate what
their overall happiness would be if they made tenure, or were denied it. The
study found that, in the short term, those who received tenure were less happy
than they expected, and those who were denied tenure were happier than they
predicted.566 Another study asked student respondents who were involved in
committed, long-term relationships to estimate what their happiness levels
would be if they suffered a break-up. Their happiness estimates were far lower
than the actual reported happiness levels of other students who had recently
suffered a break-up.567
Our pattern of poorly forecasting our affective states has been demonstrated
in a number of studies of political events. One version of the study asked
Republicans and Democrats how happy or unhappy they thought they would be
the week following the 1996 presidential election if Bill Clinton were re"

"

563. See generally Gilbert et aI., supra note 550.
564. This tendency reflects, in part, a problem we highlighted above: the failure of our imaginations
to see beyond the salient. We see the imagined event plainly, but it eclipses other events that will serve
to counteract it.
565. Gilbert et aI., supra note 550, at 292 (collecting studies) (citations omitted).
566. [d. at 299-300.
567. [d. at 297-99.
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elected. A week after the election, Democrats who had predicted that they
would be substantially happier if Clinton won in fact reported overall happiness
levels that were no different than before the election. Republicans were only
slightly less happy overall than they were before the election, although they had
predicted that they would be substantially less happy.568 Even in ordinary
circumstances that we experience repeatedly-such as consumer or employ
ment decisions-we continue to make the same affective forecasting errors
again and again.569 There is apparently too much working in favor of the
maintenance of our dispositionism for it to be compromised by evidence of it
failing us.
The basic lesson of affective forecasting research is clear. Despite our overly
optimistic and overly pessimistic predictions, the truth about ourselves is, as
Daniel Gilbert and his co-authors put it: "Most people are reasonably happy
,,
most of the time, and most events do little to change that for long. 57o
So what explains this inability to accurately assess our own emotional
reactions? There are, it seems, numerous causes. But most of them stem from
our dispositionist tendencies and the fact that we miss most of the effect of our
exterior and interior situations. Thus, when people overestimate just how happy
winning a lottery will make them, or just how unhappy becoming a paraplegic
will leave them, they do so largely because they are incapable of seeing past the
salient situational factor-a million dollars or life in a wheelchair-to all the
other situational influences that help determine their overall level of happiness.
Similarly, we vastly underestimate the way our interior situation is motivated
well-equipped to make the "bad outcome" seem not so bad-and to make the
opportunities missed appear, like unreachable grapes, sour. Our affective forecast
ing, then, responds to our dispositionist intuitions and tendencies, while our
emotions respond as well to our situations.57 I

568. See Timothy D. Wilson et aI., Focalism: A Source of Durability Bias in Affective Forecasting,
78 1. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 82 1 , 822 (2000).
569. See B.L. Fredrickson & Daniel Kahneman, Duration Neglect in Retrospective Evaluations of
Affective Episodes, 65 1. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 45 ( 1 993); Terence R. Mitchell et aI., Temporal
Adjustments in the Evaluation of Events: The "Rosy View, " 33 1. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 421
( 1 994).
570. Gilbert et aI., supra note 550, at 293.
57 1 . Social psychologists have offered a number of explanations for the affective forecasting
phenomenon, including that we misconstrue the nature of future events, that we are motivated to distort
our affective predictions, that the process of predicting focuses our imagination to the exclusion of
other aspects of our future lives that will influence our affect ("focal ism"), and that our interior
situations immunize us from being emotionally subsumed by bad outcomes in our lives. See Gilbert et
aI., supra note 550, at 293-97 (summarizing explanations of affective forecasting findings). These
explanations are consonant with our own analysis in this Article, which, in turn, draws on them.
We should point out that affective (mis)forecasting, like so many features of our situational character,
can have a very positive or adaptive part to play in our lives. Like the heuristics and knowledge
structures that enable us to make decisions with our limited brainpower, our poor affective forecasting
is no quirk; rather, it is central to our psychological makeup. Affective reactions can give us a basis for
acting and a means of recovering from the disappointment of bad outcomes. In that way, our interior
situation protects us from ourselves.
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BEHAVIOR (VS. "CHOOSING")

This Article is now deep into its examination of the situational character. The
contrast with the dispositionist models of the human actor that now dominate
policy, policymaking, and common sense is becoming clear. We are subject to a
fundamental interior attribution error-an error that helps explain the fundamen
tal exterior attribution error and that leaves us vulnerable to many varieties of
situational manipulation. As Parts IILB and IILC make clear, our thinking and
our preferences are not what they seem. Thus, it should by this point be no
surprise that our behavior-which the dispositionist models assume is the
product of "thinking + preferring + willing"-is likewise not what it seems.
Our behavior, which we tend to attribute to conscious choices based on stable
preferences and given information, is more often a manifestation of the interior
and exterior situational influences to which we are largely blind. That conclu
sion is implicit in the evidence and arguments provided above regarding our
cognitions and attitudes. Many of the experiments, including Milgram's, con
tained a behavioral component that itself proved the point. This Section supple
ments that evidence and highlights several ways in which our behavior is not
what our dispositionist schemas presume.

1 . Visceral Factors
We have already discussed the malleability and implicit aspects of our
attitudes. We have also described the power of situational forces-in our
interiors and exteriors-to shape our behavior and, in tum, the power of our
behavior to change our attitudes. According to recent work by George Loewen
stein and several of his co-authors, we are often moved by interior drive states
to act in ways that contradict even our explicit attitudes, that is, in ways that we
actually experience as counter-attitudinal. Those drive states include hunger,
thirst, sexual desire, sleeplessness, moods, emotions, and physical pain: "At
sufficient levels of intensity, these, and most other visceral factors, cause people
to behave contrary to their own long-term self-interest, often with full aware
,,
ness that they are doing SO. 572
To be sure, those urges are all manifestations of regulatory processes "essen
tial for our survival, but all are also associated with behavior disorders-for
example, hunger and overeating, fear and phobias, sexual desire and sexual
,,
compulsion, anger and spouse abuse, and craving and addiction. 573 Thus,
visceral factors are like many of the interior features that we have been
reviewing: generally useful but potentially quite harmful and capable of dominat
ing those interior elements to which we attribute our dispositionism.
There are two key reasons why visceral factors lead us to knowingly behave

572. George Loewenstein, Out of Control: Visceral Influences on Behavior, 65 1. ORG. B EHAV. &
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 272, 272-73 ( 1 996).
573. George Loewenstein, A Visceral Account ofAddiction, in SMOKING: RISK, PERCEPTION, & POLICY,
supra note 298, at 1 88, 1 88-89.

2004]

THE SITUATIONAL CHARACTER

121

counter-attitudinally. First, they tend to "crowd out" all goals other than that of
mitigating the visceral factors themselves.574 They "focus attention" on the
present, the self, and on satisfying a single craving.575 If you find that difficult
to understand, try holding your breath for two minutes or dropping an anvil on
your toe, and see what significance your other goals and attitudes have in your
behavior before the pain subsides.
Of course, responding to such intense bodily reactions makes perfect sense
and is not, in itself, problematic. People should prioritize the acquisition of
oxygen when it is scarce. And people should attend to their acute injuries before
checking to make sure the anvil is ok. The problem stems from the fact that
people often behave, in response to visceral cues, in ways that contradict their
view of how they should behave, and sometimes even their own volition. And
that problem occurs, according to Loewenstein, because of the second key
feature of visceral factors, which is that "people underestimate the impact on
,,
their own behavior of visceral factors they will experience in the future :576
"Unlike currently experienced visceral factors which have a disproportionate
impact on behavior, delayed visceral factors tend to be ignored or to be severely
underweighted in decision making. Today's pain, hunger, anger, and so on are
,,
palpable, but the same sensations anticipated in the future receive little weight. 577
In one experiment, for example, two groups of male subjects were shown
photographs and then asked to imagine how they would behave in the context of
a date-rape scenario. The group that had been shown sexually arousing photo
graphs reported a much greater likelihood of behaving aggressively than the
group that had been shown non-arousing photos.578 Without being aroused by
the photographs, the second group seemed less able to imagine what they would
do when aroused on a date.
Loewenstein explains that this divergence in our ability to appreciate visceral
factors in the present and in the future is probably an artifact of our interiors,
,,
which "seem[] ill suited to storing information about visceral sensations. 579
Thus, although "we can easily recognize pain, . . . few can recall it in the sense
,,
of reexperiencing it in imagination or memory. 5 80 Pain, cravings, and motives
in the present wield greater influence than pain, cravings, and motives in the
future because the former are cognitively vivid while the latter are cognitively
pallid.
Put differently, immediate visceral factors are like dispositional factors that
dominate our field of interior vision, while future visceral factors are like

574. Id. at 1 89.
575. Id. at 1 9 1-92.
576. /d. at 1 89.
577. Id. at 1 93 .
578. George Loewenstein e t aI., The Effect of Sexual Arousal o n Expectations of Sexual Forceful
ness, 34 1. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 443, 455-56 & tbl. I ( 1 997).
579. Loewenstein, supra note 573, at 1 94.
580. Id.
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situational factors that tend to be obscured, and their future influence thereby
underappreciated. Visceral factors are yet another manifestation of the interior
fundamental attribution error. And the influence of this error is hardly limited to
the margins of extreme exceptions. "Visceral factors are a ubiquitous aspect of
everyday life, and they regularly undermine the rationality of decisionmaking,
due to both their underestimation in prospect and their disproportional force
,,
when they operate in the present. 5 8 1

2. The Inverted Causal Relationship Between Attitudes and Behavior
The evidence on visceral factors provides further confirmation for our claim
that people fail to see much of their interior situation and that behavior often
reflects that fai lure as much or more than it reflects a person's stable prefer
ences. But the dispositionist presumption-that behavior is more or less caused
by preferences or attitudes-can be even more fundamentally challenged. So
cial psychology teaches that, although we like to believe that such a causal
relationship between attitudes and behavior exists, it is often just the reverse
that is, our attitudes reflect our behavior (which, in tum, reflects our situation).
The temptation to see preferences first and behavior as the consequence is
widely shared. When we act, we need to believe that there exists an attitude or
preference behind that act--our motive for coherence creates a need for rea
sons.
But very often reasons do not precede behavior. So, we are motivated to
concoct them-so motivated that we will often alter pre-existing attitudes. We
have already described some examples of that phenomenon. In Festinger and
Carlsmith's classic peg-moving study,5 8 2 for instance, subjects paid $20 to tell
others that the boring subject was interesting felt no dissonance, and thus did
not need to alter their attitudes. On the other hand, subjects who were paid only
$1 were still situationally moved to cooperate with the experimenter, though
they needed some way to relieve the dissonance they felt between experience
and attitude. That situational manipulation and their behavior led them to alter
their attitudes toward the peg-moving task.583
Following up on that "induced compliance" study, Philip Zimbardo and his
collaborators asked subjects to participate in a study that ostensibly was about
novel foods.5 84 More specifically, the subjects, who included ROTC members,
military reservists, and other college students, were told that the new "mobile
military" was interested in determining how much people enjoyed (or did not

58 1 . [d. at 2 1 3.
582. See Festinger & Car1smith, supra note 5 1 4.
583. Other examples of this phenomenon include disidentification and self-handicapping. See supra
Part III.C.2.b.i. We alter our behavior to protect either cherished views of ourselves or our self-esteem;
we try to trick ourselves in the same way that we trick, or are tricked by, others.
584. See Philip G. Zimbardo et aI., Communicator Effectiveness in Producing Public Conformity
and Private Attitude Change, 33 J. PERSONALITY 233 ( 1 965).
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enjoy) eating fried grasshoppers.5 85 The supposed taste test was administered by
one of two individuals. Some subjects were warmly greeted by "Mr. Nice" -a
sensitive and gentle person who worked well with his coworkers.5 86 Other
subjects took instruction from "Mr. Nasty," a cantankerous taskmaster who
berated his coworkers. Many participants ate one or more grasshoppers, but
their assessments varied depending upon who administered the test.5 87 Those
taking instructions from the gruff "Mr. Nasty" reported that they liked the
grasshoppers much more than "Mr. Nice's" subjects did.588 The experiment thus
situationally induced participants to eat something that they otherwise would
not. Those who were taking instructions from "Mr. Nice" had a good reason for
doing so-after all, "Mr. Nice" was asking them to. B ut those who were eating
grasshoppers under the instruction of "Mr. Nasty" needed to justify complying
with the wishes of a jerk. Their solution, then, was to alter their attitudes toward
the grasshoppers.5 89
Today there are hundreds of experiments demonstrating the same phenom
enon.590 As Claude Steele puts it:
For nearly 30 years, dissonance researchers have tricked subjects into "volun
teering" . . . [such] self-contradictory actions as writing public essays against
their beliefs, expending effort on meaningless tasks, and delivering embarrass
ing speeches in front of prestigious audiences. Lacking any better means of
reducing the distress over these actions, subjects typically attempt to justify
them by changing their beliefs or attitudes to be more consistent with their
actions. 59!

Indeed, from evidence that our attitudes tend to be caused by our behavior
rather than the other way around, Daryl Bern developed a plausible and initially
compelling theory that individuals do not "know" their attitudes and other
interior dispositions, but rather infer them from their behavior. As he summa
rized his self-perception theory:
Individuals come to "know" their own attitudes, emotions, and other internal
states partially by inferring them from observations of their own overt behav
ior and/or the circumstances in which this behavior occurs. Thus, to the extent
that internal cues are weak, ambiguous, or uninterpretable, the individual is
functionally in the same position as an outside observer, an observer who

585. ld. at 237-4 1 .
586. ld.
587. [d. at 24 1-54.
588. [d.
589. See id.
590. See generally Steele, supra note 86.
59 1 . /d. at 269.
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must necessarily rely upon those same external cues to infer the individual's
9
inner states. 5 2

In short, there is considerable evidence that the dispositionist view that attitudes
lead to behavior is, at least at times, backwards. The cart is often our attitudes;
the horse is often our behavior.593
There is another way of making this point. The cognitive dissonance litera
ture, which depends so heavily on induced compliance studies, is actually a
demonstration of the fundamental attribution error as much as it is a demonstra
tion of cognitive dissonance. Subjects are routinely manipulated through situa
tion to act in ways that are counter to their attitudes or perceived dispositions.
What experimenters call "induced compliance," then, subjects experience as
free choice. Because the subjects are dispositionists, and experience themselves
as acting according to their own attitudes or preferences, they react to their
counter-attitudinal behavior by feeling a dissonance, a dispositional dissonance.
To maintain their dispositionist self-conception, they unwittingly alter their
attitudes or otherwise adjust their perceptions to relieve that dissonance.594
Subjects thus see disposition and free choice based on stable preferences; they
miss the importance of both the exterior situational forces that induced their
compliance, and the interior situational forces that invisibly lead to their altered
attitudes.

E. AUTOMATICITY AND THE ILLUSION OF CONSCIOUS WILL ("THE WILL")
"The whole sting and excitement of our voluntary life . . . depends on our
sense that in it things are really being decided from one moment to an
other. . .
"

9
- William James5 5

And so we come at last to the conscious will, that inarticulable, yet unmistak
able, inner experience of "oomph" that is, in many ways, the crown jewel of our

592. Daryl J. Bern, Self-Perception Theory, in 6 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1 , 2
Berkowitz ed., 1 972). For a discussion of the history of Bern's theory and the challenge it posed to
cognitive dissonance theory, see KUNDA, supra note 6, at 2 1 7-20.
593. Our claim is not that our attitudes are always giving way in response to our behavior. In fact,
there are other ways to reduce dissonance, including changing our behavior. See supra text accompany
ing notes 5 1 0-5 1 3 (summarizing alternatives); see also Joel Cooper & Steven 1. Scher, Actions and
Attitudes: The Role of Responsibility and Aversive Consequences in Persuasion , in PERSUASION 95,
95-1 1 1 (Timothy C. Brock & Sharon Shavitt eds., 1 994) (explaining when attitude change is most
likely to change in response to dissonant behavior). Our point is that the one-way causal relationship
presumed by lay and legal-theoretic dispositionist models is missing what social psychology has
demonstrated about our interior situations.
594. See supra notes 5 1 0-548 and accompanying text (summarizing some of the ways that cognitive
dissonance is reduced and citing authorities).
595. WILLIAM JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 453 ( 1 890).
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dispositionist self-conception.596 We have been emphasizing throughout this
Article that there is a vast interior situation that invisibly influences our thoughts,
preferences, and actions, and leaves us vulnerable to exterior situational forces
that do the same. What, then, of the conscious will? Much of the social
psychological material canvassed in this Article has touched on the issue of
conscious will only implicitly, if at all. Nonetheless, such material has quietly
suggested the same conclusion drawn by those researchers who have examined
the issue directly. If we perceive that we consciously will our actions, even as
the best evidence indicates that our behavior is substantially influenced by
interior and exterior situational factors, then this experience of "will" may be a
part of our dispositionist deception. Indeed, as Daniel Wegner concludes in a
book that brings together generations of experimental research on the felt
experience of human will: "[C]onscious will is an illusion. It is an illusion in the
sense that the experience of consciously willing an action is not a direct
,,
indication that the conscious thought has caused the action. 597 Two other
leading researchers of the will, John B argh and Tanya Chartrand, have made an
extremely compelling, if unsettling, case that "most of a person's everyday life
is determined not by [her] conscious intentions and deliberate choices but by
mental processes that are put into motion by features of the environment and
that operate outside of conscious awareness and guidance"-a thesis that they
,,
acknowledge is "difficult . . . for people to accept. 598
In part for that reason, we want to be certain that the claim is not miscon
strued. None of the researchers in this field of social science have concluded,
nor do we, that the "conscious will" is purely and totally an illusion. What is
asserted-and what researchers have demonstrated-is that the experience of
will is far more widespread than the reality of will. Wegner calls the latter the
empirical Will599 and argues that our perceived will is often an unreliable and
misleading basis for understanding our behavior. The experience of will occurs
often without empirical will, and thus creates the illusion of will. Moreover, it
contributes to the illusions of choice, preference, and, more generally, disposition
ism.

596. It is worth noting that economists do not often speak of, or have a place in their models for,
"the will." Furthermore, they generally have no need for the concept, inasmuch as they assume that
behavior reflects preference-satisfying choices and that those underlying preferences are exogenous and
stable. In that sense, economists embrace a form of determinism. Individuals have no real choice but to
act as their preferences dictate. We focus on "the will" in this Article because it is important in lay
conceptions of the interior situation and many other influential conceptions of the human animal in law
and legal theory. (Furthermore, we suspect that most legal economists do not conceive of themselves as
determinists or their theories as based on such a determinist conception.)
597. WEGNER, supra note 84, at 2.
598. John A. Bargh & Tanya L. Chartrand, The Unbearable Automaticity of Being, 54 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 462, 462 ( 1 999).
599. WEGNER, supra note 84, at 14.
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1 . Automaticity
Exhibit A in the case that our conscious will is not as central as we presume is
the fact that our conscious attentional capacity is extraordinarily limited.60o
Remember your first attempt at driving a manual transmission automobile
before the processes became automatic. If you are like us, the memory still
causes some embarrassment. Images of stalling, chugging, and squealing evince
the limits of our ability to tell our feet and legs-much less the car-precisely
how to behave. Now suppose that, at the same time you were attempting to let
the clutch out with your left foot while depressing the gas pedal with your right,
you were attempting to have a serious phone conversation with a friend about,
say, your love problems. Such multitasking would be all but impossible given
the severe limits on our ability to be consciously attentive. The point has been
demonstrated in numerous experiments.601 For instance, studies have shown
that eating radishes instead of available chocolates depletes one's ability to
persist in attempting to solve puzzles, and that suppressing emotional reactions
to a movie depletes one's ability to solve anagrams or to squeeze a handgrip
exerciser.602 The unhappy truth is that because "even minor acts of self-control,
such as making a simple choice, use up [one's] limited self-regulatory resource,
conscious acts of self-regulation can occur only rarely in the course of one's
,,
day. 603 Social psychologists studying the phenomenon have concluded that, in
our daily lives, our conscious will "plays a causal role only [five percent] or so
,,
of the time. 604 Little wonder that the growing popUlarity of cell phones has
made driving generally more dangerous, even for experienced drivers.6os
Exhibit B in the case for automaticity is the now-cascading evidence demon
strating the extent to which our choice biases, our schemas, our memories, our
attributions, our affective responses, our motives, our perceptions, and so on are
activated automatically--outside our conscious awareness, and often by exterior
situational features and events.606 The evidence of implicit attitudes summa
rized above is just a small strand of the larger fabric of automaticity operating
within our interiors.607
There is also mounting evidence that our automatic perceptions are linked to

600. See supra text accompanying notes 72-78.
60 1 . For an illuminating summary, see Wendy Wood et aI ., Habits in Everyday Life: Thought,
Emotion, and Action, 83 1. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1 28 1 (2002).
602. See Roy F. Baumeister et aI., Ego Depletion: Is the Active Self a Limited Resource ?, 74 1.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1 252 ( 1 998); Mark Muraven et aI., Self-Control as Limited Resource:
Regulatory Depletion Patterns, 74 1. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 774 ( 1 998).
603. Bargh & Chartrand, supra note 598, at 464.
604. /d.
605. See, e.g., Consumer Reports, New studies define cell-phone hazarrls, at http://www.consumerreports.
orglmainlcontentldisplay_report.jsp?FOLDER %3C%3Efolder_id = 334665&bmUID = 1 1 05999597 1 36
(describing research on role of cell phone use in accidents) (last visited lan. 1 7 , 2005).
606. See B argh & Chartrand, supra note 598, at 465.
607. See supra text accompanying notes 40 1 -4 1 5 .
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our behavior, also through automatic means.60S Charles Carver and his col
leagues, for instance, found that subjects participating as the "teacher" in a
Milgram-esque experiment tended to give longer shocks when they had been
primed with a list of hostility-related words.609 More recently, John B argh and
his collaborators have made numerous demonstrations of the automatic percep
tion-behavior link. In one experiment, for example, some subjects were primed
with words related to rudeness, others, with words related to politeness.6l o The
subjects were then placed in a situation that presented both an opportunity and
motive to interrupt an ongoing conversation. The first, rude-primed group
interrupted more than sixty percent of the time, while the second, polite-primed
group interrupted less than twenty percent of the time.61 1 In other studies,
subjects primed with stereotypical qualities of elderly people (e.g., wrinkles,
Florida) behaved more like elderly people-walked more slowly, were more
forgetful, and so on-than subjects who were not similarly primed.6 1 2 And
Chartrand and Bargh have shown in other experiments that, without being
aware of it, subjects often engage in so-called "behavior matching," or the
"chameleon effect." For instance, when subjects are placed next to an interac
tion partner who is either rubbing his or her face or shaking his or her foot, the
subjects tend to engage in behavioral patterns matching those of their interac
tion partner.613
But the automaticity doesn't stop there. Although we sometimes intentionally
try to transform our conscious acts into automatic behavior-recall how you
practiced playing the piano, dribbling a basketball, or driving that dam stick
shift-much of what becomes automatic does so automatically. And that in
cludes many of our goals and motivations.614 In one study, for instance, subjects
were asked to rearrange scrambled words to make a sentence.6 l S Some subjects
were nonconsciously primed to succeed because the words included items like
"strive," "achieve," and "succeed." Others were given neutral words that would

608. See Bargh & Chartrand, supra note 598, at 466 (describing and summarizing evidence of the
"perception-behavior link").
609. Charles S. Carver et aI., Modeling: An Analysis in Terms of Category Accessibility, 19 1.
EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 403 ( 1 983).
6 1 0. John A. B argh et aI., Automaticity of Social Behavior: Direct Effects of Trait Construct and
Stereotype Activation on Action, 7 1 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 230, 233 ( 1 996).
6 1 1 . See id. at 235 fig. I. A control group, which was primed with neither type of word, interrupted
thirty-eight percent of the time. See id.
6 1 2. See Ap Dijksterhuis et aI . , Of Men and Mackerels: Attention, Subjective Experience, and
Automatic Social Behavior, in THE MESSAGE WITHIN: THE ROLE OF SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE IN SOCIAL
COGNmON AND BEHAVIOR 37, 39 (Herbert Bless & Joseph P. Forgas eds., 2000) (citing Bargh et aI.,
supra note 6 1 0, at 236).
6 1 3 . See Tanya L. Chartrand & John A . 8argh, The Chameleon Effect: The Perception-Behavior
Link and Social Interaction, 76 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 893, 897-900 ( 1 999).
614. See Bargh & Chartrand, supra note 598, at 468-73.
6 1 5 . Tanya L. Chartrand & John A. Bargh, Nonconscious Motivations: Their Activation, Operation,
and Consequences, in SELF AND MOTIVATION: EMERGING PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 1 3 (Abraham
Tesser et al. eds., 2002).

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

1 28

[Vol. 93: 1

not prime the goal to achieve.6 1 6 All of the subjects then were given a second,
timed task-to rearrange letters in words to create new words. The anagrams
ranged from simple to impossible.6 1 7 After completing the anagrams or running
out of time, the subjects filled out questionnaires about their moods. Subjects
who were not primed to succeed reported similar moods whether they per
formed well or poorly. The moods of the subjects who were primed to succeed,
however, varied depending on whether they succeeded or failed. That is, they
seemed to care about how well they performed, even though they were unaware
of what caused their moods, much less that it was the success-oriented words
they encountered in the first task.6 1 8 Subjects were, beneath their conscious
radars, given a goal that they did not even know they had, and that goal
remained, hidden in their interior situation, shaping their moods in ways they
neither saw nor appreciated.
Our automatic goals are quite pervasive. When we commonly adopt a
particular goal in a given situation-be it the workplace, the classroom, or the
ping-pong table-that goal is likely to be triggered automatically in that situa
tion, whether or not we want it to be triggered.6 1 9 As with all evidence of
situational influence, such automatic goal-setting and mood-affecting evidence
further reveals the extent to which we humans are susceptible to situational
manipulation.

2. The Illusion of Will
If most of what we perceive, feel, and do is driven by automatic processes,
then why is it that most of us perceive our behavior to be the consequence of
our conscious will? There are several reasons. First, we are rarely conscious of
that which is automatic in us-indeed, that's the point: automaticity frees up for
other purposes our extremely limited capacity for conscious thinking and acting.
It is as if automaticity occurs silently in the dark, whereas conscious thinking
happens noisily beneath a spotlight. The conscious eclipses the automatic before
our introspective eye.
Perhaps more important, when we do experience ourselves consciously will
ing our actions, we are often mistaken. Daniel Wegner, in his superb book The
Illusion of Conscious Will, brings together an intriguing array of direct evidence
to make his case that we humans are subject to an illusion of will (which, again,
we think has been circumstantially implied in evidence of the more general

6 1 6.
6 17.
6 1 8.
6 1 9.

ld. at 30.
ld.
ld.

See Tanya L. Chartrand & Clara M. Cheng, The Role of Nonconscious Goal Pursuit in Hope,
1 3 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 290 (2002). This and related work also demonstrate how nonconscious goals can
affect not only our moods, but also the way we perform and the j udgments we make about others. See,
e.g., Tanya L. Chartrand & Valerie Jefferis, Consequences of Automatic Goal Pursuit and the Case of
Nonconscious Mimicry, in RESPONDING TO THE SOCIAL WORLD: IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT PROCESSES IN SOCIAL
JUDGMENTS AND DECISIONS 290 (Joseph P. Forgas et al. eds., 2003).
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illusion of disposition ism).
Consider the case of "phantom limbs." People who have had an arm or a leg
amputated usually report that they continue to "feel" the presence of the limb
long after it is gone. One pair of researchers who studied a group of three
hundred World War II amputees found that ninety-eight percent experienced the
phantom limb phenomenon. But there is more: Many amputees report that they
can voluntarily move their phantom limbs, especially their fingers and toes.
They report having the experience of consciously willing the movement of the
limb, despite the absence of the limb or any willing movement of it. They
perceive themselves willing something that clearly is not there to will. This is
one intriguing piece of evidence that "the intention to move can create the
experience of conscious will without any action at all. , ,620
Another intriguing study provides another clue to the puzzle of conscious
will . Researchers used highly sensitive electromyographical devices to study the
patterns of electrical impulses generated during the performance of a "willed
action." Hooked to electrodes, subjects were asked to move their fingers "at
will." The researchers established a baseline electrical impulse that was wit
nessed in the brain shortly before the subjects moved their finger, which
preceded a second impulse that was seen when the finger actually moved. This
first impulse register was dubbed "readiness potential." In a recent version of
the study, subjects were placed before an especially sensitive clock, and were
asked to report for each finger movement the position of the clock hand at the
moment that they experienced a "conscious awareness of 'wanting' to perform
,,
the finger movement. 621 The researchers found that they were able to identify
three distinct blips (to use the scientific term) in the electrical impulses of the
brain throughout the course of action. The first was the "readiness potential"
registered in the baseline. Sometime after the "readiness potential," however,
came the experience of willing the finger. Finally, in a third distinct moment,
there was an impulse associated with the actual movement of the finger. The
researchers discovered that the subject's "readiness potential" occurred dis
tinctly before the subjects themselves perceived a will to move the fi nger. The
experience of conscious will, it appears , arises at some point after the brain has
already begun the action. As the chief researcher of this study concluded:
[T]he initiation of the voluntary act appears to be an unconscious cerebral
process. Clearly, free will or free choice of whether to act now could not be
the initiating agent, contrary to one widely held view. This is of course also
contrary to each individual's own introspective feeling that he/she consciously
initiates such voluntary acts; this provides an important empirical example of
the possibility that the subjective experience of a mental causality need not

620. WEGNER, supra note 84, at 40 (referring to original study by Henderson & Smyth ( 1 948».
62 1 . /d. at 50-52 (referring to original study by Komhuber & Deecke ( 1 965» .
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necessarily reflect the actual causative relationship between mental and brain
events. 622

In another fascinating study, researchers put a series of subjects into a
"transcranial magnetic stimulation" device, which has been found to cause
through a directed magnetic impulse-the involuntary movement of different
parts of the human body.623 Without explaining the operation of the device to
subjects, the experimenters asked subjects to move either their right or their left
finger, whichever they chose, whenever they heard a click. The click was
actually the sound of the device turning on, and forcing the movement of a
particular digit. Although the magnetic impulses led the subjects to move the
finger they moved, the subjects nevertheless perceived that they were choosing
which finger to move, and then moving it.624 "When asked whether they had
voluntarily chosen which finger to move, participants showed no inkling that
,,
something other than their will was creating their choice. 625 Findings such as
these suggest that the experience of conscious will may stem from an internal
system that is distinct from both the action itself and the action's true source.
Put differently, willing may be different then acting, and although the experi
ence of both may often be coterminous, they are not necessarily causally
related. Furthermore, even when some unappreciated situational force
including the business end of a transcranial magnetic stimulation device-is
leading us to act in a particular way, we tend to experience our actions as
volitional, willed choices. Again, we miss situation and see disposition.
Based on his review of many such studies, including his own research,
Wegner concludes that our minds produce the experience of conscious will
through a process that is independent of the actual cause of our behavior. "[W]e
must be careful to distinguish," Wegner argues, "between . . . empirical will
the causality of the person's conscious thoughts as established by . . . their
covariation with the person's behavior-and the phenomenal will-the person's
,,
reported experience of will. 626
There are, to be sure, times when we experience that we have willed
something when, in fact, we have.627 Foregoing a just-out-of-the-oven choco
late chip cookie can be, when we succeed, evidence of the empirical will. But

622. B. Libet, The Neural Time-Factor in Perception, Volition and Free Will, 97 REVUE DE METAPHY
SIQUE ET DE MORALE 255 ( 1 992), quoted in WEGNER, supra note 84, at 54. As often occurs in social
science, the significance and implications of this line of research are not without controversy. Our
treatment here is based largely on Wegner's analysis, which is, in our view, as balanced and reliable
account in this developing field as is presently available for use in legal theory.
623. See WEGNER, supra note 84, at 47 (citing Joaquim P. Brasil-Neto et aI., Focal Transcranial
Magnetic Stimulation and Response Bias in a Forced-Choice Task, 55 J. NEUROLOGY, NEUROSURGERY &
PSYCHIATRY 964 ( 1992». Apparently this one slipped by the human subjects committee.
624. WEGNER, supra note 84, at 48.
625. [d.
626. [d. at 14.
627. See id. at 15.

Wegner writes:
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the experience of will is not reliable evidence of the empirical will. The
experience of will is generated by our minds to accompany behaviors whose
source may be unwilled situation. "The experience of will," as Wegner puts it,
"is the way our minds portray their operations to us, not their actual opera
,,
tion. 628 Wegner's diagnosis reveals the limited viability of the experience of
will as a last bastion of dispositionism.
Though we perceive will and behave and experience ourselves "as if' our
will were controlling our behavior, and though we project will onto the behavior
of others, these intuitive conceptions of the will are fundamentally unreliable
indicators of both the reality of our will and the source of our behavior. Here
again, there is more to the situation:629
[T]he brain structure that provides the experience of will is separate from the
brain source of action. It appears possible to produce voluntary action through
brain stimulation with or without an experience of conscious will. This, i n
tum, suggests the interesting possibility that conscious will is a n add-on, a n
experience that has its own origins and consequences. The experience o f will
may not be very firmly connected to the processes that produce action, in that
whatever creates the experience of will may function in a way that is only
0
loosely coupled with the mechanisms that yield action itself. 63

A final experiment suggests the extent to which our experience of will can be
subject to situational influence, again without our conscious awareness. Subjects
viewed a computer screen that flashed strings of letters and were asked to judge
whether they saw words in what flashed.63 1 The screen would go entirely blank

In psychology, clear indications of the empirical will can be found whenever causal relation
ships are observed between people's thoughts, beliefs, intentions, plans, or other conscious
psychological states and their subsequent actions. The feeling of consciously willing our
actions, in contrast, is not a direct readout of such scientifically verifiable will power.
(emphasis added); see also id. at 327 (observing that there often is a correlation between our felt
experience of will and scientifically verifiable empirical will power).
628. Id. at 96.
629. Cf id. at 66 ("Although day always precedes night, for example, it is a mistake to say that day
causes night, because of course both are caused in this sequence by the rotation of the earth in the
presence of the sun."). We perceive ourselves consciously thinking and willing our actions, and
wrongly believe that we perceive all there is. In part, we perceive our conscious will because any time
we look for it, we find it. The problem is that when we are not looking for it, it is rarely there. See
generally Bargh & Chartrand, supra note 598 (finding that much of human behavior is nonconscious
and situational). It is as though we conclude from the fact that every time we look into the mirror we
see ourselves looking back, that our reflection is always in that mirror, looking out. It is not, but when
we look, it is-and, so, what we see when we look gives us a false sense of what is happening when we
are not looking.
630. WEGNER, supra note 84, at 47; see also id. at 64 ("The theory of apparent mental causation,
then, is this: People experience conscious will when they interpret their own thought as the cause of
their action. This means that people experience conscious will quite independently of any actual causal
connection between their thoughts and their actions.").
63 1 . Ap Dijksterhuis et aI., Unconscious Priming of Conscious Will (200 1 ) (unpublished manu
script, on file with authors).
Id.
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once each trial, either after the subject pressed the response button, or automati
cally after a very short time (400-650 milliseconds) if the subject failed to
respond. The intervals were so quick that it was difficult for subjects to tell
whether their response triggered the blank screen, or whether it had automati
cally gone blank. One group of subjects, however, was subliminally primed
with a flash of the word "I" or "me" (subjects reported not recognizing it) just
prior to the flash of letters that they could consciously see and were to evaluate.
The researchers found that subjects primed with the dispositionist terms "I" or
"me" were more likely to conclude that they had caused the screen to go blank
than were subjects who had not been so primed. The subjects, it seems, "were
influenced by the unconscious priming of self to attribute an ambiguous action
,,
to their own will. 632 Our experience of will then, is not only an internal
illusion, it is an internal illusion that is susceptible to external situational
manipulation.
The will, it turns out, rather than being the trump card in the dispositionist's
deck, may be the j oker in our dispositional delusion.633 As Wegner summarizes:
The unique human convenience of conscious thoughts that preview our
actions gives us the privilege of feeling we willfully cause what we do. In
fact, however, unconscious and inscrutable mechanisms create both conscious
thought about action and the action, and also produce the sense of will we
experience by perceiving the thought as the cause of the action. So, while our
thoughts may have deep, important, and unconscious causal connections to
our actions, the experience of conscious will arises from a process that
4
interprets these connections, not from the connections themselves. 63

We want to emphasize again what we are not claiming, lest our actual claims
be wrongly caricatured and dismissed. We have not argued here, or elsewhere in
this Article, that there is "no such thing" as will, or that everything we seem to
will is, to the contrary, determined for us. We do not doubt the existence of the
632. See WEGNER, supra note 84, at 209. For a related discussion of how sellers attempt to attribute
consumer behavior to the free exercise of consumers' wills, informed by stable preferences, see
Hanson, Yosifon, & Benforado, Broken Scales, supra note 54.
633. See WEGNER, supra note 84, at 28 ("The mind has a self-explanation mechanism that produces a
roughly continuous sense that what is in consciousness is the cause of action-the phenomenal
will-whereas in fact the mind can't ever know itself well enough to be able to say what the causes of
its actions are. ").
634. /d. at 98. Wegner adds:
We must remember that this analysis suggests that the real causal mechanisms underlying
behavior are never present in consciousness. Rather, the engines of causation operate without
revealing themselves to us and so may be unconscious mechanisms of mind. Much of the
recent research suggesting a fundamental role for automatic processes in everyday behavior
. . . can be understood in this light. The real causes of human action are unconscious, so it is
not surprising that behavior could often arise-as in automaticity experiments-without the
person's having conscious insight into its causation. Conscious will itself arises from a set of
processes that are not the same processes as those that cause the behavior to which the
experience of will pertains, however.
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individual human will, and we do not doubt that there is human genius rightly
to be attributed to it. Our point, rather, is that our experience of will-our
familiar experience that our will is responsible for our conduct-is often not a
reliable indicator of the actual cause of our behavior. The felt experience of will
therefore contributes greatly to our dispositionism. Where we are moved situation
ally, the phenomenon of will fills out our stories and helps to eclipse our vision
of the situational influences that move us. When it seems that our "will" is
doing the moving, it follows that we must have "chosen" our actions. And if we
chose our actions, we must have had reasons or preferences for doing so. Thus,
the illusion of will is a central feature of the illusion of dispositionism. How,
after all, can situation be moving us, when we can "feel" the disposition?
Our point, then, is both subtle and disquieting: The experienced "will," rather
than a mirror and measure of our true selves, may be another mask in the
disguise of dispositionism that keeps us from seeing what really moves us.
IV. A FEW POSSIBLE LESSONS FOR LAW AND LEGAL THEORY
Part I of this Article examined the person schema that forms the foundation of
most laws and legal theories. Part III summarized some of what psychology
teaches about what actually moves human beings. What is now fairly clear is
that the dominant lay and legal theories of the person (or "personology") are
wrong-not just "too simple," but fundamentally wrong. Social science has
clearly demonstrated that we are not who we think we are. It is true that we
experience ourselves thinking, preferring, acting, and willing, but those comfort
ing perceptions are often illusory, and they obscure the far more significant
influence of our unseen interior situation.
What should also be clear is that every experiment demonstrating the extent
and power of our interior situations likewise indicates just how incredibly
vulnerable we-our cognitions, attitudes, behavior, and even our conscious
will-are to exterior situational manipulation. To see that, one need only go
back and note how each experiment discussed above revealed one or another
element of our interior situations by secretly manipulating the subjects' exterior
situations. Our dispositionist self-schemas and our perceptions of thinking,
preferring, willing, and choosing lead us to miss the situation, and render us
vulnerable to it. So it is that the hidden situation can be as powerful as a loaded
gun. This, we believe, is the central lesson of our argument. Understanding its
implications generally for law, policy, policymaking, and legal theory goes well
beyond the scope of this Article.635 Still, we will suggest a few tentative

635. This Part offers a few positive predictions about the contours of the law and legal theory.
Beyond what we can describe here, there is much to learn about the legal institutions (indeed all
institutions) when one begins with a more realistic conception of the human animal. And, for now, we
are concerned in this project primarily with pursuing such positive questions about why the huamn
animal and its institutions behave as they do.
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implications here.636
A. THE LAW
Getting to know something about the situational character teaches us some
thing about how better to understand our laws. The point is taken up in other
work, but some preliminary observations are worth making here. For instance,
we believe that "law" itself can be usefully understood as a kind of disposition
ist situational character, reflecting all the same tendencies of the human variety.
That is true, in our view, because legal systems place judges, juries, legislators,
and the like in a position of resolving disputes between competing interests.
Those decision-makers-be they individuals, or groups or processes that con
ceive of themselves as individuals-tend to see their institutions as human-like
entities.637 They see themselves and their institutions very much the same way
we humans conceive of ourselves-as information-gathering, reasonable think
ers with steady sets of preferences-and they are subject to the same sorts of
situational influences, such as the various motivations for coherence, simplicity,
system-affirmation, and so on.638
For lawmakers, such preferences might be identified in various policy scripts
defining the purpose of law or lawmaking.639 In the case of judges, the
preferences might be found in similar scripts in various legal principles and

When we have presented this paper in various settings, our most vociferous and incredulous
questioners have tended to disregard the positive implications of our work and to press on us the
possible normative questions raised by critical realist situationism. Oftentimes (though certainly not
always), those individuals seemt to suggest that, absent a clear normative description of what goal the
law should serve and how the law should be reformed to better serve that goal, we have said little of
interest to legal theorists.
Needless to say, we disagree. Some conception of the human animal-be it explicit or implicit,
realistic or farcical-forms the foundation of all legal theories-positive or normative. Positive theories
are important for understanding, predicting, and influencing the law and legal institutions. And a
positive theory, particularly one that is committed to a realistic account of the human animal, can be
significant for both assessing existing normative and prescriptive theories and for developing or shaping
such theories. Put differently, we believe that the sort of evidence that we are reviewing, and the
positivist arguments we are making in this Article and elsewhere, have immense normative implica
tions. And we look forward to exploring these implications in the future. In the meantime, we believe
that, in light of the evidence, the burden is not on us to develop a new situationist-based normative
theory, but on those who embrace some form of dispositionism to justify their normative theories or to
join in the effort of trying to understand the normative implications of situationism.
636. Id. at 97. In related work, we hope to elaborate these and other implications. See, e.g. , Chen &
Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 1 36; Chen & Hanson, The Illusion of Law, supra note 32;
Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously II, supra note 1 32; Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation,
supra note 5. Other scholars have also made important strides in considering the implications of social
psychology (and related fields) for law, legal theory, and legal institutions. See, e.g., Ross & Shestowsky,
supra note 56.
637. See FISKE, supra note 233, at 460-63 (describing the perceived "entativity" of groups).
638. See Wendy Wood, Attitude Change: Persuasion and Social Influence, 5 1 ANN. REv. PSYCHOL.
539 (2000) (summarizing much of the recent evidence on individual and group decision-making
private and public).
639. See generally Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 1 36, at 1 239-52 (offering a set
of predictions about the role of knowledge structures on legal theories and law); Chen & Hanson, The
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precedents. Judges, being human, understand and portray their individual deci
sions as both internally coherent and coherent across cases, doctrines, and
time-hence the common provision in written opinions intended to reconcile
any given decision with all previous ones.640 The coherence will be, just as it is
with the human version of the situational character, largely an illusion, but not
so obviously an illusion that the system's legitimacy is threatened.64 I The
patterns behind the laws will reflect the situational influences of those individu
als and institutions best able to influence lawmakers' situation.
Furthermore, courts, in making judgments, will operate according to the same
attributional impulses and biases-assessing causation, responsibility, and
blame-very much the way we all do.642 Indeed, a major task for the law is to
sort out attributional stories and judge responsibility based on the disputants'
conflicting versions.643 Because of our biases, individuals most likely to be held
personally responsible are the salient individuals closest to the injury, particu
larly when their behavior was, in some sense, non-normal (encouraging counter
factual thinking), when they are members of cultural out-groups, or when
attributional stereotypes point in their direction. The legal system will seek to
identify the causes of harm quickly, simply, and in a way that promotes the
perceptions of closure and coherence. 644
For that reason, and many others that we we have highlighted above, judicial
attributions will be far too dispositionist-a claim for which we have already
provided some evidence.645 Where harms are caused by situational influences,
the law will tend either to seek out and name a dispositional scapegoat on which
to place responsibility, or to deny that there was a harm (perhaps by derogating
the victim)646 or the possibility of a legal remedy. Furthermore, in an effort to
legitimate, not only their own decisions, but the entire system, lawmakers will
ignore, tolerate, or justify many outcomes that could otherwise be perceived as
unjust. And they will do so by accepting and reinforcing dispositionism and
rejecting situationism. Relatedly, lawmakers and those subject to laws will be
particularly keen to promote and protect individuals' perceived rights to be
dispositionists-that is, their ability to choose whatever options they like with-

Illusion of Law, supra note 33 (providing evidence consistent with those predictions with regard to the
now-dominant general schemas of policymaking and corporate law).
640. See generally Phoebe Ellsworth, Legal Reasoning, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF THINKING
AND REASONING (forthcoming 2005) (on file with authors).
64 1 . See generally Chen & Hanson, The Illusion ofLaw, supra note 32.
642. See generally Hanson, Reyes & Schlanger, Attributional Positivism, supra note 43.
643. See id.
644 . See generally Benforado, Hanson & Yosifon, Broken Scales, supra note 54. This helps explain
the attraction of Langdellian positivism in early academic theories and the fact that, to this day, jurists
continue to claim to be simply applying the law. See Ellsworth, supra note 640.
645. See supra text accompanying notes 35-63.
646. See supra Part III.C.2.b.iii (summarizing evidence of people's tendency to derogate victims in
order to perserve their perception of a "just world").
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out the interference of arbitrary or unfair restrictions by salient actors.647
In addition, lawmakers will seek to avoid obvious tension or contradictions
between their stated goals and their actions, and they will likely seek to resolve
"precedential dissonance" in many of the same ways individuals do-from
changing their goals to changing their opinions, and from trivializing the
dissonance to emphasizing unrelated self-enhancing features of the system.648
Their decisions will ultimately be rationalized as consistent with basic self
affirming and system-affirming conceptions of justice, fairness, equality, merit,
choice, and the like.
B.

LEGAL THEORY

Getting to know the situational character, we have come to know more than
just what moves us. The discussion in Part III teaches us something about what
moves our own theories about what moves us. We are not referring here to the
many exterior situational forces behind the long and successful "life" of the
dispositional actor. That is the topic of other work649 (and, less explicitly, the
topic of Part V below). We are referring instead to the influence that our interior
situation tends to have on the shape of the policy theories likely to be most
successful. Legal theory, too, will share much in common with the law. But, as
an outside observer, a legal theorist is to law something closer to what a social
psychologist is to the human variety of situational characters: an observer
attempting to ascertain what really moves the situational character-to see, for
example, if the purported attitudes, reasons, and rationalizations of the situ
ational character square with its behavior. Where apparent incoherence is
identified, legal scholars offer theories intended either to make sense of the
decisions (positive theories, which can be legitimating or delegitimating) or to
show how the law, in practice, should be (re)formed or (re)structured to achieve
a particular goal (normative theories).
Knowing something more about the situational character, we can better
predict which theories will be most highly valued outside of law schools, and
thus which ones will tend to be advantaged, other things being equal. First,
successful theories will rely on a highly dispositionist view of the human
actor-one that presumes that humans will their choices through thought and
preferences. The model actor-the one that sets the standard for all of us-will

647. That prediction is connected to the illusion of control (and associated motive for control) .
Numerous experiments testing "reactance theory" have demonstrated that people (particularly in this
culture, we suspect) do not like to be told what they can or cannot do. Broadly speaking, when
individuals perceive an unfair restriction of their conduct, they often experience a strong motivational
state ("reactance") to remove the perceived restriction or reject it. For thorough discussions of reactance
theory and evidence supporting it, see JACK W. B REHM, A THEORY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL R£ACfANCE ( 1 966)
and SHARON BREHM & JACK W. BREHM, PSYCHOLOGICAL R£ACfANCE: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND CONTROL
( 1 98 1 ).
648. See supra notes 472-503 and accompanying text.
649. See, e.g., Chen & Hanson, The Illusion of Law, supra note 32; Hanson & Yosifon, The
Situation, supra note 5.
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be a fairly robust version of our widely held, dispositionist self-conceptions.
The model actor therefore will be a thoughtful, reasoning actor, who approaches
questions from a data-driven, bottom-up perspective, one who is not biased by
cognitive shortcuts, distorting knowledge structures, emotions, or any unseen
interior influences. She will have stable preferences that are consistent over time
and with her behavior. And exceptions to that conception will be narrow and
snugly anchored to that conception.
Legal conclusions and legal-theoretic inclinations will tend to favor the most
powerful groups (and cultural in_groups).65o Various cloaks of legitimacy will
be draped over the law and legal theories.65 1 Categories and schemas that tend
to favor those groups will be created and perceived as neutral and natural, even
when they are false, incomplete, or biasing. Laws and legal theories will also,
on the whole, tend to be system-affirming. For all of these reasons, legal
theories will, like the laws, tend to underestimate the role of situation-too
often ignoring or downplaying the role of unseen forces that move or exploit the
situation.652 Similarly, they will vastly limit our ability to see certain harmful
situational forces and our ability to correct for those that we do see, such as the
role of market manipulation.653
System affirmation will be accomplished in significant part through the
dispositionism that already infects our attributions. Throughout, there will be
little serious attention given to the possibility that people's conduct deviates
from that of the model (dispositional) actor. That is, only the most obvious
interior and exterior situational influences will be acknowledged.654 And those
theorists who challenge the dominant conceptions will be viewed (along with
their theories) as members of the same marginal and threatening out
group(S).655
The above description, we believe, accurately depicts much of traditional law
and economics, and it helps to explain its tremendous real-world influence.656
Unfortunately, social psychology also strongly suggests that such a legal theory
or legal system will have significant harmful effects--even as measured by
existing normative theories regarding the goal or goals of law. As the footnotes
in this section suggest, we have provided evidence for many of these claims in
650. See H anson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 5, at 230-84.
65 1 . See generally Chen & Hanson, The Illusion of Law, supra note 32.
652. See supra text accompanying notes 472-503 (discussing the role of dispositionism in system
affirmation).
653. See Hanson & Kysar, The Failure, supra note 1 32 (describing the failure of existing laws to
recognize and counteract the market manipulation techniques of the tobacco industry); Hanson,
Yosifron, & Benforado, Broken Scales, supra note 54 (same with respect to situational sources of
obesity epidemic).
654. See supra text accompanying notes 1 5-62.
655. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 5, at 1 57-66; Chen & Hanson, The Illusion of
Law, supra note 32.
656. For a description of both, see Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 5; Jon Hanson &
Melissa Hart, Law and Economics, in BLACKWELL'S COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL
THEORY 3 1 1 -3 1 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1 996).
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related work.
Our point here is that a better understanding of the situational character helps
us to better understand our policy and policymaking systems. And the lessons of
social psychology may be as unsettling and counterintuitive for our understand
ing of those systems as they have been for our understanding of ourselves. The
very theories that we use to legitimate our systems, for example, may in fact be
contributing to injustice-as defined by those theories. Insofar as we ignore
situation, we ignore the limits of presumed autonomy and many of the most
influential forces in our society--often far more influential than personal choice.
That situational ignorance, it would seem, likely advantages those people,
groups, and interests with the greatest autonomy to start with. Thus, situational
ignorance helps to create-and then legitimate and maintain-power relation
ships.657 Power that is reinforced by the law is legitimated as the acceptable
outcome of neutral legal processes. When those processes are understood as
part of the manipulated, constructed, hidden situation that creates that power,
any claim of neutrality vanishes-and, with it, the legitimacy that guards
associated inequalities.
Part V will provide some support for many of the assertions in this Part; it
will also demonstrate how legal theorists have dealt with the dissonance created
by the growing social scientific evidence that we are situational characters.
V. DISPOSITIONISM IN LAW AND ECONOMICS
"Living in economic science makes economists think a little differently than
other people. "
- George Stigler658

In Part I, we described the generally dispositionist starting place of legal
analysis, laws, lawmakers, and indeed virtually all western individuals and
institutions. As we suggested, no social theory more formally and explicitly
embraces the basic pre-theoretic axioms of lay dispositionism than neoclassical
(law and) economics.659 As we argued in a previous article, the success of the
economic view in policymaking has likely both depended upon and contributed
to a similar commonsense vision.660 But, as we have argued in this Article, the
dominant dispositionist model is, in many ways, fundamentally flawed.
As evidence of those flaws has gained wider audiences and has begun to
disseminate through academia, that evidence has begun to pose a threat to the
legal theorists and jurists who are committed to dispositionism. It has created a

657. Dominant dispositionist theories thus are most valuable to the very groups who have the
greatest ability to promote such theories through situational influence.
658. GEORGE J. STIGLER, MEMOIRS OF AN UNREGULATED EcONOMIST 8 ( 1 988).
659. We view law and economics as a subgenre of neoclassical economics.
660. Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 5.
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dissonance between their motives to achieve simplicity and confirm their exist
ing theories, on one hand, and their motive for accuracy on the other. The threat
has been felt most acutely among (law and) economic theorists because of their
field's dominance in modern policy making, its clear and formal adoption of
dispositionism, and the system-affirming quality of much of their work. There is
now an unmistakable uneasiness among (legal) economists and a great deal of
work attempting to reconcile their theories with the growing evidence that
seems to contradict it. Indeed, much of the most interesting and important work
these days involves applying certain features of social psychology to the law
and economics mode1.661
Most economists are, of course, humans, and their strategies for coping with
the theoretic-empiric dissonance are all too human. This section looks closely at
how law and economics has responded, and how seriously its advocates have
taken the insights of social psychology. First, it reveals that the dispositionist
actor has been carefully guarded. Second, it provides further evidence that even
scholars who have devoted their careers to one or another version of the rational
actor remain situational characters.
A. THE DISPOSITIONIST ACTOR OF LAY AND LEGAL-ECONOMIC THEORIES
"The theory of consumer demand, as is now widely accepted, is based on
[the] . . . . proposition ' " that wants originate in the personality of the
consumer or, in any case, that they are given data for the economist. "
- John Kenneth Galbraith662

Economists assume that human agents gather and process information (think)
in order to identify the best method or means of satisfying their (stable and
exogenous) preferences through willed choice. Robert Cooter and Thomas Vlen,
legal economists, summarize this basic starting place in their classic law and
economics text:
The construction of the economic model of consumer choice begins with an
account of the preferences of consumers. Consumers are assumed to know the
things they like and dislike and to be able to rank the available alternative
combinations of goods and services according to their ability to satisfy the
consumer's preferences. This involves no more than ranking the alternatives
as better than, worse than, or equally as good as one another. . . .
[T]he preferences of the consumer are subjective. Different people have
different tastes, and these will be reflected in the fact that they may have
different preference orderings over the same goods and services. Economists
leave to other disciplines, such as psychology and sociology, the study of the

66 1 .
662.

See infra Part v.c.
JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 2-3

( 1 958).
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source of these preferences. We take consumer tastes or preferences as given,
or, as we sometimes say, as exogenous, which means that they are determined
outside the economic system.663

From such axioms, it is easy to conclude that each person's actions constitute
willed choices reflecting the outcome of that information-gathering, preference
pursuing process. Or, as economist David Kreps summarizes, the basic eco
,,
664
nomic approach presumes that "choice is induced from preference .
That is the lesson of what economists call the "Generalized Axiom of
Revealed Preference" ("GARP" )665-the approach that, since its first articula
tion sixty-five years ago "has gradually taken hold of choice theory in general
,,
and demand theory in particular. 666 According to Nobel Laureate Paul Samuel
son, who first formulated revealed preference theory, "[t]he individual guinea
pig, by his market behaviour, reveals his preference pattern-if there is such a
,,
consistent pattern. 667 In this world according to GARP, preferences drive
choices; so preferences can be inferred from (are revealed by) actual choices
such that there is no need to ask consumers why they do what they do, because
what they do reveals the story:668
.

.

.

Standard economic theory employs an "objectivist" position based on observ
able choices made by individuals. Individual utility only depends on tangible

663. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 1 9, at 17; see also id. at 1 7 n.3 ("[W]e hold to the view that
economics per se is about how [the] alteration [of consumer tastes] takes place."); Martha Nussbaum,
Flawed Foundations: The Philosophical Critique of (a Particular Type of) Economics, 64 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1 197, 1 1 97-98 ( 1 997) ("Law and Economics has been built on a particular set of conceptual
foundations. These involve at least the following ideas: that rational agents are self-interested maximiz
ers of utility; that utility can best be understood (for explanatory/predictive purposes) as a single item
varying only in quantity; that utility is best analyzed in terms of the satisfaction of preferences; that
preferences are exogenous, i.e., not significantly shaped by laws and institutions; and that the ends
adopted by an agent cannot themselves be the subject of rational deliberation, although agents may
deliberate about instrumental means to ends.").
664. DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 25 ( 1 990).
665. Id. at 4 1�5.
666. Amartya K. Sen, Behaviour and the Concept of Preference, 40 ECONOMICA 241 , 241 ( 1 973); see
also id. at 242 (explaining that the revealed preference approach is not limited to market choices "and
indeed . . . has been used in studying preferences revealed by non-market behaviour such as govern
ment decisions, choices of public bodies and political acts like voting").
667. Paul A. Samuelson, A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer 's Behaviour, 5 ECONOMICA 6 1
( 1 938); see also Paul A. Samuelson, A Note o n the Pure Theory of Consumer's Behaviour: An
Addendum, 5 EcONOMICA 353 ( 1 938).
668. PAUL A. SAMUELSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 90- 1 1 3 ( 1 947); see also KREps, supra
note 664, at 27, 29-30; EDWIN MANSFIELD, EcONOMICS 7 1-72 (7th ed. 1 992); Sen, supra note 666, at 241
("From the point of view of introspection of the person in question, the process runs from his
preference to his choice, but from the point of view of the scientific observer the arrow runs in the
opposite direction: choices are observed first and preferences are then presumed from these observa
tions.").
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goods and services and leisure. It is inferred from behavior (or revealed
preferences), and is in tum used to explain the choices made. 669

In this theory, choices are the means b y which individuals satisfy their prefer
ences and by which policy analysts infer those preferences and measure social
welfare.670 Amartya Sen, yet another Nobel Laureate, insightfully suggests that
"the popularity of this view . . . may be due to a mixture of an obsessive
concern with observability and a . . . belief that choice . . . is the only human
,,
aspect that can be observed. 67 1
It is worth noting here, briefly, the striking parallel between "revealed
preferences" and the fundamental attribution error: both presume, based largely
on observability, that behavior is dispositionally explained. Moreover, revealed
preference theory is successful, not because it has been shown to be true, but
because it is tractable and comports with our intuitions. Sen (who is an
important exception to this overgeneralized description of economics)672 puts
the point this way:
Faith in the axioms of revealed preference arises . . . not from empirical
verification, but from the intuitive reasonableness of these axioms interpreted
precisely in terms ofpreference . . . .
I would, therefore, argue that the claim of explaining "behaviour without
reference to anything other than behaviour" is pure rhetoric and if the theory
of revealed preference makes sense it does so not because no psychological
assumptions are used but because the psychological assumptions used are
67
sensibly chosen. 3

As we have shown, however, those psychological assumptions are not sensibly
chosen, and thus there would appear to exist a fundamental attribution error at
the heart of revealed preference theory and the economic analysis that has been
built upon it.674

669. Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, What Can Economists Learn from Happiness Research?, 40 1.
ECON. LITERATURE 402, 404 (2002).
670. See, e.g. , 1.R. HICKS, REVISION OF DEMAND THEORY 6 ( 1 956) ("The economic theory of demand

does study human beings, but only as entities having certain patterns of market behaviour; it makes no
claim, no pretence, to be able to see inside their heads."); I.M.D. Little, A Reformulation of the Theory
of Consumer 's Behaviour, I OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 90, 97 ( 1 949) ("[T]he new formulation is scientifi
cally more respectable [because] [i]f an individual's behaviour is consistent, then it must be possible to
explain that behaviour without reference to anything other than behaviour.").
67 1 . Amartya K. Sen, The Standard ofLiving, in 7 TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 1 8 ( 1 986).
672. Sen is particularly sensitive to what we would call situational considerations. Very loosely, Sen
argues that, in addition to a person's choices, policymakers should be concerned with a person's
situation, or range of alternatives or "capabilities." See generally AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS
FREEDOM (2000); AMARTYA SEN, COMMODITIES AND CAPABILmEs ( 1 985).
673. Sen, supra note 666, at 243-44 (citation omitted) (emphasis

added); see also id. at 254
(indicating that the dominant theory "makes the analysis simpler").
674. Again, Sen himself believes that there is more to the situation than most economists assume or
their theories allow. For instance, in one article, Sen offered the following speculation:
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It is unsurprising, given their assumptions and perspectives, that many econo
mists similarly infer freedom (and happiness or welfare)675 from the perception
of choice and, hence, celebrate markets as the most trustworthy of vehicles for
the actualization of preferences. Thus, Milton Friedman explains:
When you hear people objecting to the market or to capitalism and you
examine their objections, you will find that most of those objections are
objections to freedom itself. What most people are objecting to is that the

market gives people what the people want instead of what the person talking
thinks the people ought to want. That is true whether you are talking of the
objections of a Galbraith to the market, whether you are talking of the
objections of a Nader to the market, whether you are talking of the objections
of a Marx or an Engels or a Lenin to the market. 676

To Friedman and to most economists, a market choice is, absent strong reason
to believe otherwise, a free choice.677 And free choice is, in light of the other
pre-theoretic axioms, the normative standard against which all laws, policies,
and regulations should be measured. Policies should encourage contracting and
market transactions wherever possible, and should otherwise seek to achieve
outcomes that mimic the allocations that would occur were free markets fully
functioning.678 And it is largely because of those presumptions that many
economists have responded to evidence that their simple model is badly flawed,
not by denying the veracity of the evidence, but by warning that any serious
discussion of such evidence opens the door, or begins us down a slippery slope,

I would argue that the philosophy of the revealed preference approach essentially underesti
mates the fact that man is a social animal and his choices are not rigidly bound to his own
preferences only. I do not find it difficult to believe that birds and bees and dogs and cats do
reveal their preferences by their choice; it is with human beings that the proposition is not
particularly persuasive. An act of choice for this social animal is, in a fundamental sense,
always a social act. He may be only dimly aware of the immense problems of interdependence
that characterize a society, of which the problem under discussion is only one. But his
behaviour is something more than a mere translation of his personal preferences.
at 252-53.
Professor Jerry Green, in his graduate-level introduction to microeconomics at Harvard University,
makes a similar admission. He notes that, in attempting to infer people's preferences, economists tend
to concentrate on "operationaliz[ing] a quantitative description of their observed actions," despite the
fact that questions about the "context in which we think the people are operating" are just as important.
Jerry R. Green, Lecture Notes: Lecture I , Economics 201 0a (FaIl 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with authors).
675. See Sen, supra note 666, at 244 ('''[A] person is, on the whole, likely to be happier the more he
is able to have what he would choose."') (quoting Little, supra note 670, at 98); Sen, supra note 666, at
254 (discussing the "rigid correspondence between choice, preference and welfare assumed in tradi
tional economic theory").
676. MILTON FRIEDMAN, BRIGHT PROMISES, DISMAL PERFORMANCE 89 ( 1983) (emphasis added).
677. See, e.g., Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 5, at 1 57-165 (discussing the extent of
economists' dispositionism).
678. See generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE EcONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW ( 199 1).
[d.
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to one or another form of totalitarianism.679
When people perceive a threat to the social system, they tend to see the world
in more dispositionist terms.680 Relatedly, when dispositionists-particularly
hard-core dispositionists like "a Friedman"-are confronted with evidence or
opinions that situation is more significant than they believe, they perceive that
evidence or opinion as a threat to the system. And all. those who offer such
criticisms-be they "a Galbraith ' " a Nader a Marx or an Engels or a
Lenin"-are themselves dispositionalized into a single out-group of individuals
who pose a threat to our system.68 I
We suspect that the interior fundamental attribution error largely ex
plains-or at least makes possible-both the pre-theoretic axioms of economic
models and the normative social policies that most legal economists embrace.682
Again, the attraction and success of that approach stems in part from its
consonance with perceived, if unexamined, human experience (and with its
system-affirming effects). And, for similar reasons, we suspect that the same
influence is reflected in the theories underlying many of our most influential
social, cultural, political, and economic institutions-particularly those that, like
economics, have not taken seriously the project of examining our exterior or
interior situations.68 3
The consonance between economic assumptions and common Western lay
assumptions684 goes beyond merely the pre-theoretic axioms regarding the
landscape of our interiors. Economists share not only the lay intuition that
people act according to their thoughts and preferences, but also (at least loosely)
widely held lay presumptions regarding what those thoughts, preferences, and
acts tend to be. As several social psychologists recently summarized, "the model
of the ideal person," "especially in the United States since the 1 970s," has come
to embody the following characteristics, characteristics that likewise imbue the
rational actor:
•
•

•
•

oriented primarily toward independent "success" and "achievement."
formulates personal goals derived principally from these attributes and
orientations.
evaluates life with reference to the achievement of these goals.
makes (or should make) independent, more or less rational choices in
the pursuit of those goals.

679. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 5, at 190-9 1 (discussing "the totalitarian
bogeyman").
680. See supra text accompanying notes 472-503 (describing motive to affirm system through
dispositionaiizing stereotypes).
68 1 . FRIEDMAN, supra note 660, at 89.
682. See supra text accompanying notes 1 5-23 (describing legal economists' failure to account for
situation).
683. See supra text accompanying notes 24-63.
684. See supra text accompanying notes 79-102.
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is largely in control of-and individually responsible for-"personal"
behavior and its outcomes.
often regards relationships as competing with personal needs and re
gards group pressures as interfering with personal goals . . . .
strives first and foremost to feel good about the self.68 5

Thus, there is an overlap between economic models and lay institutions, not
only in the interior source of dispositionism, but also in precisely what those
dispositions are generally assumed to be.686 That second overlap, like the first,
is no coincidence, a claim we bolster in other work.68 7 For now, it is sufficient
to state that the typical assumptions of economic models regarding what
people's precise dispositions are both reflect and reinforce common lay intui
tions. Moreover, those dispositions are easily presumed, and difficult to dis
prove, given that the shared pre-theoretic axioms have little or no place for
situation. In other words, the presumption that our interiors are driven primarily
by thinking, preferring, and acting make it difficult to understand how some
thing other than self-interested goals are behind our behaviors and difficult to
understand how people's "free" choices could be anything but personally-and,
taken together, collectively-satisfying.
B. SCRUTINIZING THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL ACTOR
"The notion that humans abide by normative principles dies hard, espe
cially amongst economists . . . .
"

�

Philip N. Johnson-Laird & Eldar Shafir688

After getting to know the situational character and learning that our assump
tions about how we think and why we act are fundamentally flawed, it is
illuminating to look more closely at the most sophisticated justifications thus far
offered for the unrealistic dispositionism of economics and legal economics.
Doing so suggests that there is, in fact, no compelling justification.
Stanford economist David Kreps, winner of the prestigious John Bates Clark
Medal, and one of the most respected economists and game theorists in the
business, begins his leading graduate-level text by laying out the basic concepts,
schemas, and purpose of microeconomics.689 His treatment illustrates what
today's top economists are teaching tomorrow's top economists about how to
685. Fiske et aI., supra note 84, at 920.
686. See supra text accompanying note 548 (explaining that economists, like most non-economists
in this culture, typically assume that individuals pursue narrow material ends in self-interested ways).
687. See, e.g., Chen & Hanson, The Illusion of Law, supra note 32; Hanson & Yosifon, The
Situation, supra note 5, at 230-84.
688. Johnson-Laird & Shafir, supra note 88, at 6.
689. He calls them the "basic categories: Actors, behavior, institutions, and equilibrium." KREps,
supra note 664, at 4.
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justify their approach, and the fact that economics, more than any other social
science, defines policy analysis and shapes policy.690
Kreps opens his book by setting forth the basic pre-theoretic axioms of
economics. He explains, for example, that
[i]n the standard approach, behavior always takes the form of constrained
maximization. The actor chooses from some specified set of options, selecting
the option that maximizes some objective function. In orthodox theory, consum
ers have preferences that are represented by a utility function, and they choose
in a way that maximizes their utility . . . . 691

On this view, nothing inside the model other than preferences influences
people's behavior,692 and any action reflects a utility maximizing choice among
options. In other words, the standard economic approach assumes that people
are both rational and dispositional actors. Thus, Kreps begins by providing the
basic economic account of human behavior.693
To his credit, Kreps goes on to admit that people (by whom we suspect he
means "non-economists") often find those assumptions to be counterintuitive or
contrary to their own casual empiricism. He writes:
These models o f consumer . . . behavior typically strike people a s fairly
obnoxious. We don't find consumers strolling down the aisles consulting a
utility function when making their choices . . . . Nonetheless, we will use the
standard model of consumer behavior throughout . . . the book.694

Because of this lack of realism,695 Kreps concedes, it would "behoove" econo
mists to explain "why [they] think such models are useful," a task that he then
takes Up.696
According to Kreps, economists typically rely on one or more of several
defenses. The first defense is that

690. Kreps's description of and justifications for the basic economic approach are fairly conventional
and, unsurprisingly, they resemble the descriptions and justifications provided by legal economists for
their approach. See supra text accompanying note 664.
69 1 . KREPS, supra note 664, at 4.
692. The only allowance made for the role of situation is in recognizing the exogenous (that is,
outside the model and unexamined) constraints of limited budget and limited set of available options.
693. See supra text accompanying note 664.
694. KREPS, supra note 664, at 4.
695. Kreps is not any more specific in describing the common criticism of the economist's model.
Perhaps he believes, as seems plausible, that people find obnoxious only the hyper-rational actors
assumed in economics (those who are assumed to "stroll down the aisles of grocery stores of
supermarkets consulting a utility function"), but not the less extreme versions of economists' key
assumptions that people act by choosing among options based on preferences. See id.
696. [d.
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economic models don' t presume that consumers actively maXlITuze some
tangible utility function; the presumption is that consumers act as if this is
what they do. Hence, an important part of the theory of individual behavior
concerns testabLe restrictions of the models we use: what behavior, if ob
served, would clearly falsify our models? If the models are not falsified by our
observations, then our models are good positive models-perhaps not descrip
tive as to why things happen, but good in describing what happens.697

Thus, the first line of defense is to claim that microeconomics theory is not a
normative or causal theory, but a positive theory-that is, a theory concerned
not with describing "why" individuals do what they do, but with predicting
"what" individuals will do. According to Kreps, therefore, so long as the
rational actor theory generates testable predictions, and so long as people do in
fact behave "as if' they are rational actors, then microeconomics is j ustified as a
positive theory, even if the theory does not provide a realistic account of why
people act that way.698
That defense was first offered a half century ago by Milton Friedman in
response to the same basic criticism,699 and it has been refined very little since.
Its longevity notwithstanding, close inspection reveals some flaws in the logic
behind the economists' Maginot Line. First, the "as if' claim, insofar as it is
true, justifies economics only as a positive theory, and not a causal or normative
theory. Thus, it largely fails as a defense against the criticism it is intended to
repel: How does one j ustify premising policy goals and policies on an unrealis
tic positive theory, except perhaps when the basic model is relied upon solely to
help predict the effects of a policy change?7oo We are getting slightly ahead of
ourselves. We should first consider whether economics succeeds even as a
positive theory.
As Kreps partially recognizes, the positive theory has some problems: "Unhap
pily, rather a lot of data has been collected, especially experimentally, which
,,
falsifies the models we will employ. 70 I Presumably, Kreps is here acknowledg
ing the recent work of economic behavioralists on choice biases.702 Still,
according to Kreps, the game may not be over, because economists still have
some moves:

697. [d. at 4-5.
698. See id. at 5 (concluding that "the ultimate test of [a positive economic] theory is its ability to
predict real-world events").
699. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE EcONOMICS passim ( 1 953).
700. Cf Sen, supra note 666, at 254 ("People's behaviour may still correspond to some consistent as
if preference but a numerical representation of the as if preference cannot be interpreted as individual
welfare. In particular, basing normative criteria . . . on these as if preferences poses immense difficul

ties.").
70 1 . KREps, supra note 664, at 5.
702. See generally infra Part I1I.B. 1 .
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At this [economists] fall back to our second line of defense by saying that
such violations may be minor and not amount to much. That is, the standard
models may be good approximations of individual behavior, and the conclu
sions of models built from such approximations may thus be approximately
valid. This requires a leap of faith, but it is still a leap that has some intuitive
0
appea1. 7 3

That seems right. Economists can claim (and, indeed, have long claimedf04 that
the anomalies are trivial in fact or trivial in effect. According to that defense, the
positive economic model is still a reasonable approximation of individual
behavior. As Kreps acknowledges, however, any such assertion is just that: an
assertion. Such a claim will be convincing only to those people willing to make
the "leap of faith" necessary to conclude that the empirically demonstrated
anomalies are minor. 705
Kreps indicates that many people are willing to make such a leap because of
the basic model's "intuitive appeal." That also seems right. After all, the leap
appears to have been made by generations of economists and legal econo
mistS.706 Still, it is an assertion that seems somewhat in tension with the
observation that led him to offer these defenses in the first place-namely that
(non-economistic) people found the basic model counterintuitive.707 And it is an
assertion that seems rarely tested, and sometimes shown to be sorely mistaken
when it is.708

703. KREPS, supra note 664, at 4.
704. See Gary S. Becker, Irrational Behavior and Economic Theory, 70 J. POL. ECON. 1 , 1-2 ( 1 962).
705. Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen are similarly nonplussed by the disjunction between conven
tional economic assumptions and realistic criticisms of those assumptions. See COOTER & ULEN, supra
note 20, at 1 2 ("While these criticisms sometimes have merit, the fact remains that the three basic
economic concepts[, maximization, equilibrium, and efficiency,] have wide application to law.").
706. See Samuel Issacharoff, Can There Be a Behavioral Law and Economics?, 5 1 VAND. L. REV.
1 729, 1 730 ( 1 998) (stating that "virtually all law and economics scholarship exists at the theoretical
plane, turning on formal models rather than observed behavior").
707. See supra text accompanying note 694.
708. For instance, in his recent Nobel Prize lecture, Joseph Stiglitz recounted how the standard
defenses of the perfect-information assumption of neoclassical economics failed to withstand frontal
challenges:
For more than 1 00 years, formal modeling in economics had focused on models in which
information was assumed to be perfect. Of course, everyone recognized that information was
in fact imperfect, but the hope, following Marshall's dictum "Natura non facit saltum," was
that economies in which information was not too imperfect would look very much like
economics in which information was perfect.
Stiglitz, supra note 365, at 461 . "The standard proofs of [several] fundamental theorems of welfare
economics did not even list in their enumerated assumptions those concerning information: the perfect
information assumption was so ingrained it did not have to be explicitly stated. . . . [The market failures
that were taken seriously] were highly circumscribed by assumption." [d. at 466. As it turned out,
however, "[o]ne of the main results of [Stiglitz's] research was to show that this was not true; that even
a small amount of information imperfection could have a profound effect on the nature of the
equilibrium." Id. at 46 1 ; see also id. at 463 ("[E]ven slight departures from the underlying assumption
of perfect information had large consequences."). Stiglitz goes on to suggest what might have
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Alternatively, according to Kreps, the positive model may be salvaged if one
changes the level of abstraction from individual behavior to that of aggregate
behavior. That popular defense, too, has purchase, Kreps admits, only "if we
believe that violations of [the] models . . . cancel out at the level of aggregate
behavior," another leap of faith, and "only if all we care about is aggregate
behavi or."709
Those are two big "only if's," which require another leap of faith that seems
contrary to the best available evidence. The problem is that there have been few
testable predictions at that level of abstraction ("aggregate behavior") that have
in fact been tested in a way that provides much significant support for the basic
economic assumptions. Indeed, to the contrary, the behavioral critiques of the
rationality assumption are not aimed just at individual behavior. They reveal
systematic biases that simply do not cancel out on net.7 I o
It is precisely the assumption that deviations will tend to cancel out that many
economic behavioralists claim to have disproven through empirical testing. That
the Nobel Prize was recently awarded to Daniel Kahneman for his decades of
work identifying tendencies that often do not cancel out bodes ill for the future
of this still-popular defense. Moreover, as we have already summarized, the
evidence that economists do sometimes offer-like downward-sloping demand
curves-is of little value as an empirical defense of the rational actor model
inasmuch as it is consistent with a vast range of possible alternative theories.7 I l
And, finally, even if behavioral deviations from the rational actor model were to
somehow disappear in the aggregate, it is not clear why that should be any more
comforting to economists than the person with one foot in ice and the other foot
in boiling water would be comforted by the observation that, on average, his
feet are warm.
motivated this long-term unwillingness to embrace the realism of imperfect information, suggestions
that resonate with our more general realist critique:
The creators of the neoclassical model, the reigning economic paradigm of the twentieth
century, ignored the warnings of nineteenth-century and still earlier masters about how
information concerns might alter their analyses-perhaps because they could not see how to
embrace them in their seemingly precise models, perhaps because doing so would have led to
uncomfortable conclusions about the efficiency of markets.
Jd. at 46 1 . The appearance of precision, the motive to reach certain conclusions, we believe, has
implications far beyond merely, the question of whether economists take into account the reality that
information is rarely perfect.
709. KREPS, supra note 664, at 5.
7 1 0. See generally Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously J, supra note 1 26 (reviewing
the economic behavioralism literature, which demonstrates systematic biases of human decisionmak
ing); see also Robert A. Prentice, Chicago Man, K-T Man, and the Future of Behavioral Law and
Economics, 56 VAND. L. R EV. 1 663, 1 66-67 (2003) ("A 'mountain of experiments' performed in
psychology and related disciplines, much of it in the 'heuristics and biases' tradition founded by
psychologists Daniel Kahneman andn Amos Tverksy, demonstrate that people tend to deviate systemati
cally from rational norms when they make decisions.").
7 1 1 . See Hanson and Yosifron, The Situation, supra note 5, at 1 98-202 (describing how the
dispositional, profit-maximization assumption about firms is premised ultimately on situational market
forces).
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So, it seems, the first line of defense is either not a defense or has already
fallen, and the second line is driven solely by faith and intuition-a faith and
intuition that not only lacks empirical support but that is contrary to the best
evidence.7 1 2
The weaknesses with those defenses become even more evident when one
looks at how Kreps, in a subsequent section of his book, describes the purpose
of economic theory. The topics are closely related, as Kreps seems to recognize,
given that the defensibility of any theory should depend in part on the purpose
to which it is being put. That the sun behaves as if activated by a rooster's crow
may be a useful positive theory to the farmer for deciding when to rise for
morning chores, but it would be a mistake to use such a theory in attempting to
influence or understand the sun's relationship to the earth. So what is the goal or
purpose of economics? According to Kreps, it is to analyze the efficiency and
specific inefficiencies in various institutional frameworks with a view towards
policy.
One tries to see whether a particular institution can, by tinkering or by drastic
change, be made to yield a socially better outcome; the vague presumption is
that changes that improve the social weal might be made via social and
political processes.7 1 3

Notice Kreps's dramatic, though only implicit, change in emphasis. When
defending microeconomics, Kreps focused neither on the understanding that the
theory provides nor the fact that microeconomics can tell us what people want
or how policy should be made. Indeed, he explicitly distanced economics from
that ambition. His point was that despite the unrealism of economic models,
they might nonetheless provide useful positive theories of behavior. In contrast,
when discussing the purpose of microeconomics, Kreps indicates that its pri
mary use is to improve social welfare through policy prescriptions and to

7 1 2. That leaves the third and "most subtle" "line of defense," which, roughly, is that economists are
able to control the unrealism of economic models:
Even if we know that there are systematic violations of our models by individuals, violations
that do not cancel out, we can still gain insight into questions of interest by studying models
where we assume away those violations. This line of defense is delicate because it requires the
theorist to have a deep understanding of which assumptions drive the conclusions that are
generated by the theory . . . .
KREPS, supra note 664, at 5. The point is indeed subtle, and we are not sure we understand it. But Kreps
seems to be suggesting that economists can and do, in conducting their efficiency analyses, ignore their
models' biases, no matter how major and systematic they may be, and then adjust the conclusions
appropriately in light of what the economists know about the sources and sizes of those biases. That
third defense requires its own leap of faith-specifically, that economists generating conclusions can
and do make such "delicate" adjustments. If ours is an accurate interpretation of Kreps's point, we can
see no reason or evidence to support making such a leap.
7 1 3. Id. at 7.
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,,
provide "a better understanding of economic activity and outcomes. 7 1 4 Thus,
as we have already hinted, Kreps is attempting to justify a prescriptive use of
economics by arguing (with little success) that the rational-actor model may be
useful in making predictions. Put differently, Kreps, like most conventional
economists, is looking to the rooster for an understanding of the sun.
The problem for Kreps-indeed, for all of microeconomics, including law
and economics7 1 s-is that even if economic models did provide valuable
positive predictions, there is no reason to believe that those models will help us
understand ourselves or that the policy prescriptions based on those models will
"improve the social weal." To serve such purposes, we would at least need some
reason to believe that the "as if' theories of economics are based on a realistic
account of the human experience.
It is one thing to use economics to predict that, say, a tax on an activity will
decrease the amount of that activity. Such a positive prediction follows from the
"as if' hypothesis and may indeed be useful to policymakers, just as a rooster's
crow is useful to farmers.716 The problem is that economics is being used to do
much more in the policymaking arena. The notion of choice-based preference
satisfaction (and the welfare maximization presumed to follow from it) provides
the nonnative analytic for determining which activities should be taxed in the
first place. Indeed, it is the basic person schema that forms the foundation for all
of law and policy.717 If the very notion of choice-based preference satisfaction
is a widely shared myth, then on what grounds should policy be built around it?
It is reliance on the presumption of such dispositionism that appears to justify
Kreps's and others' implicit jump from positive analysis to normative analysis,
and it is that very presumption that we have argued is mostly myth, rendering
the jump unjustified.
Our critique comes into clearer focus by examining more closely what Kreps
means by the sort of theory on which policy makers should rely. He asks:
[H]ow does one know when one has learned something from an exercise in
microeconomic theory? The standard acid test is that the theory should be (a)
testable and (b) tested empirically, either in the real world or in the lab. But
many of the models and theories given in this book have not been subjected to
a rigorous empirical test, and some of them may never be. Yet, I maintain,

7 1 4. [d. at 7. Kreps also mentions the purposes of satisfying intellectual curiosity and giving market
participants a better way of making "markets work better for themselves." [d.
7 15. See, e.g., COOTER & ULEN, supra note 19, at 3-4 (describing the use of economics on positive
grounds, "a scientific theory of behavior," and on prescriptive grounds, "a useful normative standard for
evaluating law and policy").
7 1 6. As we have already explained, however, the fact that behavior may comport with the disposi
tional theory does not imply that the behavior is not in fact a consequence of situational constraints. See
generally Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 5.
7 17. See Chen & Hanson, The Illusion of Law, supra note 32, passim; Hanson &Yosifon, The
Situation, supra note 5, at 230--3 36; supra Part I.
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models untested rigorously may still lead to better understanding, through a
process that combines casual empiricism and intuition.
By casual empiricism joined with intuition I mean that the reader should
look at any given model or idea and ask: Based on personal experience and
intuition about how things are, does this make sense? Does it help to put into
perspective things that have been observed? Does it help organize thoughts
about a number of "facts?" When and if so, the exercise of theory construc
tion has been useful. 7 1 8

In short, Kreps's argument seems to be that, although it would be preferable to
have reliable social scientific research to defer to, the fact that economics tends
to rely on far less is not really a concern. And so Kreps, the pure economist,
makes explicit what the work of legal economists evinces: The best we can
hope for from economic models of the sort that dominate policy analysis is not
realism or testable and tested theories of human behavior, but theory anchored,
at bottom, in casual empiricism and intuition and a theory that seems to "make
sense." This is not to say that economists and legal economists do not construct
and test theories. Clearly they do. The point is that those theories emerge from
models about human behavior that are themselves untested (at least by econo
mists).
Thus, as we emphasized at the outset, the place where economists decide to
defer to casual empiricism is precisely the place where many critics claim that
their theory is "obnoxious" and precisely the place where social psychology
applies its focus.7 19 Instead of falling back on casual empiricism or intuition,
social psychology relies on testable hypotheses and testing. What social psychol
ogy through such research teaches-and what we have reviewed throughout this
Article and its companion-is that it is precisely at that point where neither our
intuitions nor our casual empiricism can be trusted. As psychologist Robert
Crowder has expressed the point, intuition can no better teach us about the
actual operation of our minds than it can about the operation of our kidneys. "To
deny this means to accept that the brain is translucent in process whereas other
,,
organs are opaque. Why should this be the case? 720

7 1 8.

KREPS, supra note 664, at 7. Kreps adds, by way of example:

Imagine that you are trying to explain a particular phenomenon with one of two competing
theories. Neither fits the data perfectly, but the first does a somewhat better job according to
standard statistical measures. At the same time, the first theory is built on some hypotheses
about behavior by individuals that are entirely ad hoc, whereas the second is based on a model
of behavior that appeals to your intuition about how people act in this sort of situation. I assert
that trying to decide which model does a better job of "explaining" is not simply a matter of
looking at which fits better statistically. The second model should gain credence because of its
greater face validity, which brings to bear, in an informal sense, other data.

Id. at 8.
7 1 9. See supra text accompanying notes 694.
720. Robert Crowder, The Brain, the Kidney, and the Consciousness (unpublished manuscript, c.
1 990), in Banaji, Implicit A ttitudes, supra note \05, at 1 30. We would go further than Crowder-for
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The situation that economists, like most humans, have failed to take into
account, is, like renal workings, barely observable through the lens of conscious
ness, intuition, or casual empiricism. And so it is that both the interior and
exterior situations combine to lead us toward the fundamental attribution error,
to see relatively weak dispositions, and to overlook the more powerful situation.
At bottom, despite economists' claims and aspirations to be social scientific,
their work is based on little more than faith and unreliable intuitions, motives,
and situation. Our best social science tells us not to trust our intuitions as Kreps
urges, but to be suspicious of them. What "makes sense" to us is too often
demonstrably wrong. Economics, while claiming to be the hardest of social
sciences is, at its core, among the softest. Its pre-theoretic axioms are little more
than the appealing products of our constructed perceptions. And, as we argue in
other work, the success of economics is partially the result of the fact that many
people share those intuitions and readily dismiss or disregard more reliable, but
less self-affirming or system-affirming, findings of social psychology. 721
Let us belabor the point with one more metaphor. It is as if economists are
advising pilots flying in poor visibility to ignore altimeters that warn of rapid
descent and to rely instead on intuition about direction and trajectory. Unfortu
nately, that practice is the tragic inclination of many unseasoned pilots. The
right advice, of course, is for pilots to disregard intuition and fly their aircraft
based on scientific instrumentation. Thus, while economists and legal econo
mists urge us to abide by our shared vertigoes, critical realism urges that we
recognize, understand, and strive to counteract our intuitive but vertiginous
dispositionism.
C. FIVE TYPES OF INADEQUATE "REALISM"
"[Tlhe profession of economics is not lacking in the instinct of self
preservation. The other bear sees in the threat to her cubs the ultimate threat
to the survival of her kind. She reacts with angry venom. Nothing is more
likely to produce a similar reaction from defenders of the conventional
economic wisdom than an attack on the edifice which now rationalizes the
importance ofproduction and the urgency of consumer need.
The parallel with maternal instinct is important, for the defense of the
present value system . . . is largely intuitive. Few economists in recent years
can have escaped some uneasiness . . . . That uneasiness has reflected the
crucial weakness of the literature on this point. "
- John Kenneth Galbraith722

unlike our kidneys, our mind may be sending us misleading signals and may itself be subject to
distorting motivations and manipulations.
72 1 . See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 5; Benforado, Hanson & Yosifon, Broken
Scales, supra note 54.
722. GALBRAITH, supra note 662, at 2-3.
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In response to mounting criticism, legal economists, following the lead of a
burgeoning camp of economists, have gradually sought to portray their models
as based on reasonably realistic accounts of human actors.723 Responses range
from efforts to minimize the problem of unrealism by denying that the model of
humanity in conventional economic analysis is in fact terribly unreal, to paying
lip service to the problem but otherwise ignoring it, to more elaborate efforts
that involve pursuing the limits of the rational actor model as a research agenda.
All of these approaches, however, share a basic, and often deep, commitment to
the basic law and economics paradigm. They countenance only as much "real
ism" as their authors believe the paradigm can withstand.
1 . Counterfeit Realism
Some of Richard Posner's writings exemplify the minimalist version of legal
economists' response to the realism challenge. Posner denies that law and
economics is as unreal or reductionist as its critics contend. In his view,
[f]ar from being reductionist, as its detractors believe . . . . [the project of law
and economics] is not to reduce human behavior to some biological propen
sity, some faculty of reason, let alone to prove that deep within us, pulling the
strings, is a nasty little "economic man." It is to construct and test models of
human behavior for the purpose of predicting and (where appropriate) control
ling that behavior. Economics imagines the individual not as "economic
man," but as . . . one who bases decisions not on sunk costs-these he treats
as bygones ("Don' t cry over spilt milk")-but on the costs to be incurred and
the benefits to be reaped from alternative courses of action that remain open.
The individual imagined by economics is not committed to any narrow, selfish
goal such as pecuniary wealth maximazation. Nothing in economics pre
scribes an individual 's goals. But whatever his goal or goals, some or for that
matter all of which may be altruistic, he is assumed to pursue them in a
forward-looking fashion by comparing the opportunities open to him when he
724
must choose.

Posner's point here seems to be that law and economics is based not on a
caricatured and reductive rational actor model, but on a far more realistic and
flexible model of humanity-one that allows for virtually any goal. Those
familiar with much law and economics scholarship may be scratching their
heads. Posner has often celebrated the reductionism of economic analysis725_

723. See, e.g., W. KIp VISCUSI, SMOKE AND MIRRORS: MAKING THE RISKY DECISION ( 1 992); see also

Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously II, supra note 1 32, at 1 548-5 1 . The criticism is
actually an old one, but only recently has it built up enough weight and legitimacy to get much attention
from the legal economists themselves.
724. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 16 ( 1 995).
725 . See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 16

(3d ed. 1 986) ("[RJationality may
be a reductionist notion, but reductionism is inherent in scientific inquiry."); POSNER, supra note 1 8, at
1 7- 1 8 ("The reader who lacks previous acquaintance with economics may be troubled by what appear
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almost as frequently as he has assumed that wealth or some similarly "narrow"
and "selfish" goal is at the bottom of human decision-making,726 and that other
goals or motivators, such as "morality" should play no role in judicial deci
sions.727 It was Posner, after all, who based his positive theory of the common
,,
law on "wealth maximization, 728 and who informed readers that economic
theory is "committed to" the assumptions "that people seek to advance their
,,
self-interest and do so rationally. 729 And he is not alone. Contrary to Posner's
claim in the block quote above, "[t]he individual imagined by economics" is in
fact virtually always "committed to a[] narrow" goal, almost always a "selfish"
,,
goal, and usually that of "pecuniary wealth maximization. 73o
Posner thus responds to the realist critique by denying aspects of his theory
that he sometimes embraces, even celebrates. But his denial is in the form of
assertions, not evidence-assertions about what law and economics could be,
rather than about what it is. He takes refuge in the (largely unrealized) potential
of law and economics to be more realistic.73 I So it is that he claims that
"[n]othing in economics prescribes an individual's goals," instead of claiming,
as he could not, that legal economists are, in practice, ecumenical in modeling a
vast range of possible human goals.732 So it is that he asserts that the project of
law and economics is not "to prove that deep within us, pulling the strings, is a
nasty little 'economic man,''' instead of asserting, as he could not, that the little
monster does not figure prominently in most of the analyses that legal econo
mists conduct, and from which they generate their policy prescriptions.733

to be severely unrealistic assumptions that underlie economic theory. . . . But abstraction is of the
essence of scientific inquiry, and economics aspires to be scientific."). See generally Posner, supra note
4 (responding to Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 64).
726. See, e.g., RICHARD A . POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE ( 1 98 1 ) (explicating Posner's theory
that the goal of "wealth maximization" best explains the development of the common law).
727. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 1 07-44
( 1 999).
728. See POSNER, supra note 1 8, passim.
729. Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335, 343
( 1 974).
730. See, e.g. , supra text accompanying notes 690-97 (quoting economist David Kreps's admissions
regarding the unrealistic nature of conventional economic analysis).
73 1 . A "real" account of law and economics, taken generally, would never claim that the field
existed simply to "construct and test models of human behavior for the purpose of predicting . . . that
behavior." See supra text accompanying note 724. There are, as we have seen, social sciences devoted
to that purpose-though Posner and other legal economists have routinely disregarded or disparaged
them. See supra text accompanying note 587. In any event, law and economics has not been such a
field.
732. See W. Bradley Wendel, Mixed Signals: Rational-Choice Theories of Social Norms and the
Pragmatics of Explanation, 77 IND. LJ. 1 3 (2002) ("The economic mode of analysis has an almost
pathological aversion to explanations that appeal to values, commitments, loyalties, relationships, or
emotions.").
733. See DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF
ApPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 18 (1994); Gregory S. Crespi, Does the Chicago School Need to
Expand its Curriculum?, 22 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 149, 1 50-5 1 ( 1 997). See generally A. MITCHELL
POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 1 0 (2d ed. 1989).
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We are taking the trouble to lay out Posner's largely nonresponsive response
emphasizing what law and economics could do rather than what law and
economics typically does-because this type of defense is extremely com
mon.734 Yet even the potential version of law and economics, which Posner and
other legal economists believe immunizes the entire approach, is profoundly
unrealistic.735 Posner, for example, is willing to accept that people might be
motivated by goals other than wealth maximization-such as altruism.736 But
he nevertheless maintains his commitment to the view that whatever the chosen
goal, it is pursued in a prototypically rational way, with costs and benefits
balanced in a forward-looking maximizing manner.737 And, of course, beneath
this assumption is an unstated axiom that it is always one or more personally
held goals-our dispositions-that move us. This, too, is a common response.
734. As Gary Becker highlighted in his Nobel lecture, rationality "assumes that individuals maxi
mize welfare as they conceive it, whether they be selfish, altruistic, loyal, spiteful, or masochistic."
GARY BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES 1 39 ( 1 996). Becker is not alone among Nobel Laureates to
emphasize the point. See, e.g., KENNETH ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 17 ( 1 974) ("Rationality,
after all, has to do with means and ends and their relation. It does not specify what the ends are.").
Moreover, "[t] here is no general principle that prevents the creation of an economic theory based on
other hypotheses than that of rationality. . . . [A]ny coherent theory of reactions to the stimuli
appropriate in an economic context . . . could in principle lead to a theory of the economy." Jolls,
Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 64, at 1478 n. 1 3 (citing Kenneth J. Arrow, Rationality of Self and Others
in an Economic System, in RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY 201 ,
202 (Robin M . Hogarth & Melvin W. Reder eds., 1 987».
735. Moreover, it risks sacrificing one of the core values of legal economists-namely that their
theories be falsifiable, and thus amenable to social scientific methodologies. See H anson, Reyes, &
Schlanger, supra note 43.
736. "Altruism" is a popular concept for economists to tum to when their rational maximizing model
is challenged. We suspect that "altruism" is so frequently raised because it appears to be on the opposite
end of the relevant spectrum from "self-interest," suggesting that economists are entirely open-minded
about possible "rational" motivations. For a couple of reasons, however, that appearance is, particularly
as economists define "altruism," an illusion. Altruism is typically treated as motivated ultimately by
some form of self-interest. Thus, the underlying motive never changes, just its manifestation. See Lynn
A. Stout, Judges As Altruistic Hierarchs, 43 W M . & MARY L. REv. 1 605, 1 6 1 0 n. 1 7 ("It is something of
a standard move for rational choice theorists to suggest that if people behave altruistically this must
mean that they get pleasure (utility) from helping others, so altruism remains consistent with self
interest. This move has a tautological flavor: it presumes that people are selfish and so anything they do,
they must do to make themselves better off."); see, e.g. , Posner, supra note 4, at 1 557 ("All that is
required to understand altruism as a form of rational self-interest is the assumption of interdependent
utilities."). The beauty of "altruism" as an acceptable, rational motive is that it renders explicable
behavior that otherwise seems to contradict narrower models of rational action. Altruism, thus under
stood, is an escape hatch for hard-core rationalists. But it also raises significant questions about the
falsifiability of those models, suggesting that the hard-core rationalists are not hard-core social
scientists. See Jolls, Sunstein, & Thaler, supra note 64, at 1 488-89; cf Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools:
A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 3 17, 326-44
( 1 977). A second problem with the altruism out is that it maintains the focus on dispositions, a point to
which we'll return.
737. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TEx. L. REV. 757, 761 ( 1 974)
("The basis of an economic approach to law is the assumption that the people involved with the legal
system act as rational maximizers of their satisfactions."); Richard A. Posner, Values and Conse
quences: An Introduction to Economic Analysis of Law, in CHICAGO LEcruRES IN LAW AND ECONOMICS

189, 191 (Eric A. Posner ed., 2000) ("Most economic analysis consists of tracing out the consequences
of assuming that people are more or less rational in their social interactions.").
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Indeed, it may be one of the few responses available to those who, like legal
,,
economists, are committed to "rational actor 738 or "rational choice" models.739
Although it is certainly realistic to acknowledge that people may have
motives other than wealth maximization, it is not realistic to leave unexamined
and unchallenged the assumption that those ends are pursued by goal
maximizing, fully autonomous, forward-directed, rational actors. Who, for ex
ample, is this "man" who suffers no pause over spilled milk, if not the
,,
"economic man? 740 The colloquialism is itself a signal of the human tendency
to be influenced by sunk costs, a tendency that has been documented as
systematic by social psychologists.74 1 Posner's denial of realism is belied by the
fact that even his account of what law and economics could be simply ignores
much of what is in the human experience. Posner makes no serious attempt to
begin legal-economic analysis with a realistic depiction of how human beings
think and behave. As we have demonstrated, when one begins to look systemati
cally at broad ranges of what social science has taught us about humanity, the
conventional law and economics model's unrealism is revealed as severe in
almost every aspect.
Clinging to a demonstrably unrealistic model of the human actor, Posner
nonetheless goes on to assert that law and economics is comfortable with the
realities of the human mind:

738. See infra Part I.C . I (describing the rational-actor assumption and its significance).
739. The term "rational choice" assumes a dispositional causal attribution for an actor's behavior.
Indeed, the inability to identify a maximand or tractable number of maximands has often delayed the
application of rational choice models to certain actors. See Robert D. Cooter, The Objectives of Private
and Public Judges, 4 1 PuB. CHOICE 1 07, 1 07 ( 1 983) ("[E]conomists have not had much success in
creating a theory to explain the objectives of public judges."); David A. Skeel, Jr., Public Choice and
the Future of Public-Choice-Influ enced Legal Scholarship, 50 VAND. L. REV. 647, 653 n. 1 9 ( 1 997)
(reviewing MAXWELL L. STEARNS, PuBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW: READINGS AND COMMENTARY ( 1 997))
("Public choice theorists have had far more difficulty modeling . . . judges' behavior, as compared to
. . . private economic actors, due to the absence of a compelling theory as to what . . . judges
maximize."). That hurdle, however, has not stopped the most resolute economic "modelers." See, e.g.,
Cooter, supra (arguing that judges seek to maximize their prestige among litigants and lawyers);
Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3
SUP. CT. ECON. REv. I ( 1 993) (indicating that judges self-interestedly pursue numerous ends, including
their reputations, prestige, and leisure). And, unsurprisingly, "most rational choice analysis of the
judiciary rests implicitly on the assumption that judges and other people look out only for their own
interests, narrowly defined." Stout, supra note 736, at 1610 n.17.
740. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 729, at 343 ("The economic theory [of regulation] is committed to
the strong assumptions of economic theory generally, notably that people seek to advance their
self-interest and do so rationally. . . . The economist [unlike the non-economist] is reluctant to accept
. . . . [the distinction] between a profit foregone and a loss incurred-the former is a cost too, indeed the
same kind of cost."); POSNER, supra note 1 8, at 7-8 (describing the rational actor as one who ignores
sunk costs).
74 1 . E.g. , Jolls, Sunstein, & Thaler, supra note 64, at 1489-93. In light of such evidence, Posner has
very recently revamped his "rational actor model" to "predict" this phenomenon-the absence of which
he once indicated was the defining feature of that rational actor model. POSNER, supra note 36 1 , at
257-58.
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Realistic about means as well as ends, economics does not depend on the idea
that human beings are effortless and infallible calculators. A market may
behave rationally, and hence the economic model of human behavior apply to
it, even if most of the individual buyers (or buys) are irrational. Irrational
purchase decisions are likely to be random and hence cancel each other out,
leaving the average behavior of the market to be determined by the minority
4
of rational buyers (or purchases).7 2

While Posner begins here by stating that the economic approach is "realistic"
about ends and means, what he actually argues is that economics does not
"depend" on realistic assumptions about human beings. Posner's point is that
economic theory can predict downward-sloping demand curves even if "most"
people are not rational. In other words, because price increases do lead to
quantity decreases in the number of products purchased by consumers, as basic
economic models predict, Posner suggests that his reliance on the economic
model is fully vindicated, as is his dismissal of other realities that his approach
ignores. In a world where consumer behavior does map a downward-sloping
demand curve, legal economists may, according to this view, feel confident
disregarding factors other than conventional "choice" variables, such as price,
that might influence consumer behavior.
But this is a non sequitur. No one is claiming that the problem with law and
economics is its inability to predict a downward-sloping demand curve. Neither
do critics argue that more realistic views of human behavior actually predict
upward sloping demand-curves. Downward-sloping demand curves are per
fectly consistent with numerous consumer models ;743 they are neither the test of
realism, nor the issue under debate.744 Ultimately, Posner fall s back on the

742. POSNER, supra note 725, at 1 6-17.
743. See, e.g., Dan Ariely, George Loewenstein, & Drazan Prelec, Coherent Arbitrariness: Stable
Demand Curves Without Stable Preferences, 1 1 8 Q.J. ECON. 73-106 (2003) (demonstrating how the
illusion of stable, ordered preferences can be created with arbitrary anchors, and considering the effects
of that possibility for conventional economic assumptions); Gary Becker, Irrational Behavior and
Economic Theory, 70 1. POL. EcON. 1 , 4 (showing that "negatively inclined market demand curves result
not so much from rational behavior per se as from a general principle which includes a wide class of
irrational behavior as well"). For discussions of those insights for policy purposes, see Jon D. Hanson
& Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regula
tion, 1 07 YALE L.J. 1 1 63, 1 2 1 9 n.254 (1998); Jolls, Sunstein, & Thaler, supra note 64, at 1481-82;
Loewenstein, supra note 573, at 2 1 2 ("Sensitivity to price and other costs and benefits is a prediction of
purely rational theories of addiction, but almost any decision-theoretic model of addiction, including [a
visceral account of addiction], would predict responsiveness to price.").
744. Posner emphasizes in a recent book that, although Gary Becker did show that a downwardsloping demand curve is not evidence that people are behaving as rational actors, Becker
did not suggest that most consumers are irrational . . . or that well-attested economic phenom
ena other than the downward-sloping market demand curve, such as the tendency of the prices
of the same good to be equalized, could be explained without assuming rationality. Buyers do
not in fact choose randomly. Rationality is the only reasonable explanation for their reactions
to changes in relative prices.
POSNER, supra

note 36 1 , at 26 1 . Posner misses the point. First, Becker did not set out to show that
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claim that the rational-actor construct is intended, not as a realistic model of
human behavior, but as a model whose legitimacy rests in its ability to predict
human behavior.745 His assumption that people often behave as if they are
rational actors is, despite the absence of compelling empirical evidence in
support of that belief,746 enough for Posner and most other economists.747 But
even if the rational actor model did generate accurate predictions of human
behavior, the fact that that model is premised on demonstrably unrealistic
assumptions should cut against the wisdom of making it the basic framework
through which to analyze law, not in favor of it. That the sun rises as if the
rooster's crow released it from the horizon may be a useful positive theory for
deciding when to awaken; but if the purpose is one of "predicting and (where
,,
appropriate) controlling 748 the sun's behavior, one would do well to forget the
rooster and to begin with a more realistic account of celestial dynamics.
In sum, although they claim that economics is committed to realism, Posner
and many scholars applying his basic approach only pretend to be sensitive to

consumers are irrational; he would have been unjustified in claiming as much, given that his was a
theoretical argument. What Becker did show is that the key piece of evidence that Posner and other
economists have relied on as proof of the rationality of consumers does not, in fact, provide such a
demonstration. As Becker explained, a vast range of (non-rational) models are consistent with downward
sloping demand curves, including even the extreme model in which people make purchases randomly.
But no scholar has claimed, as Posner seems to suggest, that people behave totally randomly. And
again, we have yet to see any scholar propose a model that would predict upward-sloping demand
curves. Posner is thus knocking down a straw man. The point is that downward-sloping demand curves
reveal very little about what moves consumers, and Posner offers little else by way of evidence to
suggest that the rational actor model has had much predictive success.
Similarly, the fact that Becker said nothing explicitly about "the tendency of the prices of the same
good to be equalized," see id., is no help to Posner. First, we are not sure that Becker's insight about
downward-sloping demand curves does not apply as well to the tendency for prices of the same good to
be equalized. The fact that people have limited resources and will not buy as many of the higher-priced
versions of the same good, even if they make their purchases randomly, may itself lead sellers to push
prices toward equality. Second, we again know of no one who has argued that their model of human
behavior predicts that the prices of the same good should tend toward vast disparities. Indeed, we
cannot even imagine what such a model would look like.
Couple all that with the vast amount of evidence indicating that people do not behave according to
the rational actor model and the justification for maintaining the model appears to lie in something
other than the logic of the argument itself can express.
Finally, if all that economists mean by "rational" is that a person about to buy a widget will choose
the lower priced of two otherwise identical widgets, then we hereby accept the claim that people are,
other things (including the situation) equal, rational. But by so describing humanity we would not have
described much that is meaningful about them, and we would hardly have provided a useful theory of
the human animal for making or reforming (or even just explaining) law.
745. POSNER, supra note 36 1 , at 263 (Although '''economic man' is unrecognizable in real life," "a
psychologically realistic picture of the average person . . . . has methodological problems. In theory
making, descriptive accuracy is purchased at a sacrifice of predictive power.").
746. Cf Banaji, Implicit Attitudes, supra note 1 05, at 1 3 1 ("The stronger the assumption that a
concept has already earned admission to the mansion of science, the lower may be the demand to
immediately prove just what the particular procedure and construct it presumably captures really
predict.").
747. See supra text accompanying notes 688-72 1 .
748. See supra text accompanying note 725.
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realism in order to justify ignoring it. He is engaging in what we describe as
countetfeit realism; it is both token and false.749

2. Defensive Realism
Defensive realists, in contrast to counterfeit realists, accept the notion that
more accurate descriptions of human behavior exist, but they nevertheless resist
the implication that the law and economics approach should therefore be
significantly altered. The work of Jennifer Arlen exemplifies this relatively
recent tendency of legal economists to acknowledge the discoveries of social
psychologists with one hand even as they sweep away its significance with the
other.750 Arlen, for example, agrees that
[c]onventional law and economics scholars must take behavioral research into
account in analyzing legal issues, particularly in analyzing the merits of
normative policy prescriptions derived from standard economic theory. The
growing body of literature that enriches conventional law and economics in
this way is an exciting development. 75 1

But Arlen quickly marginalizes the potential implications of behavioral re
search for conventional law and economics. Her treatment, like that of many
other legal economists, appears to reveal defensiveness more than it does
"excitement" about the implications of behavioralism. She examines three
salient biases identified by behavioralists-the endowment effect, the optimism
bias, and the "fairness" preference-and indicates how "real world forces . . .
might cause these biases to be weaker [in real life] than they appear to be in the
,,
laboratory. 752 Arlen further emphasizes that experts, and lawyers in particular,
may be able to "reduce" people's tendency to fall prey to the illogical behav
ioral patterns mapped by the realist critics of law and economics. And then she
concludes with the observation that a theory that assumes the presence of
certain central specific findings of behavioralists "cannot yield clear normative
,,
policy implications any more than can conventional law and economics. 753
Re-examining the well-known Cornell coffee mug experiment, for example,
Arlen argues that the implications of the "endowment effect" which that study
appears to have demonstrated, may not be as important to legal analysis as
economic behavioralists have proposed.754 She points out that the endowment

749. Posner deserves credit, though, for at least responding to the critique that law and economics is
based fundamentally on unrealistic assumptions about the human actor. The more common response
has, until recently, largely been to ignore such criticisms.
750. Jennifer Arlen, Comment: The Future of Behavioral Economic Analysis of Law, 5 1 VAND. L.
REV. 1 765 (1998).
75 1 . Id. at 1 787.
752. Id. at 1 770.
753. Id. at 1 780.
754. See supra notes 1 43-46 and accompanying text; Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism
Seriously I, supra note 1 26, at 674-75 (reviewing experiments).

1 60

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 93: 1

effect has not been strong when subjects receive, not a mug, but only a fungible
token that may be redeemed for an assigned value. Most commercial transac
tions, she notes, involve currency that is more similar to tokens than coffee
mugs. Furthermore, the endowment effect appears to vanish when people "do
not actually possess the commodity at the time they are asked to trade it, but
,,
possess only the promise of the commodity. 755
Arlen argues that the influence of the "optimism bias" is similarly variable,
and would not, without more specification, justify additional regulatory interven
tion.756 People overestimate the risk of being hit by lightning, she argues, but
may underestimate "a whole category of risk, such as the risk of product defects
,,
when some risks in the category are well-publicized and others are not. 757
People also increase their ability to assess risk, Arlen contends, in multiple-play
scenarios-that is, where people repeatedly encounter the same kind of risk.
And again, Arlen suggests that with respect to the legal system, people will rely
on experts and lawyers who have experience and are thus "less likely to
,,
overestimate the merits of their case. 75 8
Arlen also downplays evidence that people exhibit favorable attitudes to
wards "fairness," an attitude that does not seem to comport well with the basic
law and economics approach. The "fairness bias" is revealed in experiments
such as the ultimatum game. Typically, a subject is asked in that experiment to
accept or reject another subject's proposed split of a given sum of money. If the
first subject accepts the split they both pocket the money according to their
agreement. If the subject rejects the split, neither party takes home anything. In
such experiments subjects regularly reject inequitable divisions, a result that
does not square easily with the standard conception of the rational actor, who
should be as worried about what the other person gets as she is about spilled
milk. Free money, on this account, is free money.
Arlen again contends that such evidence does not warrant a departure from
the conventional economic approach. Fairness concerns are, she emphasizes,
context-dependent. Indeed, there is "some evidence . . . that people will obey
,,
instructions to ignore fairness concerns. 759 Relatedly, there is no way of
knowing when fairness will be a factor: " [T]he role of fairness concerns . . .
appear[s] to depend on many situation-specific factors such as the background
,,
of the person, the context of the decision, [and] the instructions given . . . . 760
For this reason, it seems doubtful to Arlen that that the situation-specific
755. Arlen, supra note 750, at 1 778-79. She also emphasizes findings that the endowment effect
may not apply if a liability rule rather than a property rule protects the entitlement. ld.
756. The optimism bias refers to the well-documented finding that people tend to think that their
own chances of obtaining a good outcome from a set of circumstances is greater than the chances of
people in general of obtaining a good outcome from the same circumstances. See Hanson and Kysar,
Taking Behavioralism Seriously l, supra note 1 26, at 654-58 (reviewing studies).
757. Arlen, supra note 750, at 1 783.
758. ld. at 1 784.
759. ld. at 1 786.
760. ld. at 1 787.
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consideration of "fairness" will be a helpful concept i n the analysis of law.
Notice that Arlen is not attempting to incorporate social psychology's in
sights, as she claims to want to do. Nor does she ask about how social
psychological findings might undermine assumptions of law and economics or
how those insights might render individuals and institutions subject to forces
that legal economists have never considered. Instead, hers is essentially an
apology for, and defense of, conventional law and economics, which systemati
cally disregards those insights. Thus, she concludes:
[B]ehavioral economic analysis of law is likely to remain as a set of sugges
tions for amending conventional law and economics, together with an associ
ated set of problems that require sustained attention. It is not likely to emerge
as an alternative framework for analyzing legal issues. B ehavioral economic
analysis of law is unlikely to replace conventional law and economics unless
it can formulate a superior model of human behavior suitable for making
normative decisions about optimal legal regimes . . . . 76 1

Like many legal economists, Arlen seems preoccupied with the possibility
that behavioralist insights might be used to "justify additional intervention" by
law into the affairs of the autonomous rational actor that lies at the core of the
legal economist's vision of the person, the economy, and the republic. And it is
a possibility that she seems strongly to oppose. She is by no means unusual in
that regard-dispositionism and related schemas for markets (as preference
satisfying) and regulations (as preference-frustrating and paternalistic) are im
mensely influential in policymaking and among dominant policy theorists
(particularly legal economists).762 Arlen therefore emphasizes that insofar as the
alleged biases exist, they should be understood to bedevil and render untrustwor
thy the decision making of judges, juries, and other potential governmental
intermeddlers.
Samuel Issacharoff has, at times, responded to behavioralism in that same
defensive-realist vein. That is, he is willing to stipulate that people are subject to
specific cognitive biases that are inconsistent, in theory, with the conventional
law and economics mode1. 763 The "self-serving bias," he recognizes, encour
ages "people to integrate information in a fashion most consistent with their
self-interest" which can obstruct, for instance, efficient or wealth-maximizing
settlements of their disputes.764 And other decisional heuristics, Issacharoff
notes, can lead people to act as if they have an aversion "for extreme posi
,,
tions. 765

761 . {d. at 1787-88.
762. See generally Chen & Hanson, The Illusion of Law, supra note 32, at 6-32 (describing some of
the history and effects of the "markets good" and "regulation bad" policy schemas).
763. Issacharoff, supra note 706, at 1735.
764. {d. at 1 738.
765. /d. at 1740.
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Indeed, Issacharoff not only makes these admissions, but he also correctly
places himself among the vanguard of legal scholars advancing behavioralist
insights. He "has actively participated in developing the experimental economic
,,
literature and [has sought] to apply it in the development of legal norms. 766 He
is, by any measure, exceptionally open-minded among legal economists and
among the vanguard of behavioralists in legal academia. Nonetheless, Issacha
roff, like Arlen, is unwilling to relinquish law and economics' basic presump
tions. Before doing so, "there must [first] be a normative theory of " how to
assess" the lessons of behavioral science with respect to social welfare.767
Furthermore, Issacharoff makes clear that theory must comport with the basic
dispositionist axioms of law and economics:
There is no doubt that in order to perfect its models of rational conduct, law
and economics requires a terribly reductionist account of human behavior . . . .
It is certainly the case that the mechanical simplifications of Homo economi
cus strongly caution against most forms of regulatory restraints on the market.
It is further true that the tools of psychology may yet yield a richer understand
ing of how these human wants and desires play out in the institutional setting
of law.
But this cannot possibly translate into a justification for greater constraints
on individual decision making. Bounded rationality should not become the
pretext for the imposition of an overarching regulatory structure on individu
als . . . . [F]undamentally, it would indeed be ironic if greater insight into the
complexity of human decision making became the justification for taking the
8
freedom to decide, even if imperfectly, from those very individuals. 76

Thus Issacharoff, like Arlen, draws the line at any "greater insight into the
complexity of human decision making" that could justify greater intervention
by law into the affairs of autonomous individuals. Arlen and Isaacharoff are, it
seems, more committed to protecting the appearance of a manageable legal
theory than they are to taking seriously the possibility that that theory is itself
deeply threatened by the sort of evidence they are reviewing. Their realism, in
that sense, is defensive.769

766. Id. at 1 73 1 .
767. /d. at 1 736. The point seems to assume, among other things, that ( I ) law and economics
provides such a normative theory, (2) the positive implications of behavioralist findings do not have
prescriptive implications for policy, and (3) any general normative theory of law is not itself under
mined by those findings.
768. Id. at 1745 (footnotes omitted).
769. The key difference between counterfeit realism and defensive realism is that defensive realists,
unlike counterfeit realists, do not claim to be realists in fact. Rather, they seek to justify their
commitment to unrealistic models. In other respects counterfeit realism and defensive realism share
much in common. In both, the conversation about social psychology's implications for the rational
actor model is extremely narrow. Biases and heuristics are singled out and flips are made concerning
their applications in specific doctrinal areas. In a way, this positions behavioralism in a familiar trope of
legal-theoretic dispute, mirroring the contours of the debate witnessed in many of the critical legal
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In the time since Issacharoff posed the critiques and reservations that we have
described above, he and several coauthors have embarked on a project that aims
to cordon off more precisely those areas of legal policy where social psychologi
cal insights should be brought to bear, and beyond which the import of such
insights can and should be passed over in favor of the basic rational actor
model.770 Two other prominent behavioralists, Cass Sunstein and Richard Tha
ler, have been simultaneously advancing a similar project.77 1 Both pieces
conclude, roughly, that social psychology's teachings about human actors should
be taken into account when doing so would: 1) benefit large groups of people
who are prone to non-rationality, and 2) where doing so would not unduly
burden, or limit the freedom of, those who are not so afflicted and actually do
think rationally.772
That formulation is quite appealing as an analytical proposition, but it
reckons with only a small and tractable sample of the lessons of social psychol
ogy and affiliated fields. Issacharoff and his co-authors write as if realism does
not pose a significant challenge to the basic law and economics approach:
[W]e argue that in many cases it is possible to have one's cake and eat it too.
We propose an approach to evaluating paternalistic regulations and doctrines
that we call "asymmetric paternalism." A regulation is asymmetrically paternal
istic if it creates large benefits for those who make errors, while imposing
little or no harm on those who are fully rational. Such regulations are
relatively harmless to those who reliably make decisions in their best interest,
while at the same time advantageous to those making suboptimal choices.773

The explicit goal of this project is to develop a theory that can both respond to
critiques of the conventional rational actor model and also sustain disposition
ism:

studies critiques of law and economics. In any event, it is ironic that this indeterminacy charge is now
employed by legal economists against the newer threat of behavioralism. Part of our larger project is to
show that social psychology is not so indeterminate in its lessons for law. But for now we simply want
to emphasize the shallow level at which the question of realism is evaluated by legal economists
responding to behavioral critiques of their approach.
770. Colin Camerer, Samuel Issacharoff, George Loewenstein, Ted O 'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin,
Regulationfor Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for "Asymmetric Paternalism", l S I
U . PA. L. REv. 1 2 1 1 (2003). For other writings i n which Issacharoff has repeated and extended his call
for a conservative use of the' insights of social psychology in legal analysis, see Samuel Issacharoff,
Behavioral Decision Theory in the Court of Public Opinion, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 67 1 (2002); Samuel
Issacharoff, The Difficult Path from Observation to Prescription, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36 (2002).
77 1 . Professors Sunstein and Thaler have written an article with a very similar purpose, and which
tracks Issacharoff and his colleagues' arguments fairly closely. Both sets of authors apparently
developed the idea independently and at about the same time. See Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H.
Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 159 (2003). We will not
review the Sunstein and Thaler piece here, but we believe that our analysis is appropriate to it no less
than to Issacharoff and his coauthors.
772. Camerer et aI., supra note 770, at 1 2 1 2; Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 77 1 , at 1 162.
773. Camerer et aI., supra note 770, at 1 2 1 2 (footnote omitted).
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[The] approach we term "asymmetric paternalism," reflects trepidations shared
among all of the authors about the use of behavioral research to justify
paternalistic policies. We have two major concerns. First, while research in
behavioral economics documents commons mistakes , those mistakes are typi
cally far from universal, and we worry that paternalistic policies may impose
undue burdens on those people who are behaving rationally in a particular
situation. Second, behavioral economics is in an early stage of development,
and therefore its findings should elicit more caution than those from more
"mature" fields (which are by no means themselves invulnerable to revision).
These and related concerns suggest caution in promoting paternalistic policies
at this stage and lead to our more conservative notion of asymmetric paternal
ism. 774

There are, in our view, several analytic and normative problems with "asym
,,
metric patemalism, 775 but for present purposes we want only to highlight how
strongly it is committed to engaging social psychology's insights in a manner
that leaves the basic dispositionist picture of the human actor in place, unchal
lenged as the central starting place for legal theory. 776
One way that it does so is by beginning with a highly schematic view of
human actors as somehow comprised of two basic categories of people: those
who "make errors" in their own utility analyses, and those who are "fully
rational" in a given situation.777 Those categories are not, in our view, the
fundamental starting places that emerge from the lessons of social psychology.
While it is true that studies focused on narrowly defined "choice biases" show
that some people are more prone to them in narrowly defined choice-contexts
than are others, this, as we have tried to demonstrate in this Article, is just one
774. /d. at 1 2 1 5 . Sunstein and Thaler are similarly explicit about their pre-analytic allegiance: "Our
only qualification is that the general presumption should be in favor of freedom of choice, and that the
presumption should be rejected only when individual choice is demonstrably inconsistent with indi
vidual welfare." Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 77 1 , at 24.
775. Not the least of these problems is framing the debate in terms of paternalism and anti
paternalism. We have not used those terms throughout this Article, reflecting our serious misgivings
regarding the definitions, connotations, and schematic associations of those categories in policy
debates. As we have previously argued, a situationist or critical realist perspective requires a reconceptu
alization of the idea of paternalism. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 5, at 336-40
(grappling with "the paternalism bogeyman").
776. It may be worth highlighting again that, while the "behavioral economics" work that Issacha
roff and his co-authors refer to here might fairly be described as new (indeed, it is new to economists),
social sciences other than economics have long been interested in studying and theorizing about why
humans behave as they do and how they make sense of themselves and their environs. Put differently,
the fields that we are summarizing in this Article seem quite "mature"-at least as compared to law and
economics which, though influential, seems more the boisterous adolescent.
777. Issacharoff and his co-authors simply assert that these are the findings of social psychology that
are relevant to a paternalism inquiry: "Recent developments in the social sciences have provided new
foundations for paternalism. The latest entrant into the paternalism debate comes from the introduction
into legal analysis of developments in behavioral economics. By cataloging a list of common decision
making errors that even highly competent, well-functioning people make in predictable situations, this
research potentially broadens the scope of situations in which paternalistic policies could usefully be
developed." Camerer et aI., supra note 770, at 12 14.
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small part of the situation, and just one aspect of the situational character.778
The absence of evidence of bias in a particular choice context hardly justifies
the conclusion that legal theory can therefore rest easy relying on the conven
tional rational actor model in such contexts. Nor is bias in choice-making the
only relevant situation influencing those who do make "irrational" choices in a
given context. We have argued in this Article that we are all, in virtually all
situations, in incredibly powerful ways influenced by features of our situations
that we do not appreciate.779 There remains an ardent dispositionist presumption

778. See supra Part III.B. 1 .a (describing legal scholars' tendency to focus on "choice biases" in their
efforts to incorporate social psychology into legal analysis).
779. Readers and commentators have occasionally suggested that we have overstated the extent to
which individuals are moved by situation. They point out that roughly one-third of the subjects in
Milgram's first set of experiments, in which "teachers" were told to shock "students" up to 450 volts,
actually declined to do so. They claim that such evidence is in tension with our thesis that people are
situational characters. Some critics go further and suggest that, in light of such dispositionist heroes,
this project should be devoted, not to describing the situational character, but to encouraging people to
be more successful dispositional actors. To those observations, we have several responses.
First, the social psychology experiments, such as Milgram's, do not actually indicate that some
subjects were not significantly influenced by external situation. To begin with, all of the subjects in
Milgram's first experiment "shocked" the "teacher" up to at least 300 volts-a greater shock than most
people would predict they themselves would inflict in such a setting. Moreover, Milgram's experiment
was set up to be a "situation" in which people would not be induced to inflict much harm on the
"students." That is, the design and protocol were intended and predicted to lead most subjects to
"choose" against inflicting significant shocks: after all, there was a fellow subject (with heart trouble!),
screaming and kicking the wall and asking to be set free in the next room. There were, in other words,
extremely strong (and obvious) situational forces encouraging people to not shock or to stop at low
levels. That is what is so amazing about the experiment: it revealed features of the environment that
seemed irrelevant but that were far more powerful than the more visible and seemingly more powerful
features. The fact that some subjects opted to stop shocking between 300 volts and 450 volts doesn't
necessarily prove the strength of their disposition; it may simply reveal the growing force of other
elements of their situation. Put differently, all of the behavior in that experiment is consistent with our
situational account of human behavior-and much of it is inconsistent with. the dominant dispositional
account. (The dispositionist actor should beware Occam's Razor.)
Second, our definition of "situation" is not limited to merely underappreciated or unseen "external"
influences. This is an important point, because some confusion may result from the fact that when
social psychologists were first discovering the power of situation, they were focused on environmental
influences. Advances in social psychology revealing just how mysterious our own interiors are to even
ourselves--dispositionist schemas, notwithstanding-help make clear that our interiors, too, are "situ
ational," as we have defined that term. Thus, even when people behave in ways that seem inconsistent
with the pressures of external forces, that does not imply that they are making "choices" in response to
their "will," conscious thinking, and stable preferences. As we have argued at length, although the
concepts of thinking, preferring, willing, and choosing may give us an affirming story, narrative, or
schema for understanding our behavior and that of others, they are more or less illusory. And that is a
major part of what we mean by "situational."
We have occasionally heard the related objection that we are ignoring evidence that people often do
attribute their behavior to situational forces. For instance, when students perform poorly on an exam,
they are more inclined to attribute the outcome to some situational force ("That test was unfair!") than
they are when they perform well ("I'm a genius!"). We acknowledge that tendency and others like it, as
well as the cultural influences that can make individuals more or less inclined to attribute conduct to
external influences. And we believe those exceptions are important for a number of reasons that we
hope in future work to get to examine. We pay them scant attention here because they do not pose an
exception to dispositionism, as we define that term: The situationist attributions that do sometimes
occur are typically limited to only the most obvious or affirming elements of situation, a fact that itself
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in back of the whole asymmetric-paternalism approach, one that never strays
from the presumption that all people's preferences are more-or-Iess stable and
exogenous to their situations. Even among those who have a hard time ratio
nally pursuing their preferences, the preferences themselves are mostly taken as
given, or are at least not considered a pressing element of the inquiry.
Asymmetric paternalism is a theory designed to evade rather than to grapple
with the evidence suggesting that we are situational characters. In so doing it
reaches conclusions that are largely uncontroversial, and not at all threatening to
our sense of ourselves. It is hard to take issue with the claim that defaults should
be set in a manner that will likely engender the most utility for most, but which
allows for individual opt-outs for those who exercise their rationality and can
determine for themselves that a different arrangement will be better for them
personally. Who's not for that? The approach bears, by its authors' own account,
a striking resemblance to conventional ways of thinking about default rules, to
the way legal economists typically think about default rules, and to how default
rules actually work.780 Issacharoff and his co-authors recognize this and offer it
as evidence of the fact that their approach can contribute to, rather than detract
from, the advance of the basic law and economics approach:
An appealing way to explain how these laws came about [laws embracing
utility maximizing default rules but allowing for mutability by individuals] is
that the law reflects what we are calling asymmetric paternalism and uses it as
a cost-benefit standard. In this sense, asymmetric paternalism complements
the basic law and economics belief that the law tends to move toward efficient
solutions. An attentiveness to minimizing costs to rational actors while maxi
mizing benefits to boundedly rational actors fits well within a richer concep
tion of efficiency. 78 1

Issacharoff and his co-authors went looking for a theory that traditional
antipaternalists, and traditional legal economists, could accept without much
quarrel, and that is exactly what they found. It is no surprise then that their
framework, like those in its intended audience, misses much of the situation and

reveals the otherwise unseen power of our interior situation (such as the role of motivation), and are
often subject to the very same criticisms that we make of the dispositionist default.
All that being said, we do not disagree with those who suggest people should learn how better to
control or determine their own behavior. Our problem is with the assumption that the means to that end
is by continuing to promote dispositionism and ignore the more powerful role of situation. As this
Article should suggest, we believe it is important for individuals (citizens, consumers, lawmakers, legal
theorists, and others) to become far more aware than they are of the extent to which we are all moved
by forces within us and around us that are more or less unseen. Such an understanding will not
transform them from situational characters to dispositional actors; rather, it will reduce the effect of the
dispositionist illusion and give them greater awareness of and control (perhaps even dispositional
control) over their situations.
780. Cf Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 77 1 , at 1 199 ("The argument for libertarian paternalism
seems compelling to us, even obvious.").
78 1 . Camerer et aI., supra note 770, at 1 223.
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promotes a legal-theoretic focus that guarantees not finding it. As Issacharoff
and his coauthors conclude their article: "[Asymmetric paternalism] should
appeal to everyone across the political spectrum and can potentially shift the
debate from one about whether or not paternalism is justified, to one about
whether the benefits of mistake-prevention are larger than the harms imposed on
rational people. The idea is designed to focus debates about paternalism on
,,
these empirical terms. 782 Shifting the debate in this direction, we contend,
entrenches an unrealistic dispositionism more than it offers a response to
evidence critiquing it. These scholars focus the debate on empirical questions
that emerge from a theoretical starting place that is not, we contend, well
steeped in empiricism, much less critical realism.

3. Selective Realism
Another category of response to the realist challenge has been what we call
"selective realism." In this approach scholars employ specific findings from
social psychology to justify specific claims or conclusions, but make no effort to
incorporate a full range of evidence from social psychology, either for the
particular claim they are pursuing or for the basic starting point of their
approach to legal analysis. Selective realism of that sort has already been
adequately described elsewhere.78 3 Given the length of this article already,
therefore, we cannot justify a proportional discussion here. It is, we hope,
sufficient to point out that product liability scholars have long been tapping into
the economic behavioralism literature to make assertions about how well in
formed consumers are. In doing so, they have tended to be quite selective about
what "cognitive biases" they emphasize, depending on whether they have
concluded that consumers overestimate risks or underestimate risks. Essentially,
those scholars still employ the rational actor model, with some selected biases
thrown in.
4. Weak-Form Realism
Other efficiency-oriented scholars have been more willing to get real. Profes
sors Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein, and Richard Thaler, for example, use strands
of psychological research in an approach dubbed "behavioral economics" or
"behavioralism," to "explore the implications of actual (not hypothesized)
,,
human behavior for the law. 784 Although they fall further from the trunk than
782. Id. at 1 254.
783. See, e.g., Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously I, supra note 1 26, at 693-723
(describing and providing examples of selective realism in products liability debate); Hanson & Kysar,
Taking Behavioralism Seriously II, supra note 1 32, at 1548-53 (describing Kip Viscusi's selective
realism in analyzing cigarette markets, smoking, and the need for regulation); Jon D. Hanson &
Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: A Response to Market Maniuplation, 6 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 259, 370-80 (2000) (describing James Henderson and Jeffrey Rachlinski's
selective realism in their critique of enterprise liability).
784. See Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 64, at 1 476. Weak-form realism is distinguished from
selective realism, as we have defined the terms, in that it is not limited to a particular policy question or
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Posner, and the other quasi-realists, they do not fall far from the law and
economics tree. They attempt "to model and predict behavior relevant to law
with the tools of traditional economic analysis, but with more accurate assump
,,
tions about human behavior. 785 They emphasize that their project is "deeply
,,
constructive 786 to the law and economics paradigm: "Behavioral economics is
a form of economics, and our goal is to strengthen the predictive and analytic
,,
power of law and economics, not to undermine it. 787 We describe this as
weak-form realism, currently the most common and fastest growing mode of
psychology-based critical engagement with economics.788
The inadequacy of weak-form realism, though perhaps less acute, has much
in common with the failures of counterfeit realism, defensive realism, and
selective realism. Instead of beginning with a realistic understanding of human
actors, weak-form realists maintain the familiar and affirming dispositionist
actor and engage only "phenomena that have reasonably precise implications
,,
for legal issues. 789 They pick and choose among psychological findings, and
select only those that seem directly applicable to a pre-existing policy debate
within the law and economics paradigm.790 And, in doing so, they operate
according to the same "economics first, realism second," priority rule:
The project of behavioral law and economics . . . is to take the core insights
and successes of economics and build upon them by making more realistic
assumptions about human behavior. We wish to retain the power of the
economist's approach to social science while offering a better description of
the behavior of the agents in society and the economy. 79 1

In other words, phenomena that do not "have reasonably precise implications
for legal issues" or that may threaten "the core insights of economics" (and, we
might add, core conceptions of the human animal) are off the table. So, for
instance, Jo11s, Sunstein, and Thaler maintain the consumer "choice" center-

issue. Weak-fonn realism, in other words, attempts to provide a general theory (a revised law and
economics) to be applied across all settings. Weak-fonn realism, as we will describe, is nonetheless
selective in the sense that it considers only a small fraction of tractable choice biases.
785. /d.
786. [d.
787. /d.
788. For other excellent work adopting what we describe as the weak-fonn realist approach, see
Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality
Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1 05 1 (2000); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The "New "
Law and Psychology: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739
(2000) (arguing that the new approach provides a "more accurate description of human choice than the
law otherwise has available, which in tum should improve both positive and nonnative legal analysis").
789. See lolls, Sunstein, & Thaler, supra note 64, at 148 1 .
790. A s Richard Posner complains i n his defense against weak-fonn realism, "Behavioral economics
is defined by its subject rather than by its method and its subject is merely the set of phenomena that
rational-choice models (or at least the simplest of them) do not explain." POSNER, supra note 36 1 , at
264.
79 1 . lolls, Sunstein, & Thaler, supra note 64, at 1487.
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piece of basic economics, in which consumers are presumed to act disposition
ally to serve their own ends.792 The only difference here is that the consumer's
behavior is "bounded" in ways that influence, in predictable ways, the consum
er's actual decisions. The focus remains on the actor-who is deciding, consum
ing, and judging in accordance with her mostly exogenous dispositions and
preferences. The now-bounded actor is simply plugged into the choice-driven
models of conventional law and economics to yield positive or normative policy
conclusions. In short, realism, in the weak-form variety adopted by Jolls,
Sunstein, and Thaler, is bounded.
5. Strong-Form Realism
A few have gone still further in abandoning the artificiality of conventional
economic modeling. In a set of articles coauthored with Doug Kysar, one of us
has argued that behavioralism should be "taken more seriously" than scholars
had previously allowed. It is not enough to recognize that, say, consumers may
be subject to certain biases in their processing of product information. Rather, a
clear implication of the behavioralist literature is the deeper insight that percep
tions, and even preferences, are manipulable by other actors in the model. That
is, perceptions and preferences are endogenous in the sense that they are subject
to influence by other actors, such as product manufacturers and sellers.793 And,
further, because those actors can influence perceptions and preferences, they
will-indeed, competitive processes require as much. We call that approach

strong-form realism.794

But even that form of realism, as two of its critics highlight, may be
unjustifiably shy in holding onto the law and economic approach that it purports
to challenge. Professors Henderson and Rachlinski assert in the concluding
paragraphs of their critique:
[W]e cannot help but note that although [Hanson & Kysar] claim to have
embraced cognitive psychology and taken it seriously, in truth they hold

792. And that view is common among economic behavioralists. See, e.g., Thomas S. Vlen, Evolu
tion, Human Behavior, and Law: A Response to Owen Jones 's Dunwoody Lecture, 53 FLA. L. REv. 93 1 ,
933-34 (2001 ) ("The central distinguishing contention of this emerging emendation of rational choice
theory is that human beings are imperfectly rational. In the pursuit of their ends people make
systematic, predictable mistakes that the law can take into account in its attempts to regulate human
behavior.").
793. See Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously I, supra note 1 26 (identifying the
problem); Hanson& Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously II, supra note 1 32 (providing market
evidence); Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously III, supra note 786 (discussing possible
solutions); Hanson & Kysar, The Failure, supra note 403.
794. One author has recently lumped Hanson and Kysar's work in with the weak-form behavioralists
and interpreted it as assuming that "irrational behavior" is stable, in the sense that it is insensitive to the
role of context. See Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessi
mism of the New Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 907 (2002). We can only
assume that Professor Mitchell somehow missed those sections of the Hanson and Kysar trilogy that
emphasized "market manipulation."
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closely to a conventional economic analysis of product-related risk. For
example, Hanson and Kysar argue that "manufacturers' manipulative prac
tices may inflate consumers' perceptions of a product's overall desirability,"
and the "consumers' misperception [that this manipulation creates] would
result in inefficient purchases." If consumer preferences are completely con
structed, then what exactly is supposed to be the efficient level of consump
tion? Should the socially optimal demand for soup be measured with the cans
in alphabetical order, or not? On a rainy day, or sunny? With what kind of
music or ambient odors (if any) in the background? In what section of the
store? What should the labels look like? How big are the cans? Risk is no
different. . . . The notion that manufacturers distort consumer risk-perception
assumes that there is some natural and appropriate risk-benefit assessment
from which manufacturers lead consumers astray. If we take seriously the
psychological proposition that all preferences are constructed, then there is no
magical correct level of risk that consumers should endure .
. . . A complete, serious assessment of what cognitive psychology means for
products liability has yet to be undertaken. 795

Although we would challenge portions of their description of Hanson and
Kysar's work,796 we accept their final point that legal scholars have yet to
conduct "a complete . . . assessment" of the implications of cognitive psychol
ogy for law. Current strains in the debate all share an unwillingness to relin
quish a demonstrably unrealistic conception of the human animal and to build
instead from a more realistic foundation. It is to introduce that project-what
we call "critical realism"-that this Article and its companion are largely
directed.
VI. THE S ITUATIONAL CHARACTER 'S SITUATION
Throughout this Article, we have focused on social psychological findings
that reveal the fallacy of the dispositionism that pervades common sense, law,
conventional legal theory, and, as we just reviewed, the dominant theoretic
domains of economics and economic behavioralism. In depicting the situational
character, we have shown how, dispositionist appearances notwithstanding,
much of what moves us is unseen. We have described some of the countless
interior and exterior situational influences that give shape to our sense of our
experience. We have particularly emphasized the interior situational realities
behind our dispositionist charade-the unseen biases in our mind, unseen
knowledge structures, and motivations, and many other aspects of unexamined
and often un-examinable interiors. We have illustrated how our interior situation

795. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Product-Related Risk and Cognitive Biases:
6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 2 1 3, 258 (2000).
796. Among other things, it understates the extent to which Hanson and Kysar challenge the
conventional economic model, overstates the extent to which they argue that preferences are con
structed, and significantly misstates the source of "distortion."
The Shortcomings of Enterprise Liability,
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and behavior can be easily influenced b y exterior situational influences. Indeed,
virtually every experiment in social psychology largely depends upon, and thus
reveals, that manipUlability.
Of course, it is not just the social psychologists in their labs who are
attempting to move us through the situation. As we explained in The Situation ,
the (situational) imperatives of the market, themselves situational imperatives,
provide one common and possibly troubling source of external situational
influence. But there is a lot more to the situation.
A. SEEING IT
And there are other even simpler ways to demonstrate the role of situation,
our fear of it, and our attempt to ignore or downplay its existence. It is not just
that we are by our nature subject to situational influences over our thoughts and
behavior. Before we ever think or behave at all, our lives are already powerfully
shaped by the situation of our births in society. There's a situational character
born every minute. And each is born into a situation that tremendously influ
ences what her life will be like, what opportunities she will have, or not have,
and how she will respond to the opportunities she does have. We are born rich
or poor. We are born "wanted" or "unwanted." We are each born with a
particular set of talents and limits. We are each endowed with our looks, our
brains, and our bodies. We are born first among siblings, last, or somewhere in
between. We may be part of one family or another, one community or another,
and one culture or another. Though perhaps none of those situational parameters
is decisive, taken together they provide an immense influence over our options,
our aspirations, our experiences, our memories, our sense of ourselves, our
sense of what is natural and appropriate, and more. And just as importantly, to
further our picture of the situational character, the situational influences of the
"birth lottery," though in many ways self-evident, remain largely unseen through
our dispositionist lenses.
The power of the birth-lottery belies our dispositionist self-conceptions, and
the dispositionist assumptions at root in so many of our conventional legal and
social theories. For example, there are approximately 240 million Americans
with health insurance, and approximately 40 million without. Those without it
are generally the working poor, who cannot afford to buy private health
insurance and who are often ineligible for state and federal health insurance
programs. Those forty million suffer higher rates of deaths from treatable
diseases than do the rest of us. Those who live in poor neighborhoods attend
schools with far fewer educational resources available than those who live in
wealthy ones, and consequently find themselves on the short end of the achieve
ment gap.797
Those born into an African-American family are three times more likely to
797. See MATIHEW MILLER, THE Two PERCENT SOLUTION 7-1 1 (2003) ("Every free-market fan knows
that you get what you pay for. When the affluent suburb of Scarsdale, New York, pays teachers with a
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find themselves living below the poverty line than are those born into a white
family.79s The average African-American family's net worth is about twelve
percent of the average white family 's net worth?99 And that huge disparity is
not explained by factors like earnings rates, education, or savings rates. soo More
than 25% of of black households have no positve wealth, while just 1 4% of
I
white households are in that situation. so Similarly, those born into single parent
households are three times more likely to find themselves living in poverty than
are those born to two-parent households.s02 Those who happen to be born in
Mississippi are more than twice as likely to find themselves starting off in
poverty than are those lucky enough to be born in Connecticut. S03 And those
who are born into poverty tend to end up far poorer than those born into wealth,
with concomitantly lower levels of overall health, occupational opportunities,
consumption patterns, and life-expectancies.s04 And, of course, all of those
examples assume a person is born in America-itself an assumption with
potentially immense situational consequences.
B. MISSING IT
The evidence is all around us, and one need not have read a single social
psychological experiment to see and understand the power of situation. Even
the deepest dispositionists among us can see this situational elephant in the
corner when it is called to our attention. And yet, we tend to look away and
again see only ourselves and other individuals. Our common, affirming knowl
edge structures and self-conceptions do not take account of those situational
influences and manage to keep us a safe distance from "that comer."
In his recent book The Two Percent Solution, Matthew Miller examines the
problem of what he calls "luck" in American society. As Miller uses the term,
"luck is the shorthand that describes those things that shape our lives that are
entirely outside our control. We' re talking mostly about the pre-birth lottery,
those aspects of a person's experience dictated by the womb from which he or
she happens to emerge."S05 In his chapter "Taking Luck Seriously," Miller

masters degree and five years of teaching more than $60,000, and New York City pays her counterpart
in the 40s, is there really a question about where most of the top talent goes?").
798. See U.S. CENSUS B UREAU, U.S. DEP T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 447 ( l 2 l st ed. 200 1 ).
799. See DALTON CONLEY, B EING BLACK, LIVING IN THE RED: RACE, WEALTH, AND SOCIAL POLICY IN
A MERICA I ( 1 999).
800. See generally id.
801 . See EDWARD N. WOLFF, Top HEAVY: THE INCREASING INEQUALITY OF WEALTH IN AMERICA AND
WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 3 (2002).
802. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 798, at 447.
803. See A STATISTICAL PORTRAIT OF THE UNITED STATES: SOCIAL CONDITIONS AND TRENDS 80 (Mark S.
Litman ed., 1 998).
804. See generally ROBERT M. HAUSER, INTERGENERATIONAL EcONOMIC MOBILITY IN THE UNITED
STATES: MEASURES, DIFFERENTIALS, AND TRENDS (Ctr. For Demography and Ecology, Univ. of Wis.
Madison, CDE Working Paper No. 98- 12, 1 998).
805. MILLER supra note 797, at 70.
'

,
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points out the elephant to two o f the best-known and most effective proselytiz
ing dispositionists, Milton Friedman, the Nobel Laureate in economics, and
William Bennett, the conservative moralist. Miller, in a mind-bogglingly simple
research strategy, simply asked them about it.
Bennett, when asked about the bigger picture, could not easily hide behind
reassuring dispositionist anecdotes. Instead, he just admitted that factors relating
to a person's birth lottery "matter hugely" and that many people don't "exercise
autonomy and make a difference in their own lives . . . because they ' re in
,,
crappy families, crappy schools, crappy neighborhoods. 806
Friedman's response was even more revealing. 807 Friedman, recall, is among
the most influential proponents of the necessary relationship between freedom
and free markets, a view that begins and ends with a deep dispositionism. Even
as a young economist, Friedman was aware of the problem posed by the
situational elephant for the economic theories he advocated. In an early paper,
as Miller describes, Friedman took pains to show that social inequality may be
not just the result of "natural endowments or inherited wealth," but also the
byproduct of individual work and spending habits:
[O]ne cannot rule out the possibility that a large part of the existing inequality
of wealth can be regarded as produced by men to satisfy their tastes and
preferences . . . [that] the link between differences in natural endowment or
inherited wealth and the realized distribution of income is less direct and
simple than is generally supposed . . . . [This analysis] has implications for
normative judgments about the distribution of income and the arrangements
producing it-inequalities resulting from deliberate decisions . . . clearly raise
very different normative issues than do inequalities imposed on individuals
808
from the outside.

Even were Friedman correct that we cannot "rule out the possibility" that
individual choice accounts for disparities in poverty,809 that would not suggest
that we should therefore make that possibility the cornerstone assumption in our
theories. Rather it should counsel a further look at just how "possible" this is,
and how possible it is that "outside" influences, such as inherited wealth, are
actually hugely important. And of course, as we have been arguing in this
Article, the fact that wealth effects might be attributable to individual choices
and behaviors does not support the dispositionist conclusions that Friedman
claims to deduce from them.
In any event, we are here interested in how scholars and policymakers, even

S06. See id. at S4.
S07. See id. at 69-92.
SOS. See id. at 73 (quoting Milton Friedman, Chance, Choice and the Distribution of Income, 61 J.
POL. ECON. 277, 290 ( 1 953) (third alteration in original».
S09. More recent scholarship, by the way, suggests that we can rule out that possibility. See, e.g. ,
CONLEY, supra note 799.
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those with no reason to encounter the findings of social psychology, have
managed to miss some seemingly obvious elements of "the situation." Follow
ing that early article, Friedman spent the next several decades of his career
without ever seriously questioning his early argument. In 1 962's Capitalism and
Freedom, however, he did supplement it, arguing that there was no more reason
to question a landholder's inheritance of property than there was to question a
singer's inheritance of her voice. And based on that observation, Friedman
concluded that "[m]ost differences of status or position or wealth can be
regarded as the product of chance at a far enough remove."S I O
Sensing that there still seemed to be a giant elephant in the room, Miller
pointed out to Friedman that the cases of the lucky property owner and the
lucky vocalist do not nullify the problem of situational luck. Instead, they
exemplify the ubiquity of the problem. Microphone in hand, Miller pushed
Friedman on the point. Friedman revealed that even after spending most of his
Nobel-Prize winning career largely ignoring it, he could still see, when it was
highlighted in this way, that indeed luck is a powerful situational influence on
individuals. "Society may want to do something about luck," Friedman told
Miller, as if he had just seen the elephant for the first time. "You' ve asked a very
hard question. I don't know that I have the simple answer to it," Friedman
conceded to Miller. S I I
Yet in book after book and article after article over the course of decades,
Friedman's solution to this "very hard question" has been to paper over it.
Friedman is like the rest of us. Even the situation that is in our midst and that
should be obvious to us, the most basic situational influences over our lives, are
easily missed or explained away. Although situational forces can be in plain
view, a person, armed with reassuring knowledge structures, can spend a
lifetime not seeing them. It bears noting that perhaps no American intellectual
has had as much influence over American policy over the last half-century as
Milton Friedman has.s l 2
But, there with Miller i n his den, Friedman had a few more moves to make,
which further reveal the lengths to which many of us will go to ignore powerful
situational influences for the sake of maintaining a simpler, more reassuring
dispositionism. Regarding the ubiquity of luck and its importance as a social
factor, Friedman regrouped and retorted: "See, the question is, what you're
really talking about, is determinism versus free will": "But you can't really
justify free will. . . . . You can keep going back. There's no first cause. Nobody
has ever solved the argument of determinism versus free will. And you and I

8 10. See MILLER, supra note 797, at 75 (quoting M ILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM
( 1 962» .
8 1 1 . ld. at 85.
8 1 2. For a review of Friedman's career and influence, see Chen & Hanson, The Illusion of Law,
supra note 32, at 14-23; see also George W. Bush, Remarks in a Tribute to Milton Friedman, 38
WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc:. 782 (May 9, 2002) (proclaiming that Friedman's "vision has changed
America, and it is changing the world").
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aren't going to do so either."s l 3 Consciously or not, Friedman sought to escape
from the question of luck by jumping down an unrelated slippery slope. Miller
was not claiming, nor would we, that luck determines outcomes; instead, he was
pointing out that luck, as William Bennett put it, "matters hugely."s I 4 The
question still pending for Friedman was, if you can't say that free will is at the
bottom of all relevant human behavior, then why assume it is and why assume
that situation is all but totally irrelevant? Put another way, if there is an
unsolvable philosophical conundrum afoot, or a problem of empirical uncer
tainty, then what wisdom is there in shrugging our shoulders and assuming that
it can be left out of our fundamental theories altogether? There are numerous
reasons why individuals tend to see situationist arguments as determinist claims.
One that bears highlighting here is simply that our general inability to see
situation renders us unable to see either its effects or how it and its effects might
be usefully altered. Situation is treated as given, fixed, and natural. From that
perspective, situationist arguments look like claims that we are moved by forces
over which we have no control-as individuals or as a society. That claim
seems determinist and, in any event, is quite threatening to our own sense of
ourselves and our systems. Understandably, those making such a claim-that
unseen forces play a major role in our behavior-are eagerly dismissed as,
among other things, straw-men determinists. But to acknowledge situation is
not to surrender to it, but rather it is to take a necessary step in gaining some
control over it. The situation can be altered-indeed, is being altered constantly.
It reflects and reinforces those entities or groups with the power to influence it.
The elephant is not just sitting in the comer; it moves and can be made to move.
C. DENYING WHAT WE CANNOT ADMIT
Friedman, at one point, did answer the question. Acknowledging the elephant
in one breath and then denying it in the next, he said: "In a sense we are
determinists. In a sense we are and in another sense we can't let ourselves
be."s I 5 Although it is true that situation matters hugely, "we can't let ourselves
be" anything but dispositionists. s l 6
And s o the game i s up. The theories that w e develop for understanding and
predicting and influencing human conduct - including (or, perhaps particularly),
the policy theories developed by the most sophisticated and influential analysts,
are not meant to be based on what we know to be true. It is about maintaining a

8 13. MILLER, supra note 797, at 86-87. Note that economists generally have no place for the "will"
in their models; instead, their models tend to be deteriminist in the sense that preferences are treated as
fixed and exogenous, and behavior is treated as responsive to those preferences.
8 14. See supra note 806. Ironically, Milton and Rose Friedman's memoirs are entitled, Two Lucky
People, an irony that did not escape Milton.
8 1 5 . MILLER, supra note 797, at 86-87.
8 1 6. This reaction is not unlike the sort of reaction that many of us undergo when experiencing
cognitive dissonance. See supra notes 461-7 1 and accompanying text (describing how we seek to
trivialize the dissonance or to highlight other affirming features of ourselves or our beliefs).
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theory that is plausible, simple, and affinning. Denying the effect of exterior
and interior situation is itself a manifestation of that very situation. Friedman, it
seems, can't handle the truth. But, then, who can? Situationism is, for all the
reasons we' ve provided (and then some), a frightening and potentially paralyz
ing vantage point.
There is a long tradition of denying situationism among economists. A half
century ago, for instance, John Kenneth Galbraith lamented the dispositionism
of his fellow economists: "At least in social disciplines, obsolescence and
irrelevance are a small price to pay for the privileges of remaining comfortably,
,,
even if archaically, with the familiar, the settled and the safe. 8 1 7 But the fear is
by no means exclusive to economists.
Situationism is widely feared. Even social psychologists who are most famil
iar with the power of situation lose sleep over what their evidence seems to
suggest. Susan Fiske, one of the most prominent social psychologists of her
generation, describes her fear this way:
An absence of intent ultimately implies an absence of responsibility for the
effects of categorization . . . . It has led me to have the following nightmare:
After testifying for the plaintiff in a case of egregious and demonstrable
discrimination, a cognitive social psychologist faces the cross-examining
attorney. The hostile attorney, who looms taller than Goliath, says "Tell us,
Professor, do people intend to discriminate?" The cognitive social psycholo
gist hedges about not having any hard data with regard to discrimination,
being an expert mainly in stereotyping. When pressed, the psychologist
admits that stereotypic cognitions are presumed to underlie discriminatory
behavior. Pressed still further, the psychologist reluctantly mumbles that,
indeed, a common interpretation of the cognitive approach is that people do
not stereotype intentionally, whereupon the cross-examining attorney says in a
,,8 1 8
tone of triumph, "No further questions, Your Honor.

Her concern, just like Friedman's and our own, i s what to do with the
individuals who seem to act unjustly-those times when we see a victim and an
injurer and we want the injurer to pay and the victim to be compensated. Are we
left with no option but to chalk it up to situation and send the parties on their
way? That seems to be the only alternative that the dispositionist can imagine.
Fiske, as she would go on to explain, got back to dispositionism by claiming
that individuals can choose to wield some influence over their automatically
activated stereotypes. But as others have pointed out since, although her rescu
ing argument was reassuring, the best evidence suggests that it is overly

8 1 7. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AGE OF UNCERTAINTY 2 ( 1 977).
8 1 8. Susan T. Fiske, Examining the Role of Intent: Toward Understanding Its Role in Stereotyping
and Prejudice, in UNINTENDED THOUGHT 253, 254 (James S. Uleman & John A. Batgh eds., 1 989)
(citation omitted).
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optimistic. S I 9
SO, we are stuck with our nightmare. We hold onto our dispositionist views
tenaciously, even well beyond the point where our claims about the truth of the
matter have been abandoned. We are dispositionists, not because humans are
dispositional, but because there is too much that has already been built upon the
dispositionist foundation to begin building elsewhere, and because disposition
ism helps us to sleep.
As Nobel Laureate Isaac Bashevis Singer elegantly expressed the dilemma:
"Of course I believe in free will. I have no choice."s2o And so it is that the
illusion of our freedom, our dispositionism, our wills, are forced upon us by
fears and forces in our situation that we do not see, and would prefer not to. We
have no choice but to pretend that we have a choice.
VII. CONCLUSION
"None of us enjoys the thought that what we do depends on processes we
do not know; we prefer to attribute our choices to volition, will, or self
control. . . . Perhaps it would be more honest to say, 'My decision was
determined by . . . forces I do not understand. ' "
- Marvin Minskys2 1

Taken together, the social psychological findings we have reviewed here
should shake our self-conception at its foundation. What has been revealed in
the studies we reviewed cannot be considered marginal or anomalous. Situation,
it seems, moves us far more than we suspect in our slumbering, blissful
dispositionism. That conclusion is hard to take, hard even to get our mind
around, because of this very dispositionism, which sees us as responsible for
our situations and not the other way around.
Our "situational character" is clearly incomplete as a model, a description, or
a vision of humanity.s22 But our aim has not been to provide a comprehensive
picture. It has been to demonstrate that the model of human agency we so often

8 1 9. See Bargh & Chartrand, supra note 598; see also supra text accompanying notes 595-6 1 9
(discussing automaticity).
820. See Norman Green, The Salon Interview-Isaac Bashevis Singer, SALON.COM, Apr. 28, 1 998, at
http://dir.salon.com/books/intiI998/04/cov_si_28int.html.
82 1 . MARVIN MINSKY, THE SOCIETY OF MIND 306 ( 1 985).
822. There are no doubt many influences to which we are susceptible that are not visible through the
lens that we have offered, either because of their complexity, or because they are as yet undiscovered by
the social science on which we draw. And, although we have certainly privileged social psychology and
related fields in this Article, our focus reflects our own situational and cognitive limitations and not a
belief that other social sciences or ways of understanding ourselves don't have much to offer. To the
contrary, we believe that there is a great deal to learn about what moves us from anthropology,
sociology, history, other subfields of psychology, various critical theories, and market practices (such as
marketing and public relations). If that is correct, then it should only heighten concern about the flaws
of dispositionism, rather than weigh against adopting a situationist approach.
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work with-as laypeople, as legal scholars, and as policymakers-is wrong.
And not just wrong, but clearly and dangerously wrong, in that it drastically
understates both internal and external situational influence over our perceived
cognitions, attitudes, will, and behavior.
Our readers may be asking themselves, or itching to ask us, just exactly
where all this leaves us. How can the situational character be put to work, as the
rational actor, for example, has been? In future writing, we will have much
more to say, and others will too, 823 about the implications of situationism for
policymaking and legal theory. In this Article and its companion, our ambition
is to make the case for realism and to reveal many of the sources of the unreal
perceptions and theories that now dominate.
The situational character is meant to retire the rational actor and its disposition
ist kin, not to fill its shoes and perform in legal theory as we have come to
expect our theories to perform. We have shed light on why, given that we are
situational characters, dispositionist worldviews have emerged and why many
people react as they do to challenges to those worldviews. Such resistance, in
itself, does not rebut the claims we have made; it simply helps prove them.
Social science is not supposed to be answer-driven, and our system of justice is
not supposed to be appearance-driven, stopping only at convenient and comfort
able conclusions.
When proponents of dispositionism embrace situational blindness in the
name of freedom and responsibility, the untruth on which our systems are built
is laid bare. To relieve the resultant dissonance, requires that we relinquish

823. In fact, some scholars are more situational than others. Outside of law and economics, some
scholars have been quite sensitive to one or more element of situation. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett,
Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829 ( 1 990) (synthesizing fundamental elements of feminist
legal scholarship, including the concept of "positionality," which parallels in significant ways our
notion of "situationism"); GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMuNmEs WITHOUT B UILDING
WALLS (2000) (analyzing the ways in which government policies and the built environment, rather than
individual personal choice, give shape to lived experience within different communities); LANI GUINIER
ET AL., BECOMING GENTLEMEN: LAW SCHOOL AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE ( 1 997) (arguing that traditional
legal pedagogy is often alienating to women, forcing women to abandon values and perspectives
brought with them to law school in order to conform to the law school environment); Duncan Kennedy,
Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in THE POLITICS OF THE LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRmQuE 40
(David Kairys ed., 1 982) (exploring the ways in which the structure of legal education channels
students career choices in definite ways, but which nevertheless provide a plausible account of student
complicity in the process); TODD D. RAKOFF, A TIME FOR EVERY PuRPOSE: LAW AND THE BALANCE OF LIFE
(2002) (arguing, among other things, that the structure of our days and nights is changing under the
influence of unseen but powerful influences over the management of time); ELIZABETH WARREN &
AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE Two-INCOME TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-CLASS MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING
BROKE (2003) (arguing that, contrary to widespread belief, two-income families typically spend nearly

all of their income on situational necessities rather than on choice-driven luxuries, leaving most
families on the brink of bankruptcy should they encounter unforeseen expenses such as illness or
unemployment). And some social psychologists have begun to write, as we have, explicitly about the
distortions of dispositionism and the power of situation. Our hope is that by identifying some of the
sources of our disposition ism, and detailing the extent to which we are situational characters, we have
buttressed that work by connecting it to a firm social-scientific, general foundation and by revealing the
unreal foundations of now-dominant theories.
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either the belief that our system is legitimate-meritocratic, fair, democratic,
just, freedom-enhancing, and so on-or the immense edifice erected upon that
dispositionist bulwark.
We are dispositionists trapped in situational characters. We can't escape our
condition through denial-be it deliberate disregard of what we know about the
human animal or subconscious redoubling of our faith in the illusion of disposi
tionism. Any solution is to be located mostly, like the problem itself, in the
situation.
There is a tragic irony in our predicament. By blinding ourselves to the very
forces that impinge upon our freedom, we are surrendering to them. To be
serious about liberty requires that we not unwittingly tum over the situational
strings to whoever has the means and ends to manipulate them. Indeed, our
greatest dispositional act may be to acknowledge that we are situational charac
ters and to choose to understand and gain some voice and control over the
situation that largely controls us. In that very important sense, we do have a
choice.

